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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the confusion of reality and unreality in 
contemporary media discourses, and focuses specifically upon the medium of 
cinema. The art of our time, cinema reflects the postmodern fusion between 
machine and culture. As such, a crucial concern of this work, which addresses 
the impact of digital and visual technological developments in western 
societies and examines how such advances have come to supersede the 
historical and cultural imperatives, is precisely this resultant 
confusion/fragmentation. The thesis analyzes how audiences interpret the 
current cinematic evolution, based on computer generated imagery, and how 
their subjectivity influences and impacts upon knowledge, ideology, culture 
and society as a whole.  
The creation of (un)realities in fictional spaces is most apparent in 
such concurrent places as the Internet, videogames and Virtual Reality, 
spaces which are certainly of interest to this thesis. However, it is also 
crucial to note that recent years have seen a proliferation of films based on 
the confusion between reality and unreality; and, further, that these have 
enforced a fear of being deceived by technology. Indeed, such post-classical 
films as Total Recall (Verhoeven, 1990), The Lawnmower Man (Leonard, 
1992), The Matrix (Wachowski and Wachowski, 1999) and eXistenZ 
(Cronenberg, 1999) materialize this fear cinematographically; a fear which is 
arguably then assimilated by the spectators because this fear is projected 
onto their lives. In this respect, it is essential to be aware of the creation of 
new spaces, identify related boundaries and understand our own creations in 
order to have control over our destiny. Concepts such as (un)reality, a hybrid 
of reality and fiction, are essential to refer to the inventions, contexts and 
information that appears in a world where atoms and a binary of 0s and 1s 
constitute a dual code to which our lives conform. 
The production of an original film, Luna (Diaz Gandasegui, 2007), 
works in synergy with the written text to illuminate the complexities of 
(un)reality and the vital influence of technology on its confusion.  
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Introduction 
 
The confusion between reality and unreality is not a new phenomenon 
exclusive to the moment in which we live, but it has certainly acquired of 
late emergent and distinctive characteristics that shape it in a particular 
manner. The influence of technology in this process is undeniable. Thus, the 
introduction of new visual technologies that profoundly affect our 
observations of reality, communication, expression, knowledge and 
entertainment in a society governed by the principles and structures created 
during the Enlightenment, has produced a rupture between what we know 
and what we think we know. This research will not specifically refer to a 
crisis in western knowledge, but, rather, to a potential crisis of the social 
structures that conform to what we understand today as Western Society.  
There are as many interpretations of the confusion between reality and 
unreality as stages in different cultures. Relevant philosophical authors in the 
history of western culture such as Plato, René Descartes, David Hume and 
George Berkeley, writers such as Jorge Luis Borges and cultural 
psychoanalysts such as Jacques Lacan have tried to illustrate, in a diversity of 
forms, the relationship between reality and unreality. Today a vast canon of 
authors such as Jean Baudrillard, Slavoj Žižek, Frederic Jameson, Manuel 
Castells, Scott Lash and Paul Virillio strive to analyze, understand and explain 
the world around us, a world of 0s and 1s that is immersed in, and connected 
to, a material reality. Virtuality and reality have fused and, in the process, 
we have been dragged into an unknown region, a zone that has received 
different names including Cyberspace and Hyperreality and that I denominate 
(un)reality. It is this wholly intriguing region that is explored in this thesis.  
It is undeniable that technology has assumed a fundamental relevance 
in the perception of reality. The digitalization of the image, the virtualization 
of the media, and the relevance attributed in our lives to videogames and the 
Internet have changed the way that we observe and, most significantly, 
participate in the world. The technologically mediated perception and 
experience of today is heading towards a virtual and/or interactive 
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relationship with the world, whereby we can select, transform, copy or erase 
that which we wish, or do not wish, to see or become part of. Cinema, which 
is simultaneously affected by and a witness to this process, is a perfect 
medium to observe the effects and ‘reflects’ of technology and its 
consequences. The use of the ‘mirror’ or the ‘dream’ as a metaphor to 
explain the properties and capabilities of cinema is recurrent in this research. 
Indeed, through the existing technology, films can be seen to filter and 
condense the social imagination and unconsciousness; and, like a 
(occasionally distorted) mirror or a dream, to reproduce our present and 
future fears, hopes and confusion. 
 Cinema not only reproduces the disorientation of reality and unreality 
with its exhibition, but it also foregrounds and fetishizes this phenomenon via 
a trend of films that have appeared in recent years which aim precisely to 
confuse the audience about the reality of their perception. The genre of 
Science Fiction (henceforth denoted by the abbreviation ‘SF’) is predominant 
in this trend as it hypothetically anticipates what might one day be history. 
And this tendency is illustrated throughout this research by way of films such 
as The Matrix, Total Recall, The Lawnmower Man, eXistenZ, Videodrome 
(Cronenberg, 1983), 12 Monkeys (Gilliam, 1995), Abre los Ojos (Amenábar, 
1997), Dark City (Proyas, 1998), and The Thirteenth Floor (Rusnak, 1999). 
The films studied here are not exclusively SF films, but they nevertheless 
attend to pertinent characteristics of the confusion between reality and 
unreality. So films including Memento (Nolan, 2000) and Waking Life 
(Linklater, 2001) explore metaphysical or psychological perspectives of this 
phenomenon by way of a visually confusing and technically innovative 
cinema. Often these films are characterized by a dark, pessimistic aesthetic 
that draws upon the use of special effects and other visual innovations with 
which the image is created, manipulated, transformed or erased. The ‘bullet 
time’ made famous in The Matrix, for example, has today become common in 
films such as Wanted (Bekmambetov, 2008), which also makes use of the 
zooms (or reverse zooms) which are able to transport us from a general 
perspective to microscopic detail, and to show us the world from 
unconventional perspectives and angles. What we find in these films is the 
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use of artificial positions and movements of the camera to paradoxically 
simulate reality. It is a cinema that appeals to the fascination of the 
spectator by adopting visual spectacle to commandeer their attention. It is a 
cinema that offers special effects that are pleasurable in their own right, 
although they are often ‘artificial’ means to aid narration. Simultaneously, 
these films transmit ideas about the confusion between reality and unreality 
and/or distort the spectator’s image of what he is watching. The protagonists 
of these films such as Neo (Keanu Reeves) in The Matrix, Quaid (Arnold 
Schwarzenegger) in Total Recall and Allegra Geller (Jennifer Jason Leigh) in 
eXistenZ are frequently lost between a reality and an unreality that are 
interwoven, and this sensation is arguably transferred to the spectator who 
abandons a passive attitude in front of the screen to become an active and 
willing participant in such disorientation. Contemporary cinema is therefore a 
perfect tool and medium through which to investigate the major concern of 
this research. 
My hypothesis is that we are witnessing an emerging situation where 
the confusion of reality and unreality is becoming more apparent and has 
acquired new forms based on the culture of the copy and the simulation. This 
is a culture that is spread through the visual technological media that 
produces/facilitates the creation of (un)realities. This has relevant individual 
and social influences that must be analyzed and understood in order to 
prevent negative repercussions such as identity crisis or the de-socialization 
of our society. Within this context, the recent spate of a range of films based 
on the confusion of reality and unreality seems a particularly useful focal 
point for examination of the disorientation we are experiencing nowadays.  
The following research into pertinent visual and written texts 
concerned with the confusion between reality and unreality should be 
considered alongside the production of an original film, Luna, that 
simultaneously researches the characteristics of this technologically 
motivated confusion and its consequences. The theoretico-practical nature of 
this thesis suggests an intentional and consistent election for the creation of 
a philosophical and sociological discourse, cinematographically 
contextualized. Thus, the written text is intended to be a personal position in 
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the technologically produced confusion between reality and unreality, and a 
critical application of relevant thinkers, mostly, and necessarily 
contemporary, such as Baudrillard, Jameson, Žižek, Lash, Jean-Luc Godard, 
the Wachowski brothers, Paul Verhoeven and David Cronenberg who, in 
books, journals, on web sites or through cinema, have considered the 
philosophical, sociological, technological and visual aspects relevant to this 
investigation. It is important to note that the recurrent use of recent authors 
and electronic sources is indicative of a peculiar characteristic: this 
phenomenon is emerging now and thus it is appropriate that its extensive 
social, psychological, economical and political relevance receives in-depth 
investigation with not just established, canonical discourses, but also with 
the most up-to-date critical and analytical tools.  
The selection of these authors and theories, such as those that refer to 
Hyperreality, Simulation, Cyberspace, the prospects of society in a 
technological mediated world, visual media, the development of Virtual 
Reality and the present and future of cinema, have helped to guide and 
establish a discourse to create critical perspectives and conclusions about the 
current confusion of reality and unreality, its sources, anatomy and potential. 
This thesis intends to be analytical but also has the characteristic of being a 
provocation; a provocation as it proposes to provoke a reaction to the 
phenomenon of the confusion of reality and unreality through a multi-angular 
analysis. With this in mind, the film that accompanies these words, Luna, 
becomes not only a practical illustration of the confusion of reality and 
unreality but a subjective examination of the use and influence of 
technological development in such disorientation. Theory and practice, text 
and film, are not only compatible; they produce a homogeneous and unique 
body of work. The objective is to create an ‘interactive’ text; a work which is 
concatenated through all its extension.  
In addition to confusion, paradoxes are a key element in this research, 
both in theory and practice. In this way Luna is outlined within the paradox 
and conflict of choosing to be confused. The film is intentionally narrated 
from the subjective point of view of someone who is (un)consciously 
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confused, thus supplementing the ‘objectivity’ of the text with a personal 
and abstract perspective. 
Crucially, the intention of this study is not to distinguish reality and 
unreality, to separate them, or indeed to ultimately join them as a desperate 
measure, but to understand the technologically mediated characteristic of 
the confusion between them. It is not possible or, indeed, useful to define 
these concepts as ‘static’, as this would only serve to both limit and 
undermine the research. Instead, it is argued that we need to understand 
reality and unreality as dynamic, fluid, and shifting concepts. Therefore, this 
research does not intend to uncover what is real or what reality is, but may 
be understood as a useful guide to approach and dissect the social and 
psychological circumstances that we are living in today, and to consider these 
concepts in and through cinema. In other words, the goal is an understanding 
of these ‘new’ notions of reality and unreality, rather than obtaining an 
accurate definition of them.  
The first chapter provides a brief background to the confusion between 
reality and unreality, and proceeds to contextualize this confusion in visual 
technological terms. The second chapter analyzes the crucial role of new 
technologies such as media, digital imagery, videogames, Virtual Reality and 
particularly visual and cinematographic techniques in today’s society. 
Specifically, it examines the protagonist’s/user’s participation in two 
interconnected elements: cinema and the confusion of reality and unreality. 
The third chapter examines the connections and relationship of cinema and 
(un)reality in both directions, that is how cinema intercedes in the confusion 
between reality and unreality and how this disorientation affects cinema’s 
themes and forms. Finally, the fourth chapter, through the analysis of Luna, 
connects film practice with the theoretical discourse, showing the links, the 
invisible bridge that connects images with words. This thesis as a whole will 
thus demonstrate new perspectives, an original approach to the 
understanding and analysis of the confusion between reality and unreality 
provoked by technology. 
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Chapter I 
(Con)fusing (un)reality 
 
The difficulty in distinguishing between ‘reality’ and ‘unreality’ has 
been a significant concern in western philosophical thought throughout its 
history. Nevertheless, in recent years the phenomenon has acquired peculiar 
characteristics. In short, the rapid development of technology has 
complicated our understanding of our own creations and the consequences 
that they invoke. Current technology has provided us with new visual, digital 
and virtual sources for the creation and perception of realities in fictitious 
spaces; yet our culture seems unprepared to assume, with its cultural 
baggage, these transformations concerning all social and psychological 
scopes. It is in this gap between our existing technology and our 
understanding and knowledge of this technology that the current confusion 
between ‘reality’ and ‘unreality’ resides. It is important, then, to be 
conscious that a new reality is being produced. In order to understand this 
distinctive new space between what we know as ‘reality’ and ‘unreality’, the 
solution may be to find how to live with and within the coexistence of both. 
The discrepancy between these complex entities of ‘reality’ and ‘unreality’ 
will be the territory explored in this short introductory chapter. 
 
1.1.  (Un)reality in context  
 
According to the Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy, ‘reality’ relates 
to ‘the states of things as they actually are, rather than they are imagined to 
be’ (Audi, 1999: 677). In this sense, what has true and effective existence is 
what we perceive through the senses. However, from a philosophical point of 
view, and following Descartes, the founding father of modern observational 
science, the senses are deceptive and serve to distort reality. Descartes 
(1977: 19) suggests that we cannot trust in our own senses when perceiving 
reality. We rely on our five senses to transmit information to the brain and 
consequently we create a construction in our mind that is classified as real. 
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However, what we perceive as real is not necessarily what is ‘there’; it is just 
an approximate interpretation by our brain of the information available.1 Our 
senses are too coarse to be able to capture all the manifestations of reality; 
rather they filter reality. As Christian Doelker writes, our ‘perception is 
necessarily selective, limits reality and selects what is significant for us’ 
(Doelker, 1982: 27).  
The selection of reality becomes doubly complex when we perceive 
reality through the images and information provided by the media. Indeed, it 
is through the media that reality becomes more diffused and the concept of 
what is real varies inexorably: the reality we perceive will not only be 
exogenously configured by the media we are observing, but it will also be 
consciously selected by that company or institution. Thus, media becomes the 
central antagonist of a technologically mediated reality. As Neil Postman 
observes: 
 
We do not see nature or intelligence or human motivation or 
ideology as ‘it’ is, but as our languages are. And our 
languages are our media.  Our media are our metaphors. Our 
metaphors create the content of our culture (Postman, 1985: 
15). 
 
It is clear that the influence of technology is such that the reality in 
which we are living today, ‘our reality’, is no longer the same reality that was 
experienced by our ancestors. Centuries ago reality was based on everything 
that was experienced through our senses and transmitted by those who 
surrounded us. Nowadays, however, the circumstances of mass media and 
technological communication mean that something that is happening in 
another part of the world seems as close as if it is happening in our own 
town. Everything can be reduced to a question of trust, as has been indicated 
by Antony Giddens (1990: 29-36); and it is crucial that this trust has varied 
substantially in recent decades. In this respect, Paul Virilio dates the critical 
                                               
1  In this sense, Morpheus (Laurence Fishburne) defines reality in The Matrix saying: ‘what is real? how 
do you define real? If you’re talking about what you can feel, what you can smell, what you can taste and 
see, then real is simply electrical signals interpreted by your brain’. This definition has a strong 
connection with the theory of ‘Brain in a Vat’, according to which if the brain is suspended in a vat only 
receiving electronic impulses from a computer, there will be no possibility of differentiating the virtual 
experiences from real events (Putnam, 1982: 1-21). 
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moment at which we could no longer believe our eyes and when faith in 
perception became slave to faith in the technical sightline, citing the images 
that were created and distributed in the First World War as a discernable 
turning point (Virilio, 1989: 16-17).   
Today, and despite the fact that society is arguably becoming 
increasingly media literate, we give credibility to events that are narrated by 
mass media, and we ignore, in most cases, who is behind the information that 
we are receiving and the political or economical intentions of showing (or not 
showing) certain things. In this way, we can build an opinion about certain 
facts based on information that is shown partially, that is somehow 
transformed or translated, or is simply an invention. The mass media are thus 
a fundamental part in today’s socialization process: the symbolic bases of our 
lives, they tend to work on our conscience, behaviour, attitudes and opinions 
in a similar way that the experience of reality influences dreams. What 
currently exists is a feedback system between distorting mirrors, as Manuel 
Castells states with particular reference to the medium of cinema: 
 
Mass media are the expression of our culture and our culture 
penetrates basically by the materials provided by mass 
media. Consequently, when cinema, which is the most 
suitable support for the elaboration of dreams, is full of 
science fiction, it corroborates that we are living a stage in 
which fantasy and reality are confused, mixed in an 
indifferent way (Castells, 1999: 369).  
 
Because we are living in a time in which technology is able to simulate what 
our imagination creates, it is not necessary simply to rely on our imagination, 
or to differentiate for ourselves what is real and what is not, as technology 
can do this for us. Specifically, videogames and the development of Virtual 
Reality embody this ability with their continuous technological innovations 
and their (potential) offer of a total interactive immersion within which we 
can live a different or better life. Today we can identify a parallel world of 
bits, not necessarily opposed to the world of flesh, but complementary and 
sometimes substitutive.  
If the term ‘reality’ implies certain difficulties in its application due to 
the ambiguity of its definition and the disparity of interpretations that it 
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attracts, then ‘unreality’ seems to be a more extreme case, as is 
demonstrated by the multitude of labels that it receives: virtuality, fiction, 
dreams, invention or simply ‘not real’. ‘Unreality’ is therefore everything 
that is not real, a concept without boundaries defined in opposition to 
something abstract. It is surely not possible to mention one of these terms 
without involving its inverse and thus invoking the weak line that separates 
the two. Crucially for this thesis, technology has blurred this indistinct line 
further and consequently transformed and fused the nature of both concepts, 
creating spaces such as Virtual Reality or Cyberspace in which both notions 
can coexist. Precisely the confusion of reality and unreality is therefore an 
intrinsic element of the dependent relationship of these ambiguous, fluid 
concepts. The confusion between both can certainly be explained as an 
involuntary disorientation about the nature of our perception and existence 
or the consequence of a specific, usually traumatic, event; but it can also 
mean a voluntary escape (consciously or unconsciously), in which we play 
with the ambiguity between reality and unreality to intervene in the 
knowledge of certain facts. Today, technology facilitates and produces both 
states. Thus, although the perception of reality and the confusion with 
unreality are modulated by (further fluid) cultural, educational, social, 
ideological, political and economic factors, the confusion of reality and 
unreality takes place frequently and tangibly in our daily lives: the 
introduction of virtuality and digital media in our society through 
videogames, films and televisual products has been decisive in this 
phenomenon, playing a fundamental role in the creation of alternative 
(un)realities and exacerbating the confusion of reality and unreality.  
The wide use of the Internet, providing us with an incredible amount of 
information, means that, in many situations, what we should and should not 
believe is extremely disconcerting to us. Such technology has not only 
changed and hidden the sources of information; it has also multiplied them 
and facilitated the expression and communication of individuals across the 
globe. As a result, personal identity has been exposed to old and new crises. 
The election of a different identity through means such as the Internet, 
videogames or Virtual Reality can produce an enormous and uncontrollable 
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confusion that extends to the rest of our existence, altering our personalities. 
In this respect, Stephen Frosh observes that:  
 
The reality of modernity is one of fragmentation and the 
dissolution of the self, then belief in the integrity of the 
personal self is ideological, imaginary, fantastic. Whatever 
illusions we may choose to employ to make ourselves feel 
better remain illusory, deceptive and false (Frosh, 1991: 57-
58).  
 
Such deception is something that we can see in Total Recall, a film set in the 
future, in which technology facilitates the implantation of memories, a 
satisfactory ‘virtual past experience’, in the brain of the consumer. However, 
in Quaid, the implantation of memories produces, instead of satisfaction and 
entertainment, confusion and loss of identity. Quaid chooses to be someone 
different, to be who he wants to be, but by doing this he faces an identity 
crisis: he confronts himself with his ideal self and the result is a crisis and a 
total disorientation about who he is and the reality in which he is immersed. 
The character of Quaid is a perfect example of how the most powerful tool to 
fight against the deconstruction/destruction of the self is to maintain a 
‘historical’ consciousness, an anchor, a constant knowledge of who we think 
we are in spite of who we are ‘playing’ at being. The alternative is 
schizophrenia, as Jameson indicates: in present society we live our lives 
submerged in multiple personalities that sometimes can get closer to a 
schizophrenic feeling (Jameson, 1996: 33-34). These multiple personalities 
coincide at a given time, functioning, in many cases, in opposition to each 
other. Our identities are thus constantly being challenged by continuous 
fragmentation, and exposure to fiction and technology, primarily virtuality, is 
actively contributing to this phenomenon. 
New technologies such as the virtual world of Second Life (2003), 
which is a reproduction of our world in an immaterial universe, enable us to 
adopt identities far from what we really are: class, ethnicity and gender are 
no longer a problem in social relationships conducted in Cyberspace. Although 
it is in the hands of consumers to manipulate social categories in such 
fictitious spaces, a potential consequence of these spaces can be a deep 
confusion about who anyone really is; in other words, a disorientation of our 
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reality itself. Technology has created the concept of ‘no-space’ (Castells, 
1999), the non visible space where institutions, social status and relationships 
are not observed under social criteria. Nowadays, the act of meeting 
somebody, even at an intimate level, does not necessarily imply a ‘face to 
face’ relationship. The new space that the Internet has opened through chat 
rooms, e-mails, on-line videogames, instant conversations and even on-line 
dating has caused our faith to ‘become blind’. It is ‘blindly’ how many people 
manage to build effective or professional relationships, reading characters on 
a screen or observing images sent to them. In such situations, confidence in 
the other person becomes a matter of pure faith. These ‘technological 
relationships’ are almost exclusive to the current time. Nowadays, we know 
and deal with more people remotely than we actually interact with 
personaly. The result, when our knowledge about something or someone is 
entirely based on faith, is the evocation of doubt; doubt about the 
information we have and about the reality of certain social relationships. 
Faith and doubt are confronted in virtual relationships and consequently we 
have been increasingly obliged to pause and reconsider the reality of certain 
experiences (Loader, 1997: 27).  
In this sense, Cronenberg’s eXistenZ, an SF film based on a virtual 
game which is connected to the nervous system and that has the ability to 
reproduce reality with total fidelity, is an intriguing case study. With this 
film, he hyperbolizes the present incapacity to separate reality and fiction in 
a schizophrenic labyrinth of the mind set up by technology and which reveals 
the potential threats of such confusion. eXistenZ fictionalizes a deep 
confusion between reality and virtuality: within the overarching game the 
characters play, they play further successive games that remind us of the old 
sensation of dreaming that we are dreaming, of the immersion of unrealities 
inside unrealities. Thus eXistenZ illustrates technology’s active role in the 
provocation of our disorientation. Indeed, how do we know then when we are 
awake? As occurs in Luna, when we really wake up, there are brief moments 
when we cannot differentiate dreams from reality: we rub our eyes, we touch 
the walls, we look at the clock, but nothing provides a definitive answer to 
our confusion. If we were dreaming in our dreams, how could we know for 
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sure that this is the definitive awakening? As Descartes considers, given that 
when we are dreaming we think that we are living something real, is it 
possible to find any criteria to distinguish the reality from dreams? Descartes 
uses the figure of a ‘malicious demon’ to represent the manipulation that can 
be suggested in the confusion of reality and unreality, and the idea of being 
manipulated whilst we are in our dreams. Indeed, in The Matrix, Morpheus 
questions Neo in the same way when he is introduced to the virtual world of 
The Matrix and explains the unreality of his life:  
 
Have you ever had a dream, Neo, that you were so sure was 
real? What if you were unable to wake from that dream? How 
would you know the difference between the dream world 
and the real world? 
 
Today, the same question can be applied to visual virtual technology: how 
can we differentiate the virtual world from reality? What is perhaps useful is 
the reflexive, Cartesian and convincing thought that we create in order to 
demonstrate to ourselves that we are indeed awake, in the ‘real world’. After 
this, our life proceeds as normal. But what would happen if we were still 
dreaming? Total Recall and eXistenZ end with the same open question, 
related to virtuality in their case, when the characters, unsure of the level of 
(un)reality they are inhabiting, ask if they have abandoned the artificial 
world of bits.2  
 
1.2. Jean Baudrillard: Simulacrums and Hyperreality. 
 
A propos the cinema and image in general (media images, 
technological images), I would like to conjure up the 
perversity of the relation between the image and its 
referent, the supposed real; the virtual and irreversible 
confusion of the sphere of images and the sphere of reality 
whose nature we are less and less able to grasp (Baudrillard, 
1987b: 13). 
 
                                               
2 In Total Recall Quaid queries: ‘I just had a terrible thought… what if this is all a dream?’ Similarly one 
of the protagonists in eXistenZ asks of the rest of the players: ‘Hey, tell me the truth… are we still in the 
game?’. 
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The work of Baudrillard is particularly useful in identifying and analyzing the 
tangible confusion of reality and unreality examined in this thesis. 
Baudrillard’s work conveys a particular interest in the technological causes 
and consequences of this confusion, and so has important repercussions 
today. His provocative ideas are expressed through examples, myths and 
illustrations taken from popular and historical culture, and their resonance 
can clearly be seen in films such as The Matrix which fictionalize and make 
palatable his ideas of the Simulacrum, Hyperreality and the transformation of 
the relationship between the object and the referent. Simulacrum is, 
according to Baudrillard, something that replaces reality with its 
representation: 
 
Simulation is no longer that of a territory, a referential 
being, or a substance. It is the generation by models of the 
real without origin or reality: a hyperreal.(…) It is no longer a 
question of imitation, nor duplication, nor even parody. It is 
a question of substituting the reality for the signs of the real 
(Baudrillard, 2001a: 166). 
 
Defining Simulacrum, Baudrillard seems to provide the synopsis of The Matrix. 
Indeed, the release of The Matrix seems to constitute a crucial moment in 
the social understanding about the (un)reality that surrounds us and the 
(defensive) mechanism of doubt that we should use. Just as Morpheus asks 
Neo in The Matrix if he wants to know reality or live in the Simulacrum, 
offering him a blue or a red pill,3 our society is facing the dilemma of 
discovering what the representations hide or (un)consciously immersing 
ourselves in Simulacrum, ignoring the consequences.  
Baudrillard understands the reality of today as being produced from 
miniaturized units, matrices, memory banks and command models. In this 
respect, he sees in Disneyland the perfect illustration of a Simulacrum, the 
fabrication from the cultural industry of the absolute fake:  
 
                                               
3  Morpheus: ‘This is your last chance. After this, there is no turning back. You take the blue pill - the 
story ends, you wake up in your bed and believe whatever you want to believe. You take the red pill - 
you stay in Wonderland and I show you how deep the rabbit-hole goes’. In other words, the ‘red pill 
awakens the individual to reality and the blue pill puts it back into the sleep of self-centred illusion’ 
(Irwin, 2002: 143). 
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Disneyland is presented as imaginary in order to make us 
believe that the rest is real, when in fact all of Los Angeles 
and the America surrounding it are no longer real, but of the 
orders of the hyperreal and of simulation. It is no longer a 
question of false representation of reality (ideology), but of 
concealing the fact that the real is no longer real and the 
means of saving the reality principle (Baudrillard, 1983: 25). 
 
Therefore, Baudrillard argues, most of the world is now an artificial hyperreal 
construction, an ‘irradiating synthesis of combinatory models in a hyperspace 
without atmosphere’ (Baudrillard, 1983: 23). Consequently, what we 
understand as reality only exists in remote and degraded pockets. 
In this light, SF writer Philip K. Dick, with ‘paranoid visions’ about the 
potential danger of technology in the future, offers up pessimistic 
technological labyrinths in which we cannot exit the simulation of reality. 
Total Recall4 is based upon this fear of the incapacity to discern reality when 
technological reproductions (implanted memories) become as real as the 
reality we have known. The use and resultant danger of virtual and digital 
technology to manipulate our life, choices and identities is also shared by 
Žižek, who suggests that it is the awareness of living in an insulated artificial 
universe that generates the notion that some ominous agent is constantly 
threatening us with ‘total destruction’ (Žižek, 1999: 5).  
Baudrillard also observes further (dangerous) implications for the 
individual in the Simulacrum of reality as it implies a strategy of 
disappearance. The ‘desert of the real’ is created from the indifferentiation 
of the map and the territory, the virtuality and the ‘real reality’ (Baudrillard, 
1983: 1-5). Baudrillard draws upon the fable of Borges’ ‘The Rigour of the 
Science’ (1960: 103) to illustrate what represents, for him, the world of 
simulation, affirming that we now live within the map, not in the territory. 
We live in a world of reproductions of The Matrix, not in ‘the desert of the 
real’ that conforms to reality. One of the dangers produced by the fascination 
for the representations, for the creations of simulations that replace reality, 
is what Baudrillard names ‘narcissistic refraction’ (Baudrillard, 1988b: 34). 
Narcissus failed to recognize his own reflection in the water as he could not 
                                               
4 Based on Dick’s short story ‘We Can Remember It for You Wholesale’ (1966). 
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fathom any difference between himself and the surroundings. Indeed, we are 
currently in a similar situation where we are not able to differentiate 
between reality and its representations. The risk of destruction implied in the 
Narcissus myth, when he fell in love with his reflection, is an apt 
metaphorical threat regarding the time of the Simulacrum in which we live.  
Indeed, today we are achieving a moment in the reproduction of 
reality in which a map does not represent abstraction, the double, the mirror 
or the concept; today ‘the mirror has given way to a screen and a network’ 
(Baudrillard, 1988b: 12). Now, Baudrillard is skeptical and distrusts the 
benevolent effect of the reproduction of reality where ‘there are no longer 
exact images of the world, no more mirrors - only trick mirrors’ (Baudrillard, 
1987b: 25). In this sense, when the images become more convincing, truthful 
and more in conformity with reality, they become more diabolical, more 
immoral and perverse. Baudrillard exemplifies the diabolical nature of the 
reproduction of images with Zelig (Allen, 1983), a film in which Leonard Zelig 
(Woody Allen) becomes a ‘human chameleon’, a man with the ability to 
transform his appearance in accordance with the people who surround him. 
Zelig illustrates for Baudrillard the image, not only in its role as a mirror, as a 
reflection of the real, but also in its evocation of a false reflection that 
‘contaminates’ reality (Baudrillard, 1987b: 13, 16). 
Indeed, behind the naïve resemblance and fidelity of the reproductions 
is hidden their real danger: we are deceived by the confusion of the 
Simulacrum and reality, and our incapacity to discern their nature provokes 
our incapacity to identify their intention. The responsibility of the ‘diabolic 
power’ of the image resides in the society of consumption in which we live 
and the sovereignty that this society concedes to the Simulacrums. In the 
dialectical relationship between reality and images, the latter have imposed 
their immanent, (un)real, immoral and superficial logic, and we are 
accomplices to this event. We are currently embracing a magic occultation of 
reality by ‘excess’. We feel such fascination for the increased number of signs 
that they ultimately block the real thing; not in an aseptic subtraction, but by 
the saturation that it produces. Simulation and the saturation of copies 
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threaten the difference between ‘true’ and ‘false’, between the ‘real’ and 
the ‘imaginary’.  
Baudrillard suggests that the ‘impossibility of rediscovering an absolute 
level of reality unleashes the hopeless act of defining an illusion’ 
(Baudrillard, 1983: 38-39). In this sense, power today consists of investing in, 
and reinventing, (un)reality; persuading society of the existence of certain 
economical and social issues and (strategically) ignoring other matters. If 
technology has facilitated the realization of imagination in an (un)reality of 
bits, then the mediums and the ideas, informational material elements, are 
the basic components of power. For Baudrillard, this explains why 
‘contemporary production is Hyperreal in itself’ (Baudrillard, 2001a: 167): 
 
This also means the collapse of reality into hyperrealism, in 
the minute duplication of the real, preferably on the basis of 
another reproduced medium – advertisement, photography, 
etc. From medium to medium the real is volatilized; it 
becomes an allegory of death, but it is reinforced by its very 
destruction; it becomes the real for the real, fetish of the 
last object – no longer object of representation, but ecstasy 
of degeneration of its own extermination; the hyperreality 
(Baudrillard, 1983: 141-142). 
 
Taking the example of the events of 11th September 2001, Baudrillard 
determines how the ‘technological image’ consumes the events, in the sense 
that it absorbs and transforms it into an article of consumption. This kind of 
terrorist violence is not real, but it can be defined as symbolic: it means 
more than the events themselves (Baudrillard, 2001b: 2-3). There is a 
resurgence of reality and its violence in a virtual environment. If reality 
exceeds fiction, it is because it absorbs its energy and uses fictional sources.  
 Baudrillard’s work (1996) reveals a constant concern about the future 
effects of technology on society and the individual. He proposes that, in the 
short term, the possibilities offered by new technology produce a greater 
variety of individuals, where each one creates their own identity. But 
paradoxically, the absolute presence of technology has the potential danger 
of rendering the representation empty, the consequence of inhabiting new 
spaces without having a profound knowledge of the technology that produces 
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them. In this way, identical human beings will be created, preventing the 
possibility of becoming original. In his pessimistic conception of the future, 
this will be the characteristic of ‘the age of Hyperreality’. Baudrillard’s 
theories of the future constitute a particularly useful vision and premonition 
concerning the confusion between reality and unreality and the future of our 
society in the time of the technology of reproduction, hence the recurrence 
of his writings in this thesis. Furthermore, it is apparent that it is the medium 
of cinema that is simultaneously immersed and a participant in this process. 
As a visual technological medium it is clearly affected by technological 
innovation, but, at the same time, it is a medium that filters and expresses 
the ideas, fears and hopes of our societies. Thus, cinema and technology, the 
confusion of reality and unreality that they produce and reproduce find 
themselves at the crux of this thesis and of Luna. 
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Chapter II 
Technology and (un)reality   
 
Today, in western societies, our general expectations of the 
technology we create and use go further than entertainment, leisure or 
comfort, as we are increasingly eager to be free from work or from engaging 
in any ‘unnecessary’ effort as much as we chase immortality. These are not 
new and original desires, of course, but they are more apparent and present 
nowadays than at any other time since the advent of modernity. However, 
there are grounds for questioning the modern myth that technology will set 
us free. Indeed, the fear is that technology will make us slaves (literally or 
metaphorically) of our own creations. In this sense, we can observe the social 
consequences of technology in two well differentiated stages of technology 
through two influential films, Metropolis (Lang, 1927), which shows the 
potential effect of mechanical production in society, and The Matrix, which 
illustrates the hypothetical repercussions of digital reproduction.  
From the beginning of modernity there has been a belief in continuous 
technological evolution and the production of a powerful technoscientist 
human being, stronger and wiser than ever before in the history of human 
kind. However, this belief clashes with reality. The reality is that the 
individual is often impotent when facing and understanding technology. For 
most of us technology becomes similar to magic when we try to understand 
its mechanisms or endeavour to fix one of the machines we use daily. This 
inability to comprehend the devices that we use in many aspects of our lives 
is at odds with our feeling of superiority when using machines: the illusory 
control over technological functions is uncovered when it becomes apparent 
that we are completely illiterate in the use of 0s and 1s and strangers to the 
cables and metal components of our computers. The potential dangers of 
technology are hidden in this paradox. 
The impact of technology on society is not only possible to establish in 
marginal moments and locations such as virtual experiences or ‘visits’ to the 
Cyberspace, but is experienced in the context of extended systems, affecting 
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everyone in one way or another. This technological development was 
produced by the accumulation of several consequent technological 
innovations in different fields, resulting in a huge and global impact on 
western societies with effects that are still waiting to be deciphered. 
Marshall McLuhan (2001: 76-81) uses the example of the car and roads to 
explain such a phenomenon: technology brought the car and the resultant 
necessities created the roads. This is a useful metaphor for our current 
situation: we invent new technology following our needs and the social 
adaptation it requires will produce an impact that is as yet unknown, 
although we certainly suspect its dimensions. The allegory of cars can be 
applied to the technology of today if we consider devices like a GPS which 
can, on one hand, be very useful for orienting us, but, on the other, can find 
us constantly looking to the map on the small LCD screen, to the reproduction 
of reality instead of through the window, where we would find the reality of 
the roads surrounded by the natural and urban environment. Indeed, 
technology truly fascinates us and has the potential to absorb our attention 
and produce the contrary effect of what was intended: we get lost in the 
world of bits by not paying attention or believing in the world of atoms 
through which we are driving. We have created tools that today are re-
creating us. The paradox is that humans have to adapt and learn from 
technology and not technology from humans as might be expected. In a 
cyclical and feedback process we create inventions but then our own 
productions shape our society and our way of understanding and perceiving 
the world.  
The consequence of the technological society that we have created is 
that today we can intervene in our future but we will not be able to stop 
technological progress. Technological development is our ‘destiny’; it is the 
consequence of overcoming the precedent stages in the evolution of humans. 
There is a certainty and an uncertainty about technology: it will continually 
progress but the direction and intensity of this progress is unpredictable. 
John Smart explains that there is a part of our future that seems 
experimental and unpredictable, and another part that looks predictable and 
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progressive. Our challenge consists of inventing the first part and discovering 
the second (Barca, 2008: 45). 
Margaret Mead points out that the fast evolution of technology can 
drag society into a movement that can be too fast for its structures (cited in 
McLuhan 2001: 91). However, instead of an inconvenience, this can be an 
advantage if the social, educational and political transformations result in a 
better scenario. The shake of social, economic and political bases can 
reconstruct a system with more fairness and equality for all the members of 
the society. There is perhaps no need to be so pessimistic about our future, 
but just be cautious, conscious and in control of the journey we undertake, 
thus retaining a forward and a backward glance; that is to say being aware of 
what is about to come and also mindful of the evolution and history of the 
technology we have created. Continuing the example of cars, McLuhan argues 
that in understanding the actual situation of technology we find the same 
dangerous experience we might have if we drive only looking through the 
rear-view mirror: then we only can see what we have already left behind us, 
not what is coming in the future.  
Historically, human beings have used technology to be freed from the 
tasks that we do not want to do and, in this way, have more time to spend on 
other things. Indeed, today we delegate our memory to hard drives, and, 
thanks to the programmes we have created, we do not need to calculate 
certain scientific problems or imagine solutions. The density of data 
nowadays is doubling approximately every eighteen months and this is an 
increasing tendency.5 With such a development in technology, it should not 
surprise us that the prediction regarding this phenomenon is that machines 
will soon achieve self awareness. The experiment to produce quantum 
computers, with the ability to go further than the combination of 0s and 1s 
and to be able to process notions and abstract terms, is currently an incipient 
and ongoing investigation, but it hints at the future (awareness) of 
technology. There is even an estimation of the moment when human mental 
activities will be a hybrid of biological and technological functions: it is 
                                               
5 This is a prediction made by Gordon Moore, one of the co-founders of the Intel Corporation, in 1964, 
and one that has been so accurate that his prophecy has been named ‘Moore´s Law’ (Woolgar, 2002: 55). 
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known as Singularity and is expected to happen around 2030. Singularity will 
be a phase in which humans will be surpassed by technology and was probably 
inaugurated when Deep Blue, the computer chess simulator, beat Garry 
Kasparov, the reigning chess world champion in 1997. In other words, what 
Singularity is implying is the beginning of the post-human era.6  
The fears that this new post-human era provokes in us have been 
reflected in a variety of films in recent years that have reflected the control 
acquired by machines over human destinies. These films have reflected this 
from different perspectives: the assumption of decision and control of the 
computer Hal in 2001: A Space Odyssey (Kubrick, 1968); the technological 
submission of humans to slavery in The Matrix; and the rebellion of 
humanized robots in I, Robot (Proyas, 2004). Indeed, the feeling of creating 
something that runs contrary to our aim of having a better and more pleasant 
life is present in all of these films. However, the worst possible potential 
consequence in the development of technology comes from computer 
dependency in military systems and the delegation of decisions that impact 
upon the lives of millions of individuals. In this sense, War Games (Badham, 
1983) demonstrates how the extinction of the human race depends on a 
multitude of 0s and 1s that are slowly slipping further from our control.  
In The Matrix, as in The Terminator (Cameron, 1984), the extinction of 
the human race is a real danger. In The Matrix, Artificial Intelligence creates 
an alternative world in which machines have absolute control over everything 
that happens. We can see in this film the culmination of the era of 
simulations that Baudrillard describes: machines substitute reality for the 
signs of the real, producing the perfect and total Hyperreality. The Matrix is, 
in this sense, a computer programme able to simulate reality with all its 
positive and negative components, a parallel unreality of bits. The 
domination of machines over humans in The Matrix metaphorically represents 
a current dilemma: developments in technology, and specifically in visual 
media, mean that any image or sound can be accurately and easily 
                                               
6 For further explication of Singularity see Kurzweil’s The Human Machine Merger: Are we Headed for 
The Matrix? http://kurzweilai.net/meme/frame.html?main=/articles/art0552.html and Vinge’s: The 
Coming Technological Singularity: How to Survive in the Post-Human Era  
http://wwwcse.ucsd.edu/users/goguen/misc/singularity.html 
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manufactured and reproduced. Thus, as Baudrillard (1994b) points out, the 
distinction between the original and the copy has disappeared irreversibly. 
Digitalization is the perfect way to reproduce the general, the repeatable and 
the representable, the quantifying characteristics of objects and people; in 
short, everything that can be expressed with 0s and 1s.   
The film AI: Artificial Intelligence (Spielberg, 2001) offers a different 
perspective, a more humanistic vision of the future of technology. In the film, 
a perfect reproduction of a child is discriminated against and persecuted by 
humans because of his artificiality. The film describes a future where the 
ability of machines to interact with humans has developed to such an extent 
that we can admit the presence of feelings and ‘uniqueness’ in them. 
Ironically, this is not an obstacle for most of the humans in the films who 
hunt the replicas as they recognize in them a danger to humanity.7 Hence, 
according to the interpretation of the future that we find in AI, machines are 
merely servants and entertainment for humans. AI and The Matrix have 
diametrically opposed connotations, yet, paradoxically, the moral of the 
story is similar in both: the extinction of humankind (almost successfully 
extinguished in the Wachowski brothers’ film) and the survival of the 
machines. Probably the most notable difference between these films is that 
in AI, machines are portrayed from a benevolent perspective: they are 
artificially human, with their feelings, fears, desires and memories, while 
humans are revealed as cold beings who want to defend the status quo and 
refuse to accept and understand their own creations.8 
Today, the form of technology that has gained most relevance in 
western societies and is producing a profound social impact is the Internet 
and the ‘universe’ it has created, Cyberspace. Cyberspace is an artificial ‘no-
space’, inhabited by humans but technologically mediated that appeared in 
our lives in the 80s when William Gibson created it in Neuromancer (1984). 
Cyberspace is a world where, in theory at least, everybody can enter without 
prejudice or privilege, where ethnic origin, religion, economic power or 
                                               
7  There is a parallel with Blade Runner (Scott, 1982), where the artificiality of the replicas is being 
persecuted despite the machines being certain about their own humanity. This blurs the boundary 
between machines and humans. 
8 We can find similar conclusions and visions of machines in the film The Bicentennial Man (Columbus, 
1999). 
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nationality are irrelevant factors, and where democracy has a new definition 
together with the freedom of expression. There is no matter and therefore 
there are no properties or identities in the actual definition of these 
concepts. The self is understood in Cyberspace as a fluid and diversified 
entity, able to be constructed, transformed and modified. Although there is a 
clear connection between Cyberspace and the negative vision of the no-space 
of The Matrix, according to John Perry Barlow in his Declaration of 
Independence of Cyberspace (1996), Cyberspace has the potential of being a 
positive virtual environment. It can create a new civilization of the spirit, 
more human and fair than in the real world. However, it is important to note 
that on-line identities created today in Cyberspace are not necessarily free 
from the real world constraints in the opinion of some authors. Thus, Rodney 
Jones points out that ‘for the most part, on-line identities are not purely 
reflections of off-line identities nor complete reconstructions, but convenient 
hybrids of both processes whose uses often have as much to do with what is 
happening in the off-line social life of users as their on-line social life’ 
(Jones, 2001: 13). For authors such as Michael Hardey on-line identities are 
irremediably anchored to the off-line lives of the consumers (Hardey, 2002: 
581). This way of seeing identities in Cyberspace implies the assumption that 
our identity is a solid construction that we drag into our incursions into the 
non-space even if we are ‘dressed up’ with a different identity. The potential 
to create more consistent and continuous identities in Cyberspace in the 
future can make this connection of real and cyber identity disappear, thereby 
achieving a cyber-civilization closer to the idea exposed by Barlow. 
We are at the beginning of a process, yet we feel completely immersed 
in it, almost without having undergone any transition. Nonetheless, we have 
to understand that the ‘virtual age’ has just started and until we can address 
the anxiety and fears that new technologies produce in us, technological 
changes will not be completed and we will not fully control machines. 
Therefore, this is a feedback process: we do not understand technology 
because we fear it, and we fear it because we do not understand it. This is a 
critical moment in the history of western societies to manage, transform, 
control and influence the technological development and the creation of 
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alternative/virtual worlds. This is the moment in which this world and this 
technology are being formed and created. This is the moment to be conscious 
of what technology is: 
 
To be unaware that technology comes equipped with a 
program for social change, to maintain that technology is 
neutral, to make the assumption that technology is always a 
friend of culture is, at this late hour, stupidity plain and 
simple  (Postman, 1985: 157). 
 
Since the beginning of modernity, and very much associated with the 
development of technology, western civilization has shown an increasing 
inability to come to terms with, and understand, the reality of the world. 
Warren Bennis and Ian Mitroff describe this situation in these terms: ‘we do 
not only lose interest in dealing with reality per se but we invented substitute 
realities. Somehow, we became more adept at dealing with these substitute 
realities, or unrealities as we call them’ (Bennis and Mitroff, 1989: 6). These 
technological unrealities to which the authors refer are sometimes easier to 
control and deal with than the reality in which we live. According to these 
authors, the human mind is not only prepared to perceive reality, but also to 
recreate simulated realities in the form we want them to be. 
Consequently, a combination of modern works such as Einstein’s 
Theory of Relativity, the influence of Baudrillard’s ideas about simulation, 
the questioning that we can find in the skeptical novels of Philip K. Dick and 
the power of the images in contemporary films such as The Matrix, with its 
visions of futuristic virtual societies, has positioned the examination of 
(un)reality as a cultural and social phenomenon. In this sense, the inability to 
control our creations produces doubt about everything that surrounds us, and 
the search for conspiracy has become symptomatic of contemporary 
societies. Our time is characterized by bringing together contrary poles, a 
time of reality and unreality, the fragment and the global; a time where we 
believe and disbelieve in absolutely everything. We even have doubts about 
our doubts and skepticism becomes an ideology in itself.  
The ideas about the confusion of the nature of reality together with a 
fear of the arrival of new technologies were anticipated by authors such as 
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George Orwell and Aldous Huxley in two dystopian works: Nineteen Eighty-
four (1949) and Brave New World (1932), respectively. Postman indicates that 
what we find in Brave New World is that ‘in the age of advanced technology, 
spiritual devastation is more likely to come from an enemy with a smiling 
face than from one whose countenance exudes suspicion and hate’ (Postman, 
1985: 155). In this sense, the confusion provoked between reality and 
unreality is produced by the same media entertainment technology that we 
create to afford pleasure. These devices that promise endless hours of 
entertainment have the danger of confusing us, the audience, and (directly or 
indirectly) controlling our decisions.  
Today, the fact of technology means that virtuality occupies some of 
the places that were inhabited by reality not so long ago. This is illustrated 
by the words of Ecclesiastes with which Baudrillard begins his book 
Simulations (Baudrillard 1983: 1): ‘the Simulacrum is never what hides the 
truth, it is truth which conceals that there is none. The Simulacrum is true’. 
We are achieving a stage where real experiences can be judged in relation to 
their corresponding experience in media products, films and videogames. 
Paradoxically, the artificial measures the real, reality becomes the simulation 
and, in the confusion, reality loses its meaning. Consequently, one of the 
risks that we are experiencing with the development of visual technological 
procedures is the tendency of the spectator to either believe everything or 
not believe anything at all. Complete faith or absolute skepticism seem to be 
the alternatives and both block the perception of reality. Perhaps we should 
find a half way, a third direction, in which we question what we perceive. In 
this respect, Richard Gerrig points out that ‘resisting our susceptibility to 
stories is a useful skill in a media and advertising saturated world’ (Gerrig, 
2004: 268). Indeed, we need to reposition ourselves and our perception in 
relation to the new circumstances of technology. It is clear that our brains do 
not only respond to personal and bio-psychological effects, but also to 
cultural and technological conventions about realism that are constantly 
changing. Therefore, as visual technology has changed substantially in recent 
years, we have to adapt to the new conventions and perceptions that this 
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development has created in the notions of reality, unreality and the 
relationship between both:  
 
The brand-new problem of the simulation is mistaken with 
the very classic problem of the illusion, already mentioned 
by Plato. Here lies the mistake. The world as a complete 
illusion is the problem that faced all great cultures and they 
solved it thanks to art and symbolization. What we did invent 
in order to put up with this pain is a simulated real, a virtual 
universe cleansed of everything dangerous or negative and 
which now overrides …., Now the Matrix is totally that! (Le 
Nouvel Observateur, Interview with Baudrillard, 2003).9  
 
Today in western societies we cannot be ‘neutral’ to technology and 
its effects. Particularly, technology determines the way we perceive, 
represent and reproduce (un)reality. In this sense, cinema is a ‘double mirror’ 
to technology: it manifests, and is influenced by, its effects, becoming a 
perfect medium to analyze the present and future of technology and our 
society. According to Norman K. Denzin (1991) cinema is responsible for 
creating a parallel reality, an ‘unofficial’ version of civil society. The 
director, through the film, will reproduce dominant social values, hopes and 
fears. In this way, cinema organizes and gives sense to the world, the same 
world that ‘feeds’ cinema, completing the circle. The appearance of new 
technologies which drive the plot and are the subject matter of many recent 
films such as The Matrix, The Lawnmower Man, Total Recall, eXistenZ, Dark 
City, Abre los Ojos and The Thirteenth Floor suggests that these films are 
trying to tell us something about our technological society. In these 
contemporary films there is a patent inability to deal with present reality, its 
reproduction and the development of technology. These films share common 
characteristics concerning the computer and electronic reproduction of 
reality and the theory of Simulacrum or Hyperreality. In all these 
productions, we find an argument for multiple alternative realities, and the 
anxiety of the protagonist to discern which is the real one. This is presented 
to the audience in the form of a problem that requires a solution. The 
question of ‘what is reality in the time of the Simulacra, Cyberspace and 
                                               
9 The interview is available on-line at: http://www.empyree.org/divers/Matrix-Baudrillard_english.html 
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Hyperreal productions?’ is moved from the characters to the spectators. In 
this way, the characters (Neo in The Matrix, Quaid in Total Recall, Allegra 
Geller in eXistenZ and César (Eduardo Noriega) in Abre los Ojos) question the 
reality that they live/experience and this doubt is assumed by us as we 
(un)consciously share the same feeling. Indeed, the unrealities or alternative 
realities discovered by the protagonists of these films are simultaneously, and 
in parallel, being revealed to us, the spectators, as something we did not 
consciously imagine before. In particular, alternative reality films reflect the 
inability to separate the positioning of humans in relation to the virtual world 
produced by machines and simultaneously the increasing fusion of human and 
machines. This paradox is illustrated in eXistenZ, in which the cyborg 
achieves a new conception. Here, the human/machine goes further from The 
Terminator and closer to a fusion with the virtual world: a human being that 
is half way between reality and virtuality.   
Virtual/alternative realities will be bridged to reality through us, the 
spectators, transforming, in this way, the distance between both. Developing 
the already alluded to famous metaphor of Baudrillard about a map that is a 
perfect reproduction of a referent, we can predict the future independence 
of the map. As a result, Virtual Realities will be stranger to reality, the sign 
and referent will break their relationship and the reproduction of reality will 
begin to change reality. The notion of ‘reality’ will be completely modified 
when we will be able to generate a total and convincing reality using only 
information resources. This constitutes the next stage of the Hyperreality 
described by Baudrillard: when life happens in the simulation and not in the 
terrain known today as real, thereby creating a chaotic map. 
 
2.1 (Old) Media 
 
We are in the situation of an actual image and its own virtual 
image, to the extent that there is no longer any linkage of 
the real with the imaginary, but indiscernibility of the two, a 
perpetual exchange (Deleuze, 2005: 273).   
 
Visual media are intended to be an (artificial) extension of the human 
eye. We live in a visual culture in which there is a tendency to visualize our 
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existence, a culture ‘concerned with visual events in which information, 
meaning and pleasure is sought by the consumer in an interface with visual 
technology’ (Mirzoeff, 1998: 3). The influence of media today is fundamental 
in the social construction of reality and the associated cognitive processes. 
Therefore, the cultural patterns, the identity and the experience of 
(un)reality of millions of people are sustained by the images that emanate 
from technological media including cinema, videogames and television 
screens. It is actually here, within the production processes of cinema and 
television, and in videogames content, that contemporary history and life are 
not only being reflected, but more importantly, are being (de)constructed. 
Gradually we have started ‘to see the world by means of mediated vision and 
doing so we have increasingly been able to distance and detach ourselves 
from contact with its reality’ (Robins, 1996: 21).  
In this sense, Bennis and Mitroff (1989: 11) distinguish two different 
kinds of generations of unreality. Unreality one is an artificial reality where a 
person and an image can interact on a screen and the viewer is unable to 
differentiate which one of the images is real. Unreality two is a deliberate 
distortion of reality, and one of the most illustrative examples of this is the 
information that we receive from the television news: it can make unreality 
look so entertaining that we do not care about reality anymore. Both 
unrealities involve some dangers, but whilst unreality one can be used and 
manipulated to obtain certain entertainment and educational benefits, 
unreality two is only used to manipulate us.  
Today, visual media generate a bidirectional product as it allows the 
spectator, through the use of technology, to cross from the side of reality to 
the side of fiction without encountering any barrier on the journey. This can 
be illustrated in the popularity and proliferation of reality television shows 
such as Big Brother (Endemol, 1999 – present) and the satisfaction of 
audiences in perceiving a supposed reality. Indeed, it is not only often the 
fans/members of the viewing public themselves who become 
contestants/participants on shows such as Big Brother, but the audience also 
determines the fate of the contestants by voting them out via text and e-
mail, and even suggesting to the producers tasks for them to undertake. Thus 
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the pleasure found by audiences in reality shows is also a result of the 
‘spectacle of the real’ (King, 2005), the paradoxical fascination of the 
spectators with the mundane. Indeed, its simple projection onto screens is 
what makes reality (un)real.10 Yet cinema has duly reflected the fears of such 
double reflexivity introduced by new television formats with films that 
express how far the simulational mode of experiencing reality has gone in the 
contemporary age. Films such as The Truman Show (Weir, 1998) and Edtv 
(Howard, 1999) project the possible negative consequences of these 
television productions on the audience. The Truman Show is indeed the 
ultimate reality show, in which the life of Truman (Jim Carrey) is directed 
and manipulated without his knowledge in order to create a television 
program. Truman represents the perfect manipulation of media: his life is 
successfully broadcast to the world and is voyeuristically observed by the 
diegetic audience who enjoy watching him from ‘the other side of glass’. 
Therefore, what we find in reality shows is a technological twist of reality 
and unreality in which both sides, participants and spectators, do not have to 
directly interact with one another (but often, of course, actually do) in order 
to maintain the confusion and produce fascination and pleasure.  
Audiences perceive themselves through media like a mirror in front of 
a mirror, a never-ending process that produces an ecstasy of simulated 
communication in the audience. Reality shows have thus transformed the 
perception of reality and fiction in mass media; and Videodrome, a film about 
the future of visual technology, the potential development of reality shows 
and the influence that they have over the audience, metaphorically 
illustrates the link of media and humanity with a psychical and physical 
transformation of the spectators through technology and media consumption. 
The power of the television screen which ‘has become the retina of the 
mind’s eye’ (Videodrome) has the potential to absorb the audience in the 
same (un)reality that is broadcast. Nowadays, reality can be shown as fiction 
and vice versa. The audience must continually decide what is real and what is 
artificial; spectators must choose what to believe, and ascertain for 
                                               
10 While the pleasures of viewing these shows is widely documented (see especially Holmes and Jerymn, 
2003), ironically the contestants themselves often comment how ‘bored’ they are within the Big Brother 
House.  
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themselves where the manipulation of the audience and participants ends 
and where the ‘truth’ begins. And this constant doubt, this questioning and 
skepticism may well result in a pleasurable, simplified perception in which 
everything is merely spectacle. Indeed, in the Opening Ceremony of the 2008 
Beijing Olympic Games, the fireworks that amazed the world were actually 
computer generated images of a display produced six months previous to the 
live event itself. Thus, simulated fireworks were broadcast to an audience of 
millions, thereby alleviating any possibility of embarrassment for the 
organizers due to mis-timings or accidents. This made possible the impossible 
broadcast of all the fireworks that simultaneously exploded in the sky over 
Beijing (Reinoso, 2008). In this way, the reality perceived by spectators, both 
diegetic and extra-diegetic, was an unreality that simulated the reality that 
they expected to take place at the stadium. Indeed, the technological ability 
to simulate reality 'live' has achieved such accuracy nowadays that the 
computer generated display was only discovered five days later when news of 
it was filtered to the media by members of the visual special effects team.11 
The dilemma that the media and audiences have to face is access to 
the truth. Nevertheless, today, truth is more likely to be replaced by either 
the plural, truths, which are moving, fluid, concepts constructed through 
discourses and representations, or by credibility, which alludes to the reality 
believed by each individual. Although there is a common and shared interest 
in the message transmitted by the media, with a consumerist and ideological 
intent the multiplicity of information that we receive produces a personal de-
codification and consequently an individual perception of the (un)reality in 
which we live. This is the duality that for Henry Jenkins constitutes the 
phenomenon known as media convergence, in which ‘both a top-down 
corporate-driven process and a bottom up consumer-driven process’ converge 
(Jenkins, 2004: 6). Jenkins writes:  
                                               
11 Also revealing is that the opening ceremony featured a photogenic child, a strategic substitution by the 
organisers of a less attractive girl (whose audio was retained). Further, spectators were transported to 
venues in droves to fill seats, a similar move to enhance the spectacle unfolding. Indeed, this is the 
Olympics of the simulacrum or the simulacrum of the Olympics.   
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Media environment is now being shaped by two seemingly 
contradictory trends: on the one hand, new technologies 
have lowered production and distribution costs, expanded 
the range of available delivery channels and enabled 
consumers to archive, annotate, appropriate and recirculate 
media content in powerful new ways; on the other hand, 
there has been an alarming concentration of the ownership 
of mainstream commercial media, with a small handful of 
multinational media conglomerates dominating all sectors of 
the entertainment industries (Jenkins, 2004: 2). 
 
Today, media are controlled by powerful economic holdings that, with 
the broadcast of images, are producing the (un)reality that we are assuming 
and therefore are (in)directly guiding ideological and consumerist behaviours. 
In other words, this phenomenon allows multinational corporate control over 
the flow of information that the individual receives about the world in which 
we live. To achieve this, the most important factor used by media in the 
construction and transformation of (un)reality is the immersion of the 
audience in the entertainment and spectacle displayed on the screens. In this 
sense, the discourse first developed by Guy Debord (2000: 51-61) in the 1960s 
about the society of spectacle is still valid today. According to Debord, our 
media and consumer society is organized around the production and 
consumption of images in which the real is presented as spectacle and the 
spectacular as credible; the (con)fusion of reality and unreality thus becomes 
characteristic of both spectacle itself and of the reception process. 
Consequently, ‘everything that was directly lived has moved away into 
representation’ (Debord, 2000: 37). Spectacle is the end and the medium 
through which audiences, via the use of visual technology, perceive the 
(un)reality of the world and simultaneously block the perception of what is 
not satisfying their perception: an unbalanced society with economic 
inequality and political control.  
 The paradox that we find is that media were invented by humans and, 
once they are developed, are re-inventing the perception of reality: ‘in films 
and television we can find a curious and paradoxical phenomenon as they are 
the perfect expression of a reality transformed with its own experience’ 
(Baecker, 1996: 567). Nowadays, with the introduction of digital imagery that 
facilitates the transformation and generation of images, media use visual 
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technology to confuse reality and unreality, generating fascination in the 
spectator and producing a ‘modern hypersensitivity’ (Camarero, 2002: 91) 
that reflects the search for pleasure simply by observing artificially created 
(un)reality. According to Baudrillard (1996: 5-12), we live in the time of the 
image and this is reflected in the plenitude of signs that shows ‘obscene’ and 
‘cruel’ evidence, but without consequences. Our society of spectacle has 
almost achieved sensitive immunity to the effects of the image. In spite of 
the impact that they can produce, our minds do not suffer considerable 
damage from the horror of certain scenes. The shock of the images of the 
Gulf War or 9/11 are perfect examples of world events that, presented in a 
spectacular way, are perceived more as fiction than reality, and therefore 
their effects are cushioned. The cruelty and realism of media are 
paradoxically producing the opposite effect of what was intended: the feeling 
of unreality. This is the phenomenon that Baudrillard terms the ‘perfect 
crime’: there is no crime scene, no guilt and no trace in our memory. In Linda 
Hutcheon’s words, ‘it represents not just liberal humanism’s assertion of the 
real but the apocalyptic murder of the real’ (Hutcheon, 1989: 229).  
Indeed, Hyperreality, as mentioned previously, refers to this 
phenomenon of simulations generated from models of something real but 
without any origin or reality (Baudrillard, 1983: 12-13 and 146). Hyperreality 
absorbs reality, thus the negation of reality is incorporated into reality itself: 
it is the principle of non-reality based on reality. This is symptomatic of the 
evolution of the perception of reality and the crisis of realism as a method of 
representing reality. Media are a source of Hyperreality as they have gained 
the technological ability to produce an ‘unreal reality’ based on matrices and 
models. Thus, the metaphysical distance between the thing and its 
appearance is technologically abolished. Visual media are not necessarily a 
‘window on the world’ (Ellis, 1992: 51), but they exercise the ability to be a 
simulation of it. 
 The multiplication of visual media and the information they generate, 
creates, according to Baudrillard (1983: 2-12), an abundance of image, a 
complete saturation that leads towards (un)reality through the excess of 
reality. Reality disappears, for Baudrillard, when we are not able to interpret 
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the extreme amount of signs that we have constructed. In Denzin’s words: 
‘members of the contemporary world are voyeurs adrift in a sea of symbols’ 
(Denzin, 1991: vii). This multiplicity of representation is illustrated by the 
fact that the reality reproduced by new formats of television is being 
perceived by audiences through the filter of other media, such as cinema and 
videogames. In this sense, Cronenberg’s highly intertextual work reflects the 
effects of technological media on humanity, paradoxically using technological 
media to communicate with his audience. Ambiguity is indeed a key concept 
in Cronenberg’s productions. The technological anxiety portrayed in 
Videodrome is evoked by something that is not already present and 
identified, but that represents the terror of what we may become. 
Concerning this, Scott Bukatman discusses Videodrome, observing: ‘initially 
the image functions as a reflection of a basic reality. Cleary until the 
hallucination begins, the viewer trusts the image as the sign of truth’ 
(Bukatman, 2002: 90). This is a fear of mutations of the human form and 
psyche, as well as of the future of the individual once economic institutions 
other than the state command humanity. The protagonist of Videodrome, Max 
(James Woods), loses control of his own will at the end of the film. This is a 
useful metaphor for identifying the enemy of our advanced technological 
society: it is not a particular entity but the ‘totalitarian’ influence of 
economic agents in our decisions, and the loss of individuality as a 
consequence of the development of technology, specifically visual media.  
 
2.2 Digitalization 
 
In the last decade digital media has gained remarkable relevance as a 
new way to produce audiovisual material. The influence and potential of this 
new medium is only just beginning to become apparent, yet, with the ability 
to transform, modify and erase reality, the digital medium undoubtedly has a 
marked effect on the portrayal and perception of reality amongst audiences. 
Recently, predictions about the rapid development of digital technologies 
have provoked a split amongst analysts, similar to the historical technological 
polarity generated with the introduction of the telegraph, photography, 
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cinema and television; in short, a split concerning all the innovations that 
influence our lives and the way we perceive the world in which we live. Thus, 
today we can find a division between apocalyptics, who believe that new 
technologies will come with the arrival of a dark period, the end of 
civilization and rationality, and those who uphold an optimistic and positive 
mode of thought that considers the appearance of the digital era as the 
opening up of a new and better world. Nicholas Negroponte  and Giovanni 
Sartori are two authors who represent this dialectic and dual argument. 
Negroponte (1995: 230) believes that the digital era cannot be denied or 
halted as it has qualities that will make it successful over time: it is 
decentralized, global and has the facility to be accessed almost everywhere 
at all times. However, Sartori believes that the audiovisual culture is 
uneducated and therefore it cannot accurately be considered as culture. 
According to Sartori (1998: 47) the predominance of the digital image 
weakens our ability for abstraction; in other words, our capacity to 
understand. The consequence, for him, is obvious: digitalization will produce 
illiterate, uneducated and ignorant human beings. This, however, is refuted 
by Negroponte (1995: 232), who believes that once new generations 
appropriate global information resources, we will find new hope and dignity 
in places where we currently do not expect them.  
Such critical and, conversely, enthusiastic observations clearly lack the 
advantages of an ambivalent, moderate, middle ground position. A digitalized 
society with a global ability to understand and interpret the world will surely 
benefit from access to culture, transforming the traditional educational 
patterns: books will be substituted by audiovisual inter-textual material and 
knowledge and memory will be replaced by acute understanding of the 
information in a world in which ‘no one knows everything, everyone knows 
something, all knowledge reside in humanity’ (Lévy, 1997: 20). We need to 
know how to socially utilize and manage technology to take advantage of the 
digitalization of the world and create a better society. In this sense, a society 
composed of illiterate or perfectly educated individuals is either a utopia or 
dystopia; we should shape a future, as we have the instruments to do so, in 
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which there will be a significant increase in the quality and quantity of 
education, information and culture in our society.  
In parallel with the digitalization of our society, today we are 
experiencing what can be called a virtualization process. This can be 
understood through the reconfiguration of space and time which transforms 
our conception of reality. The virtualization and ‘acceleration’ of our society 
affects the image in a process that it is not yet complete and has an 
uncertain future. The facility to access the image and the diegetic worlds of 
the unrealities that we have created, almost without clear limitations of time 
and space, renders the connections and boundaries of our lives and the 
unrealities more and more blurred. Simultaneously this is represented today 
by the fact that we have even disposed of the wires that previously 
connected our devices to these technological unreal environments, no longer 
needing special locations or occasion to immerse ourselves in virtual 
experiences, becoming, in this way, like ‘nomadic’ audiences. The limitations 
are diminishing as fast as the virtualization is advancing and vice versa. In the 
same vein, Baudrillard describes the acceleration of modernity as one of the 
main characteristics of our time which is directly related to the acceleration 
of technology, events and media: ‘we have flown free of the referential 
sphere of the real and the history’ (Baudrillard, 1994a: 1). The acceleration 
of our world reaches a point where, in some ways, we find the disappearance 
of the boundaries of reality and unreality a consequence of its inertia. In 
Baudrillard’s words, we can describe it as the end of an illusion, the end of 
the world as we wanted to know it.  
For authors like Negroponte, to ‘become digital’ is the only possibility 
remaining in order to survive in a world where information moves at the 
‘speed of light’ (Negroponte, 1995). Indeed, the most relevant characteristic 
of our present time is the massive presence of information. Information is 
everywhere and everything is information. Information is power and control 
today and this is illustrated in Johnny Mnemonic (Longo, 1995), a William 
Gibson story12 that describes a world in which some individuals such as Johnny 
(Keanu Reeves) have become ‘data traffickers’ who store and transport 
                                               
12 Longo’s film is based on Gibson’s 1981 short story of the same name.  
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information without any knowledge of the information that is contained in 
their brain. Today, we do not only need to understand and filter the 
information that we receive, but perhaps more important is the ‘process of 
production’ of that information. The social need to understand the digital 
world is comparable to the learning process of Neo about the virtual world of 
The Matrix. When Neo learns how to read and decipher the codes of 
information of The Matrix, perceiving the world through the green 
composition of binary codes on the screen and also the world of simulation 
transformed in information, his achievements are an illustration of what our 
digitalized society must do: understand the information, comprehend the 
roots, the systems, and have the ability to transform it.  
Computer hackers have the ability to intervene in the information 
system and ‘play’ with it. In films such as Hackers (Softley, 1995), War Games 
and The Matrix, Dade Murphy (Johnny Lee Miller), David Lightman (Matthew 
Broderick) and Neo are hackers presented with positive associations: 
glamorous sub-cultural heroes, sophisticated rebellious nonconformists who 
fight the system. In fact, today, hackers have become the terrorists of the 
information system. When information is the main source of power and 
control, their ‘crimes’ are not aimed at actual economic or political 
institutions but at virtual entrepreneurs who hold the (un)real loot. Hackers 
also have the ability to transform the reality we perceive and this renders 
them simultaneously powerful and dangerous to the maintenance of the 
information system. 
We live in a world based on information, intimately linked to a binary 
code in which the messages that we receive through digital media are 
transformed into 0s and 1s before we receive them. Between emissary and 
receptor there is always a ‘computerized censorship’ of 0s and 1s that subtly 
and imperceptively interferes with our message. The ‘purity’ of the message 
may well be influenced, but the context of its reception will certainly affect 
the meaning of the communication. The neutral screen of a computer will not 
reflect the emotions that we are trying to convey in an e-mail or an instant 
conversation; rather the interpretation of the message will depend on the 
receptor, on his mood, on his environment. Therefore, it will be conditioned 
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by factors external to the sender. The relationship of the message between 
the receptor and the emissary becomes more and more estranged from the 
latter who sees with impotence how the meaning of his message is modified. 
Now, this is not a new experience in western societies as epistolary and 
telegraphic communications have existed for centuries, but the intensity of 
this phenomenon has increased considerably since digital and virtual 
technologies have become integral to our lives as a means of communication.   
It is clear that if we are not to be disconcerted by the information we 
receive, we must gain consciousness about the relationship between reality 
and the devices that we use to observe it. Hence, computers must be 
understood as a tool, a simple medium. Digital technology has transformed 
the perception of reality with the high fidelity of its copies, but, in spite of 
the ability to simulate reality, there is always a distortion, not always 
identifiable, between the sign and the referent, in this case, between reality 
and the simulacrum. Following a classical semiological example, we can 
illustrate this with a photograph of a cat: although the cat on the print is the 
one captured by the camera, it may not be perceived as the same cat: the 
lighting, colour, camera angle and lens may influence the viewer’s perception 
(Yuen, 2000: 3). Therefore, the perception of the content may be modified 
by the context, in other words, by the devices we use to capture, edit, send, 
receive and reproduce the object. In this sense, Negroponte suggests that 
‘the medium is not the message in a digital world. It is an embodiment of it. 
A message might have several embodiments automatically deliverable from 
the same data’ (Negroponte, 1995: 71). Technology is still producing a filter 
in the reproduction of reality but it seems that we are on the way to 
achieving a perfect reproduction of the original copy and, in this process, 
originality will lose its value and will become an irrelevant concept, 
reminding us, once again, of Baudrillard’s (1983) state of the Hyperreal. 
The effect of new technologies is exemplified by the way in which we 
interpreted the messages produced by digital images in the Gulf War. 
Suddenly, the analogical image that we perceived by way of photography and 
cinema became obsolete and was transformed into bits of an abstract reality. 
It was the inauguration of a sterilized war in which the information, being 
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digitally (re)created, was (un)naturally filtered. The consequence of the 
introduction of a different kind of technological image produced in the 
spectators ‘an ontological uncertainty about the status of the real, creating a 
considerable anxiety’ (Niedeffer, 2005: 3). Indeed, sophisticated new 
technologies often tend to provoke skepticism and naïve speculations about 
their ability to be manipulated, and this is what we are experiencing today 
with digital imagery and Virtual Reality. It is, in fact, the same process that 
we experienced more than a century ago with the introduction and spread of 
cinematic technology, a phenomenon that will be examined in the next 
chapter. Paradoxically, this ‘fear’ of the appearance of new visual formats 
contrasts with the social belief in technological progress.  
Nowadays, aesthetic elements assume an important relevance in our 
culture through the use of technology and so displace ideology to a hidden 
but equally influential position. In fact, the ideology of the digital and 
interactive era is ‘economic control’ of the audiences through technology and 
spectacle. Consequently, and to be discussed later in this thesis, digital and 
interactive visual technologies redefine the concept of cinema. Indeed, in 
digital video or images in real time, interactivity means that there are no 
antecedents in the secession of images: what we see is what it is. The 
spectacle in front of our eyes does not require a deep understanding of what 
we perceive; there is no mystery, no history, in the gaze of the object. 
Baudrillard accounts for the success of this cinema of ‘immediacy’ and 
fascination in the lack of interest in the ‘definition or richness of imagination 
in these images: we look for giddiness of their superficiality, for the artifice 
of the detail, the intimacy of their technique. What we truly desire is their 
technical artificiality and nothing more’ (Baudrillard, 1988: 43-44). 
A collateral consequence of the development of new visual technology 
and its abilities is the presumption that old films, especially SF films of the 
pre-digital era, are no longer very convincing and are observed with 
incredulity by audiences. Yet this is refuted by the fact that films such as Star 
Wars (Episodes IV, V and VI) have been digitally remastered to update the 
impact of the special effects. The original astonished reaction of the 
audience to the technology of films of the pre-digital era has given way today 
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to comical skepticism, and this is something that we observe in the reception 
of SF films from the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s, such as Destination Moon 
(Pichel, 1950), The Incredible Shrinking Man (Arnold, 1957) and Silent 
Running (Trumbull, 1972).13 The conclusion is that the fast development of 
visual technology means that what we believe today will likely not be 
believed tomorrow. 
 Computers and digital imagery achieve a level of realism similar to 
mimesis that has facilitated the creation of hybrid forms with the 
combination of synthetic and existing images. Paradoxically, digital media 
have the capability to reproduce and imitate ‘old’ visual media formats with 
the intention of producing credibility in the imitation. We can observe this in 
Titanic (Cameron, 1997), in which the recreation of old footage intends to 
contextualize historically and give credibility to the fiction that follows. 
Indeed, and as we find in JFK (Stone, 1991), realist codes can be 
technologically simulated to confuse the audience and immerse spectators in 
the plot of the film. In JFK the images become ‘historical’ and gain veracity 
with the imitation of original old footage. The consequence for the spectator 
is that there is no concrete evidence to verify the facts we are watching. In 
this way, an unsteady camera, the use of sepia or black and white, the 
intentional use of unframed, unfocussed and uncorrected colours and the 
resultant pretence of amateurism produces a credibility in the audience; and 
the feeling of not knowing if the images are real or an imitation consequently 
generates a distortion in their perception. Such technological simulation of 
real footage can be observed in films like Zelig, The Blair Witch Project 
(Myrik and Sanchez, 1999), Open Water (Kentis, 2003) and [REC] (Balagueró, 
2008), films in which the feeling of realism of the image amplify the 
credibility and anxiety of the spectator. This is a hybrid cinema characterized 
by ‘total (un)realism’ in which reality is digitally reproduced using the 
simulation of unprofessional techniques. Consequently, as audiences, we 
need to differentiate between the ‘realistic thematic’, referring to the 
                                               
13  Reviews of these films often make recourse to this way of interpreting special effects in SF films. See 
http://scififantasyfilms.suite101.com/article.cfm/scific_movies_from_the_early_1950s 
http://classicfilm.about.com/od/earlysciencefiction/fr/ShrinkingMan.htm,; 
http://www.hometheaterinfo.com/silent.htm;  
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veracity of the content, and the formality of the production that we 
perceive, that is to say how a work achieves the representation of the world, 
the appearance. The differentiation of both aspects can be a complicated and 
ambitious act as they are intrinsically linked, but we need new tools, a 
reinvented position in front of the screen to filter and analyze events in 
which, thanks to technological visual developments, unreality can simulate 
reality and reality can be presented as fiction.  
One of the visual technologies that has most efficiently confused the 
perception of reality and unreality is Rotoscope. Rotoscope is the process of 
drawing over the lens generated image, and the result is a (con)fusion of the 
animation and lens generated image. Though invented in 1915, the Rotoscope 
has gained increasing relevance in recent years with the incorporation of 
digital techniques and its use by Richard Linklater in his films Waking Life and 
A Scanner Darkly (2006). The technological hybridization of real images with 
animation and, simultaneously, digital and analogical techniques, creates a 
feeling of confusion in the audience, of not being able to identify the 
reality/unreality of the footage. This visual confusion produces a film that 
most likely unfolds entirely in the mind of the spectator who is constantly 
questioning the images that he perceives. As a result, Linklater integrates 
two films in one: a real one and an artificially generated one. Linklater uses 
technological devices to connect the form of the film with its content and to 
facilitate the spectators in the immersion in the plot with the visual 
aesthetics displayed. In this sense, Waking Life captures the twisted illogic of 
a dreaming state, being visually incoherent. A Scanner Darkly, a film based 
on Philip K. Dick’s 1977 novel of the same name, is more consistent in the use 
of Rotoscope techniques: the images become regularly irregular, but the film 
incorporates a story of paranoia and hallucination, of confusion, that is 
visually reinforced by rotoscoping the image. The reaction to rotoscoping and 
other technologically generated imagery in the spectators is explained by 
neuroscientists with respect to the way our brain responds differently to real 
images and cartoons. Animation has a special ability to be perceived and 
processed into ideas by our brain as it produces more activity in the area 
called the bilateral orbitofrontal cortex, which responds to rewarding stimuli 
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(Witfield, 2006: 3-4). In this sense, the rotoscope technique aims to merge 
the qualities of perception of cartoons with the authenticity of real footage. 
In recent years we have experienced a fast assimilation of the digital 
image in animation, where there is no direct and necessary relationship with 
the image and reality. Films such as Final Fantasy: The Spirits Within 
(Sakaguchi, 2001) signal an increasing interest in an alternative to Disney 
cartoons. This film was the first serious attempt to produce photorealistic CGI 
(Computer Generated Image) humans. The pleasure and fascination in 
observing how real we look in our technological creations has become 
symptomatic of the time of reproduction in which we are living. The 
influence of technology on the image and its perception is usefully illustrated 
if we consider the radical difference between computer generated images 
and lens generated images. The computer generated images are synthetic, as 
opposed to the analytical nature of lens generated images. Therefore the lens 
generated images are, in some sense, reflective of the reality they represent 
while computer generated images are always ‘medium-generated’. Another 
opposed characteristic is that the lens generated images are deductive 
because what we see is a portion of the landscape, whereas the computer 
generated images are inductive, a large combination of numbers being 
translated into pixels. Therefore, while lens generated images have instant 
access to the world, the computer generated images have to create the world 
and objects with the ‘atemporal’ sequence of 0s and 1s. Paradoxically, as 
Herbert Zettl (1996: 83-91) points out, the final goal of the computer 
generated image is not to recreate the world but to recreate the lens 
generated image. Ironically, and as Lash notes, ‘cinematic signification in the 
age of hi-technology and the 30 million dollar film, comes closer than other 
forms of signification to resemblance of reality’ (Lash, 1990: 186).  
The perfect coexistence and harmony of lens generated and computer 
generated images come together in films such as Toy Story (Lasseter, 1995), 
an interesting hybrid of the two. Toy Story demonstrates unprecedented 
imaging in which the light, colour and movement have the most extraordinary 
detail, although they have no direct correlation with real life, creating a 
‘moving photographic image of the impossible’ (Darley, 2000: 110). Toy Story 
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and, more recently, films such as WALL-E (2008, Staton) demonstrate how 
‘perfectly real’ the artificial image can be, comparing it, simultaneously, 
with lens generated images. 
The distrust that animation and computer generated images promote 
in audiences should not deny the potential benefits that they imply if we can 
be in control of their confusing, perverse effects. In fact, technologically 
created images promote the creation of unrealities that facilitate a possible 
escape from the frustrating aspects of our reality; further, they function to 
reveal things that are ordinarily hidden or unnoticed by our perception. 
Computer generated images are able to express what is inexpressible by lens 
generated images: the unreal aspects of reality. The paradox is that once we 
overcome the distrust of the ‘new image’ there will be an open possibility to 
reveal fears related to our society, technology and future. A film like WALL-E, 
over and above its status as a commercial, family entertainment product, is a 
useful incipient example of this. In WALL-E the most developed visual 
technology is used to recreate the future, a future in which the environment 
has been destroyed and the earth is inhabited only by machines. In this 
space, in the non-place, humans live a passive life that technology has 
physically degenerated, converting them into unthinking consumers who 
simply assume the mandates coming from technology without questioning 
them.  
In WALL-E we can observe how digital media have now achieved pre-
manufactured and fabricated images with a similarity and fidelity to the 
original never expected before. The direct consequence of the ability of 
technology to create simulacra is that reality and fiction have been 
(con)fused and the concept of authenticity is becoming irrelevant. In this 
respect, we have to be aware that even if artificially generated images offer 
us a more attractive version of reality, they are not ‘harmless’. The mere 
substitution of reality means something in itself: it indicates that we are not 
as far as we thought towards finding a habitable alternative to our world, 
replacing ‘standard’ reality by its representation. We are in the process of 
pronouncing that virtuality is the new reality.  
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When the spectator’s belief in the visual (un)reality and the diegetic 
story of the film is increased, an ‘hallucinatory’ process is turned on: the 
spectator will be confused and will accept the (un)reality of the film. The 
danger of technological visual developments is that we can be at the mercy 
of technology and the worlds we create. However, we do not necessarily have 
to be ‘apocalyptic’ about our future and its technology, as mentioned 
previously, just remain cautious and conscious of the potential threats 
implied in technology in order to obtain the maximum possible benefit from 
it. 
 
2.3. Videogames  
 
We seem to enjoy escape into fantasy and reverie almost as 
much as we enjoy ‘reality’ and the modern agencies of mass 
communication are calculated to stimulate those worlds with 
such an extraordinary vividness that we are hardly aware 
that there has been any change in our status. The signals are 
so taken for granted, we are taken by stealth as in dreams 
(Berger, 2002: 11). 
 
There are obvious analogies in the genesis of cinema and videogames. 
Both media have grown from being a ‘segment’ of other arts to become 
independent and relevant forms of entertainment. Like cinema, videogames 
were the result of several experiments and socio-political conditions that 
facilitated their development; and, like film, videogames are being created in 
a society which often reflects its beliefs, fears and value systems.  
It was in the 1960s when technology and art converged to create a 
fertile field where new media could grow. In the 1970s videogames were 
culturally integrated and found their place in the arcade next to the pinball 
machine and in homes alongside the TV. By the end of the 1980s, videogames 
started to compete with cinema and television, providing an alternative 
source of diegetic worlds, worlds that are seen on screen, which are an 
artificial production of image and sound, but ones with which the player 
could interact (Wolf, 2002: 29-30). The influence of this technological 
entertainment in western societies created a significant impact that is 
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reflected in films such as Tron (Lisberger, 1982) in which the protagonist 
Kevin Flynn (Jeff Bridges) is literally absorbed by the game. Today, 
videogames are the perfect example of a global, post industrial cultural 
product, a product that represents the fusion of digital technology and the 
culture and economy of the late 20th and early 21st century.  
Videogames can certainly be observed from different perspectives, and 
although they have a strong ‘disconnection’ component they are not 
necessary asocial. Using a ‘Jungian’14 theory of videogames culture we 
observe that videogames are strong active agents in the creation of the 
archetypes and myths of our society, thus representing the ‘storytelling’ of 
today. Indeed, videogames have an inestimable power to draw us into an 
alternative reality and simultaneously to teach us to think and interact with 
others in a different way (Wolf, 2002: 174-176). In this sense, we should see 
the competition element intrinsic to many games as a way, as sports were 
originally created, of ‘blocking out competing stimuli of a more threatening 
kind’ (Robins, 1996: 120).15 Videogames also facilitate players in 
understanding and assimilating rules. The intrinsic rules of the virtual games 
do not necessarily have to be extrapolated to the reality, but ‘the process’ is 
useful to live and interact in the real social world. Paradoxically, videogames, 
which can be used as an escape from our society, can simultaneously help us 
to adhere to our society. However, videogames are not simply an escape from 
the reality of daily life: they may also constitute, when playing the game, an 
alternative to the world in which we live. They are able to create worlds that 
‘are ‘self-contained’ and completely independent from the complexities of 
the real world outside, where we are playing’ (Robins, 1996: 48). In this 
sense, Bob Hodge and David Tripp (Hodge, 1996: 105) use the term ‘modality’ 
to define the (un)reality of a videogame. ‘Modality’ refers to the level of 
certainty or belief that one can find in a videogame, and is therefore a very 
useful concept in terms of differentiating the duality reality/unreality.  
                                               
14 See The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious (Jung, 1968) for a Jungian theory of the 
construction of archetypes. 
15 Indeed, the concept ‘e-sport’ has been created to refer to games in which the competition is more 
important than the plot, graphics, realism or any other factor.  
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However, and in spite of the importance of the virtual and diegetic 
aspects of videogames, we cannot ignore the physical and tangible factors 
that they imply. Playing a computer game is as much a physical activity as it 
is a mental one, and nowadays this affirmation is more patent with video 
consoles such as the Wii that simulates movements in the virtual world of the 
game with similar physical movements in the players. The games played with 
this console require mental interactivity and simultaneously physical 
dexterity of hand-eye coordination. Wii players project into virtuality through 
the parallelism of their movements with those of the avatar. In this way, 
brain and body assimilate the player with the virtual world.16 The interface is 
the link that bridges the existing gap between the diegetic world and the 
world/life of the player (Wolf: 2002: 3). Indeed, the player’s control over the 
interface and dominion over the virtual world is one of the sources of 
pleasure that videogames provide. A good level of skill with the controls and 
a near automatic response to the ‘virtual stimulus’ of the games is not only 
essential to play the games, but fundamental to players’ intense enjoyment 
of them. The challenge for the future is to create a connection between 
technology and the nervous system, producing a perfect symbiosis between 
both elements. This is the dream/nightmare that Cronenberg shows us in 
eXistenz, making visible the potentially dangerous aspect of this technology. 
Before the advent of videogames, a generation that was brought up 
(remarkably socialized) with television and films, with images and sounds 
coming from the screen, lacked the quality of ‘visual dynamism’ as the 
spectator could not influence the image. Videogames are the first medium to 
combine visual dynamism with active participation and this has had a 
significant influence on the generations that are now brought up playing 
videogames (Greenfield, 1984: 101). Observational and anecdotal evidence 
would seem to suggest that some children, at very early ages, are able to 
deal with situations of a virtual world before they can read or write, and this 
is apparent from my own experiences watching family members engaged in 
                                               
16 This works in such a way that, paradoxically, sometimes simulated activity becomes a very similar 
copy of what would be the ‘real’ activity and the consequential effects (tiredness, sweating, injuries etc). 
Increasingly Wii is capitalizing on this very recreation of physicality with the release of games such as 
Tiger Woods PGA Tour 08 (2008), Wii Fit (2008) and Wii Dancing Stage Hottest Party (2008). 
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gaming. This is a clear sign that the generations that are growing up at the 
same time as the development of virtuality are conceiving virtuality and 
reality in a different way to previous generations. This is demonstrated by 
the relevance that they give to what happens to them in the fictitious 
dimensions created by the games, something that was difficult to conceive in 
the past. It is actually by listening to children speaking about these games 
that we may understand this phenomenon. Young videogames consumers 
sometimes comment with the impetus of a ‘lived’ experience on what has 
happened to them the day before: whilst in front of the computer, they have 
conquered places that many of us have never heard of before. It can be 
argued that the suggestion that these generations have developed a higher 
imagination or superior capacity for creation than their predecessors is 
possibly false, because children in preceding generations had other fictions 
that engaged them. However, the important point is that these fictions were 
not absolutely based in technology. In short, new generations have developed 
a sense of virtuality and technological escape from reality that was not 
granted in the past. This is a sign of how the world is changing. Indeed, 
further evidence of the influence of technology in the creation of fictions 
may be found in the fact that previous generations often lived the secondary 
experiences of the characters of television’s Soap Operas, whilst today what 
we find in new generations is the tendency to live the first person 
experiences of virtual interactive environments. These new generations have 
also replaced the physical environments where these collective, social 
experiences were previously shared (the office, the staff room, the pub) with 
virtual environments such as Messenger and Facebook, indicating the 
distinctly technological nature of these fictions and their reception.  
Nowadays, computer games also constitute a relevant source of 
entertainment in adults’ leisure world, and the fact that many adults live the 
virtual life that games provide with such intensity reinforces the theory of an 
increasing necessity to escape the existing reality in which we live. The 
classic argument often heard from games consumers, and substantiated by 
personal observation of friends and work colleagues, is that it helps them to 
‘disconnect’ from their life, and especially from their preoccupations and 
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feelings of stress. It is therefore a sign, on a small scale, of what society is 
experiencing today: a frustration with our way of life that, in spite of its 
benefits, is full of dissatisfactions and dangers.   
Cinema, another contemporary ‘storytelling’ medium, is not only 
assuming plots taken from videogames, but is also reflecting the 
consequences and fears provoked by the relevance acquired by them in 
contemporary society. Thus, many films adopt the visual and narrative 
conventions of videogames, and a film such as Run Lola Run (Tykwer, 1998), 
with its exploitation of a videogames aesthetic within a filmic structure, is a 
perfect example of this. In much the same manner, The Matrix, with its use 
of computerized special effects, slow motion movement of the camera and 
the creation of a device with multiple cameras placed in a circle that gives 
the impression of freely moving around an object or a person, originated a 
new videogame-filmic aesthetic that has important repercussions for the 
audience. Indeed, the Wachowski brothers’ work has been particularly 
influential on recent cinematic output, not only with respect to the SF genre 
with films such as I, Robot, but also in terms of martial arts output like 
Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon (Lee, 2000) and action films such as Wanted 
(Bekmambetov, 2008). 
It is true to say, then, that the filmic apparatus has been very much 
affected in recent years by the electronic culture of video and the computer 
generation of images, based on the formula of temporal simultaneity and 
freedom of movement of the image. Taken from the three dimensional worlds 
of computer games, where it is possible to choose an angle from which to 
perceive the action, cinema has developed a way to approach the 
‘infectiveness’ of virtuality beyond animation films (King, 2005: 158). After 
all, a substantial amount of the pleasure experienced when playing 
videogames comes from the delight of observing (and ‘participating in’) the 
development of technology. Cinema has found a way to share this amusement 
and can be summarized, much in the same way as the cinema of the 
beginning of the 20th century was, via the notion of ‘fascination’ (King, 2002: 
37). Tom Gunning explains this first fascination of the cinema spectator:  
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Rather than mistaking the image for reality, the spectator is 
astonished by its transformation through the new illusion of 
projected motion. Far from credulity it is the incredible 
nature of the illusion itself that render the viewer speechless 
(Gunning, 2004: 866).  
 
The connection between cinema and videogames has also now become 
an economic matter. The clearest examples are Lara Croft: Tomb Raider 
(West, 2001), Final Fantasy and Resident Evil (Anderson, 2002), blockbuster 
films based on the success of videogames and which illustrate the transition 
from the small screen of the monitor to the big screen of the cinema, 
exposing the permeable boundaries existing between both media. Today, 
many Hollywood productions intentionally include CGI action scenes, as seen 
in films such as Star Wars Episode III: Revenge of the Sith (Lucas, 2005) and 
The Matrix, in order to sell the videogame and, at the same time, 
videogames trailers include cinematographic conventions, montage and 
narration to gain currency amongst videogames consumers (Chien, 2007: 26). 
In this way, games adapted from films, and films inspired by videogames, 
acquire an advantage as they allude to diegetic worlds that very often are 
familiar for the spectator/player, facilitating, in this way, their ‘immersion’ 
within these worlds. The Enter The Matrix (2003) game, which was released 
on the same day as The Matrix Reloaded (Wachowski and Wachowski, 2003), 
is an illustrative example of the transmedia storytelling of today: ‘media 
conglomeration provided a context for the Wachowski brothers’ aesthetic 
experiment - they wanted to play with a new kind of storytelling and use 
Warner Bros blockbuster promotion to open it to the largest possible public’ 
(Jenkins, 2006: 108). Game and film thus constitute at once alternative but 
entirely complementary mediums for audiences to follow the story of The 
Matrix. Acutely aware of the existing link between games and films, as well 
as videogame players and cinema audiences, Warner Bros secured the 
economic success of the game and film with the simultaneous release and 
mutual promotion of both products. 
Hybrid forms of videogames and films have now started to appear 
following the aesthetic principle of verisimilitude facilitated by the 
supremacy of the digital image. Today we can find experimental films, not 
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only based on computer games or that adopt their aesthetics, but actual 
games recorded and dubbed in order to provide them with a ‘filmic plot’ to 
attract videogames consumers. This phenomenon is known as ‘Machinima’. 
Irene Chien remarks on the self-reflexivity of machinima and points out that 
‘the way these game-movie hybrids use cinematic narrative to challenge 
video-game logic, and game culture to question filmmaking paradigms is what 
makes them, for the moment, so arresting’ (Chien, 2007: 24). Machinima 
develops an entirely new film language, one that is not necessarily restricted 
by the real world. A pertinent example of Machinima is the aptly titled short 
film Deviation (Griggs, 2006). Released to the public at the 2006 Tribeca Film 
Festival, this virtual film was created by players/actors on-line who were not 
present at the Festival and did not even meet each other or the director in 
the real world (Chien, 2007: 24-25).  
Mackenzie Wark summarizes the current difference between cinema 
and videogames stating that the latter ‘represent a significant step away 
from the intensity of cinema and the simultaneity of television. Its aesthetic 
depth lies firstly in the complexity of possible interactions between the 
audience and the media text’ (Wark, 1994: 23). Indeed, in spite of the 
common characteristics that are shared by films and videogames (plots and 
aesthetics, fundamentally), time and space are managed in a different way in 
them. In cinema the camera is a window on the world which can be explored 
from a given position (or more than one, as occurs in films such as in Time 
Code (Figgis, 2000)), but videogames go a step further and allow players to 
explore and have an active role in the environment. We watch films but we 
are active participants of videogames. Indeed, in a videogame we are 
simultaneously the spectator and the protagonist. The keyword to understand 
the current difference between film and videogames is interactivity. This can 
be the future of cinema: interactive films with active spectators. In this 
sense, the appearance in the last decade of a videogame genre that recreates 
worlds and periods that are played in the first person or FPS (First Person 
Shooters) is crucial. Thus, games like Halo (2001), Half Life (1998)17, Quake 
                                               
17 In a review of this game, Ron Dunlin writes: ‘A major goal in any game is to create the illusion of 
reality, a fact that is especially true for first person shooters. The whole point of the genre is to put you, 
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(1997), Unreal Tournament (1999), Grand Theft Auto (1998) and Grand Theft 
Auto San Andreas (2004)18 offer the possibility of reducing the physical and 
symbolic mediation necessary in order to translate the actions of the user 
into activities within the synthetic environment. In other words, these games 
increase the freedom of movement and actions of the players within the 
game.  
Realism in videogames decisively contributes to the enjoyment of the 
game, although consistency and playability are fundamental factors that 
make a game successful. Andrew Darley observes that ‘the increasing sense of 
presence in a three-dimensional world that the best games offer comes when 
interactivity and visual realism combine to augment the impression of 
kinaesthetic presence or involvement in the image’ (Darley, 2000: 159). 
However, it is important to point out that totality of realism and involvement 
is not desired by every videogame player as maintaining a certain ‘distance’ 
from the diegetic worlds of the videogames is often essential to enjoy a 
variety of videogames genres. Realistic games produce more intense 
behavioural and emotional responses in the player and sometimes these 
feelings can exceed the limits of enjoyment as can be the players’ experience 
of games such as Bully (2006) and Grand Theft Auto IV (2008). The grade and 
quality of the involvement of the player in videogames depends on several 
factors: the actual game is obviously an essential one, but the personality and 
contextual moment of each individual are also fundamental contributory 
components. Nonetheless, from a global perspective, it is possible to observe 
that whilst in traditional narratives (print media) readers use imagination to 
be involved in the text, technological media ‘immerses’ the player with an 
elevated level of participation, becoming an ‘extension’ of our central 
nervous system. eXistenZ certainly reflects the potential development of 
videogames when the game converges in the player. Cronenberg expresses his 
intentions in eXistenZ, saying: 
                                                                                                                                         
literally in the role of the protagonist. Half Life creates a reality that is self-contained, believable and 
thoroughly engaging’ (King, 2002: 40). 
18 This example is particularly interesting because, apart from offering the possibility of choosing your 
own virtual actions, the game is not only limited to the missions the players have to complete: it has 
games that can be played inside the game, being an incipient idea of the phenomena described in 
eXistenZ. 
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It seemed to me that what people are really doing in 
computer and videogames is trying to get closer and closer to 
fusing themselves with the game. The idea that a game 
would plug right into your nervous system made perfect 
sense to me, because putting on glasses and gloves is a crude 
attempt to fuse your nervous system with the game. I went a 
little bit further – if I want to be the game, the game will 
also want to be me (King, 2002: 150). 
 
In this respect, it is useful to observe the appearance in Japan of a new 
phenomenon named Otakuism which designates the life of computer games 
consumers who live almost permanently in the virtual worlds generated by 
technology (Mandosio, 2001: 10-11). This style of life has certainly already 
been described in novels such as Miguel de Cervantes’ Don Quixote (1605-
1615) and Gustav Flaubert’s Madame Bovary (1856). Nevertheless, the 
difference today is the crucial development and involvement of technology in 
the establishment of these kinds of worlds.  
 Technology has created what has been named ‘virtual communities’, 
social groups, with no corporeal/material contact, that form webs of personal 
relationships in Cyberspace. In social terms, technology has simultaneously 
united and divided virtuality and reality, creating two societies in one or 
dividing one society in two. Virilio expresses this sociological phenomenon, 
commenting that:  
 
One is a society of ‘cocoons’ and home offices where people 
hide away at home, linked into communication networks, 
inert. (…) The other is a society of the ultra-crowded 
megalopolis and of urban nomadism.(…) Some people, those 
in the virtual community, will live in the real time of the 
world-city, but others will live in deferred time, in other 
worlds, in the actual city, in the streets (Virilio, 1993: 75). 
 
In recent years the appearance of virtual environments created to live 
a parallel existence like Sims (2000) and Second Life19 have assumed special 
relevance. Second Life is a 3D world where the users live and socialize as 
                                               
19  Following the line of other machinima productions, January 2007 saw the release of Molotov Alva and 
his search for the creator: A Second Life Odyssey (Gayeton, 2007), a film made entirely in the virtual 
world of Second Life that presents a diary of a citizen, Douglas Gayeton, who disappears from the real 
world to inhabit the virtual environment of Second Life. The diaries can be found at 
http://www.molotovalba.com 
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they would in the ordinary world. The difference from reality is the 
opportunity to choose, without living and risking the choices. The facilities of 
virtuality are exploited in this game, combined with certain real elements: 
the users can create their own businesses, buy and sell objects, properties or 
even perform arts (famous groups such as Red Hot Chilli Peppers have 
performed concerts and charged for them in the virtual world). The currency 
in Second Life (Linden dollars) can be exchanged for US dollars and therefore 
the game becomes a real source to make (and spend) money. Recently the 
environment has become the target of many multinationals and institutions 
that do not want to lose their portion of the market even in the virtual world. 
Therefore, they invest in advertising and they virtually sell their products 
(although the money paid is real).20  
Second Life illustrates perfectly the current situation of virtuality: the 
escape from reality, paradoxically, drives us to the real in a circular process. 
The virtual meets the real and the real is prolonged in the virtual. Perhaps 
the only difference in the virtual world is that we do not have to suffer the 
consequences of our actions and we can turn off the computer with a click, 
something that is not an option within our real lives, quite possibly 
accounting for the success of these kinds of games.  
 
2. 4. Virtual Reality   
  
By the turn of the millennium a technology known as Virtual 
Reality will be in widespread use. It will allow you to enter 
computer generated artificial worlds as unlimited as this 
imagination itself. Its creators foresee millions of possible 
uses – while others fear it as a new form of mind control… 
(The Lawnmower Man).  
  
In every period in the history of humanity since modernity there has 
been a revolution in art. In the Renaissance this revolution related to 
perspective, in the 20th century to movement through the cinema and in the 
21st century we find technological interaction, manipulation and culture of 
                                               
20  However, this may urge us to question the freedom of this virtual world, because when the agencies 
that hold power and influence in the real world transfer this control to the virtual world, the latter 
becomes a replica of the real world and less an alternative to it. 
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the copy that allows the spectator to become an active part in the production 
of art. Virtual Reality will not perhaps help us to tell new stories although it 
will certainly affect the way in which we tell them and the nature of 
perception. Virtual Reality offers the opportunity for consumers to become 
immersed in a world that looks simultaneously different from and similar to 
the world in which we live. During this process we can become aware of not 
being in our world and therefore our perception of artificiality is increased, 
or we do not retain such a level of consciousness in this respect and therefore 
it is the feeling of immersion that is increased. Interactive and Virtual Reality 
technology is thus more effective if we believe we are immersed in the 
virtual environment, and this situation is reflected in recent years in a 
proliferation of films concerned precisely with the confusion of reality and 
unreality within the Virtual Reality context. This is perfectly illustrated in 
eXistenZ, a film with no real narrative resolution; a film where the actors and 
audience constantly doubt if what they are living/watching is real or virtual; 
and where virtuality is introduced into virtuality several times, reproducing 
the old feeling of dreaming that we are dreaming, and the consequent 
confusion/anxiety this evokes. eXistenZ represents both the potential 
qualities of Virtual Reality and also our fears about it. 
Virtual Reality is a fictional world constituted between a magical 
reality and realism. It is a ‘technology of miracles and dreams that allow us 
to play God’ (Dovey, 1996: 2). Jaron Lanier, a pioneer in Virtual Reality and a 
‘techno-romantic’, explains that Virtual Reality is (imagined to be) ‘a 
combination of the objectivity of the physical world with the unlimitedness 
and the uncensored content normally associated with dreams or imagination’ 
(Lanier, 1990: 188). Nonetheless, behind the initial amazement produced by 
Virtual Reality there is an unconscious or unconfessed fear; the fear of a 
potential future in which artificially generated virtual worlds will offer 
‘better’ realities, more in conformity with our desires and dreams, worlds 
that people will choose instead of the real one. In this sense, Cesar in Abre 
los Ojos elects to live the virtual life he could not live in the real world just 
as Cypher (Joe Pantoliano) in The Matrix chooses, hedonistically, to be 
immersed in the artificial virtual life offered by technology as the virtual 
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satisfactions are better than the frustrations of reality: ‘Ignorance is bliss’ he 
says. Cypher’s choice raises the dilemma of questioning reality through its 
comparison to a technological utopia, yet, as Lanier points out, Virtual Reality 
is something totally different to the physical world. The physical world allows 
you to be lazy, it always remains there, while the virtual world is dependant, 
existing thanks to the power of our nervous system: this is the only possible 
way to transform virtual things into ‘real things’ during our interactions. 
Therefore in the virtual world laziness is not permitted: the virtual world will 
disappear if we do not act upon it.  
Lanier observes the qualities of reality comparing it to the virtuality 
we experience today. According to him, when we leave a virtual world we 
can observe a curious phenomenon: the real world that surrounds us has a 
‘superreal’ condition, a special texture and beauty. When we observe the 
real world after a visit to the virtual world we can perceive more details, and 
everything is more transparent and clear than in the virtual environment 
where the main characteristic of the elements, besides their artificiality, is 
their simplicity. However, Lanier is positive when predicting the future of 
Virtual Reality. He believes that it will become similar to language, or at 
least, a different version of it. It has the potential to be a kind of 
communitarian service where we can share our dreams and where ideas 
develop in social collaboration. He defines this as post-symbolical 
communication, a time that will come in the future when a new generation 
will adopt the habit of inventing virtual worlds and will acquire the ability to 
improvise ‘new realities’ (Leeson, 2000: 23-27). Virtual Reality is therefore 
certainly more than a language. It is a conglomeration of languages where the 
novelty is not the codes that are being used, but their utilization: the 
peculiar relationship between signs, referents and users. In this sense, virtual 
knowledge denies the possibility of stable semantic limits able to fix a certain 
meaning. Barrie Sherman and Phil Judkins share this vision and explain that 
‘Virtual Reality can transmit a universal language. It is a perfect medium 
through which to communicate in what will be difficult times. Common 
symbols will emphasize common humanity, expose common difficulties and 
help with common solutions’ (Sherman and Judkins, 1993: 134). Technology 
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has the ability, not only to improve the quality and dimension of 
communication among humans, but also to give form to our dreams and 
fictions. J.G. Ballard talks of the ‘qualities of expression’ of technology 
commenting that: 
 
In the past we have always assumed that the external world 
around us has represented reality, however confusing or 
uncertain, and that the inner world of our minds, its dreams, 
hopes, ambitions, represented the realm of fantasy and 
imagination. Today these roles have been reversed (Ballard, 
1973: 5). 
 
Michael Heim suggests that the key to deal with new technologies such 
as Virtual Reality is to be aware that these are our creations and are perfect 
tools for entertainment, education and communication. Heim observes that 
the essence of Virtual Reality can be better established when related to art 
rather than technology (Heim, 1993: 82-108). Hence, every artist needs a 
medium to express his or her imagination and, in this sense, art and digital 
new technologies are able to complement each other. New technologies such 
as Virtual Realities are certainly very intriguing devices with fewer 
restrictions regarding what it is possible to do and express. In this respect 
Ralph Schroeder suggests that ‘new forms of human self-expression will 
release human beings from the material constraints of their current lives’ 
(Schroeder, 1994: 524). The potential freedom of expression of Virtual Reality 
has to be managed to create something that will not be turned against us, but 
will facilitate a pleasurable and educative medium that will satisfy, instruct 
and encourage communication for consumers.  The role of the artist in this 
process of creation is understood to be fundamental. 
Technology is important for art and art has to be fundamental in new 
technologies, otherwise there is a risk of it becoming boring or mundane if it 
merely imitates the real world. New technologies supply the artist with the 
ultimate illusion maker, providing new ways to change the nature of the 
relationship between the artist and the audience through the interactive 
possibilities of the digital. In this respect we find a significant extension of 
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the intertextual21 experiences promoted by such other art forms as post-
classical filmmaking which, with their modernist techniques, similarly 
implicate the spectator within the fiction.22 Thus, the contemporary 
spectator will become a participant, will get closer to the artist as they will 
both share the production of the work. In consequence, when the audience 
gradually becomes more involved in the work, it is increasingly difficult for 
them to differentiate between the artificial world that is being co-created 
and their personal experience.  
Today, Virtual Reality is a technology that offers us certain social 
solutions (such as flight simulators and similar learning devices), promises of 
a ‘better life’ and what is not promised, their reverse: the creation of 
labyrinths of confusion between virtual worlds and reality. We have to accept 
that Virtual Reality is something new and therefore it involves various 
problems in our understanding of it. One of the difficulties that an analyst has 
to face nowadays when examining Virtual Reality is intrinsically 
methodological: how can we evaluate new realities when our tools for 
analyzing these realities are obsolete? It is important for us to pretend that 
we are confident about our conclusions and analysis; in some sense we need a 
stable and fixed point to establish our knowledge even though our pillars can 
paradoxically be virtual. We are aware of our ‘paralysis’; we have the 
certainty of not being able to solve the problems that new technologies are 
demanding and not even to find names for them, able only to employ an 
inadequate theoretical language to deal with this new phenomena. Sherry 
Turkle provides a useful definition of our current cultural context and the 
influence of virtuality in our lives. It is one, she says, based on:  
 
The erosion of the boundaries between the real and the 
virtual, the animate and the inanimate, the unitary and the 
multiple self, which is occurring both in advanced scientific 
fields of research and in the patterns of everyday life 
(Turkle, 1997:23).  
                                               
21 For useful explication of intertextuality in cinema, see Robert Stam (1992).  
22 Robert Kolker offers a valuable reading of the modernist techniques of directors such as Scorsese and 
Altman (2000). For a useful account of the emergence, economics and aesthetics of Post-Classical 
filmmaking more widely, see Geoff King’s New Hollywood Cinema: An Introduction (2002). 
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Nowadays, the current technological efforts concerning Virtual Reality 
are conducted in a double direction: to improve the polysensorial images and 
at the same time to create interfaces for total immersion. In theory, and in 
the opinion of the most optimistic experts, in the future it will be possible to 
conceive a virtual experience, a perfect hologram that would be identical to 
reality to the point that it would not be possible to differentiate one from the 
other. What Virtual Reality thus changes is the dichotomy between reality 
and unreality, the thin line that separates them. We can find new hybrid 
forms composed simultaneously by these two notions, because Virtual 
Reality, as the name indicates, is indeed configured with a mixture of both 
spaces. In Virtual Reality consumers live inside the simulations and therefore 
their ‘virtual’ lives depend on the possibilities offered by such (un)reality.  
The duality of the real self and virtual representations finds an answer 
in films like The Matrix. Paradoxically, this film reconciles both spheres: the 
world of flesh and the world of virtuality through their opposition. Neo leaves 
his body in the chair, in the real world, to immerse his mind in the 
technological world of The Matrix, but the connections with both are obvious: 
his body maintains the same appearance in the virtual world and suffers in 
reality when it is attacked in the technological environment. The Matrix does 
not offer a pleasant possibility but a link, a reason to accommodate both 
elements in our lives. Virtuality and reality do not necessarily need to be 
opposed; indeed Virtual Reality opens the doors to many fused 
interpretations of both spheres and the possibility, as is illustrated in Luna, to 
simultaneously inhabit both dimensions with the metaphorical separation of 
mind and body: a body that is attached to the real world and a mind 
immersed in virtuality. 
  Jameson (1996) and Pierre Lévy (1999) belong to a group of authors 
who believe that we are currently affected by a general movement of 
virtualization that is something other than mere ‘computerization’. According 
to them, virtualization is a moment, a particular stage in humanity. In this 
sense, virtualization is not necessarily good or bad, rather it is just a specific 
moment through which technological devices experience ‘otherness’ and this 
state proffers its advantages: if we are careful and aware of the risks, we can 
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find in virtual technology useful educational tools for the population; 
learning, for instance, to be empathic, whilst enjoying a pleasurable source 
of entertainment. In this respect The Lawnmower Man demonstrates both the 
advantages and dangers of psyche stimulations through Virtual Reality, which, 
after altering the intellect of Jeff Fahey (Jobe Smith), produce devastating 
effects on his personality. 
For Lévy there is no such opposition between real and virtual; the 
antagonism that we can appreciate is between virtual and actual:  
 
The virtual, strictly defined, has little relationship to that 
which is false, illusory or imaginary. The virtual is by no 
means the opposite of the real. The virtual should, 
properly speaking, be compared not to the real but to the 
actual (Lévy, 1999: 16). 
 
Therefore, according to Lévy, Virtual Reality is a complement to, and not a 
substitute for, real activities and existing social organizations. We should 
understand virtual worlds as realities expressed in bits rather than atoms, as 
signified and informational realities. Virtuality extends reality, rather than 
eliminates it. In the same vein, Virtual Reality is not necessarily opposed to 
cinema. Indeed, Virtual Reality offers an interesting opportunity to expand 
cinema with new prospects and capacities. The idea of using digital and 
virtual technology to create films with which the audience increases their 
sense of immersion and interactivity to produce a personal experience cannot 
be denied by traditionalism or technological fears. Moreover, it should be 
accepted that ‘the marriage’ of cinema and technology has achieved a 
different stage in their relationship. Nevertheless, even if we assume 
nowadays that cinema can create anything that we can imagine, we have to 
be aware that we firstly have to conceive it before we can make it into 
fiction. 
In this respect, and according to Jacques Aumont (1992), a further 
stage in the development of cinema will come when the spectator will have 
the ability to generate unique and original images, ‘produced’ by each person 
but always from previous and recognizable ones. Nowadays digital and virtual 
techniques can be applied to cinema and therefore, even being embryonic, it 
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is possible to introduce the notion of interactivity in films. In this sense the 
film Time Code splits the screen into four and gives the spectator the chance 
to choose the point of view that he would like to watch. However, the 
freedom of the audience is not absolute, as it is not possible to choose the 
angle and move freely within the screen, and also because the soundtrack 
emphasizes the relevance of a particular screen over the other three. Time 
Code is just an incipient ‘sample’ of what interactive films can offer to us.  
Indeed, the ultimate goal of interactive cinema will be a fully 
immersive film, which will blur the distinction between reality and the virtual 
world of the film, isolating the user from any signals outside the system. In 
other words, when ‘the experiences are cognitively similar ‘a belief in the 
reality of’ or the clear distinction between ‘real’ and ‘unreal’ becomes not 
just blurred but irrelevant’ (Irwin, 2002: 183). Before the advent of digital 
and virtual technologies, the closest we were to a stage of total immersion 
was the 70mm formats. There were also further attempts to produce a more 
immersive cinema with systems such as Cinerama, bicolour 3D glasses and 
Omnimax, but they never achieved the sense of reality, interactivity and 
confusion obtained by Virtual Reality (Westlake, 2005). However, in the last 
year, the release of a new digital visual technology called ‘Real D’ has 
significantly improved the capability of producing a notably credible feeling 
of immersion in the spectators, as demonstrated in Beowulf 3D (Zemeckis, 
2007). ‘Real D’ creates a 3-Dimensional cinematographic image through an 
electro-optical modulator, a unique projector that circularly polarizes the 
frames and is also perceived by the spectators with 3-D polarized glasses. The 
resultant effect satisfactorily makes the audiences believe that they are 
involved in the image projected on the screen, although it is not yet a truly 
personal experience.   
The characteristics that a film (or other technological product) should 
have to be lived as a personal experience and reach a believable level of 
reality can be summarized in the combination and balance of cognition and 
sensation, form and content. Then, of course, the personality of each 
individual and the enjoyment found in the film are crucial in the impact of 
every film on the spectator. In technical terms, virtual/interactive films are 
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more efficient and increase the sense of presence in the spectator when they 
are simple, coherent and seem ‘natural’. In other words, the more difficult 
the interface is, the more barriers we will find preventing our immersion in 
the simulation of reality and our ability to forget the physical links of our 
world. Indeed, the biggest obstacle that Virtual Reality finds today, in order 
to engage with society and immerse consumers, is the development of its 
interface. The devices are very present, very obvious; it is not easy to isolate 
the mechanical elements from the perceptual and personal experience, and 
this effect prohibits the virtual experience, making it impossible to avoid the 
feeling that the environment is moving and not us.  
However, the combination of the existing technologies of cinema and 
interaction introduces the audience to the ability to influence the film and 
create a different film, transforming, in this way, traditional understanding 
of cinema. In this sense, experimental short films such as Textual @traction 
(Morris, 2005) and Watch Me (Morris, 2007) produce an active interaction 
between the film and the audience through SMS and Video Messages. Textual 
@traction connects the audience to the film through SMSs that they receive 
on their mobiles phones, sharing the information contained in the SMS of the 
diegetic characters and extending the plot from the screen to the mobile 
phones of the audiences. In Watch Me, the audience receives the first scene 
of the film on their mobile phones in the form of a video message before 
entering the cinema. They then watch the main body of the film in the 
cinema until the penultimate scene, when the film pauses and the inter-title 
‘to be concluded elsewhere’ appears on the screen. Thirty minutes after 
leaving the cinema, the spectators receive the final scene on their phones. As 
a form of ‘expanded cinema’ Watch Me combines two technologies to explore 
new ways of telling stories and break the time and space traditionally 
associated with cinema (Morris, 2008). 
The question that surely arises from this point is: are Virtual Reality 
and computer generated images the future of cinema? Will the old cinematic 
concept of cinema be replaced by the mobility and control over the image of 
the new media environment? The answer is probably not. The reflexivity, the 
ability to transmit thoughts, experiences and feelings, the ‘active passivity’ 
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of cinema, makes film a unique and different medium from Virtual Reality, 
although both mediums are naturally complementary. Certainly, the 
relationship of the spectator to the film in the ‘pre-interactive era of cinema’ 
is a very special one and, in spite of the awareness of the audiences about 
the unreality of the stimuli, the film has the ability to maintain the 
spectator’s empathy in direct connection with the content. Cinema and 
Virtual Reality will coexist and mutually reinforce one another in the future. 
There will no doubt soon be an effective and satisfactory fusion of both 
elements, but the end of cinema has not yet arrived. In fact, cinema has 
always, and will always, change in form and content. Technology is helping to 
develop this new stage of the cinematic image but it has not suppressed the 
cinematic notion: it merely introduces new and interesting ways of 
expression.  
 
2. 5. Technology and/in Cinema  
 
Generally we may see image technologies as still being ‘in 
touch’ with reality. But they may also be mobilised as 
intoxicating and narcotic distraction or defences against the 
vicissitudes of reality. And, at their most extreme, they may 
be used to construct alternative and compensatory realities 
(Robins, 1996: 123). 
 
As this thesis has described thus far, throughout the history of 
humankind art has always found new ways of creating the impression of 
(un)reality. From its origins, cinema, in particular, has always been an art of 
illusion and paradoxically an art that is committed to the discourse of reality. 
Thus, the reality of film is a reproduced and/or simulated reality. The aim of 
cinematic techniques can therefore be summarized as the recreation of 
reality and/or the fascination of the spectator. There are two different yet 
common aspects regarding technology in cinema. Firstly, audiences generally 
observe the action from a designated point of view that reproduces our eyes: 
the camera. Secondly, they observe the place where they physically perceive 
the action: the screen. Therefore, our perception is guided twice in a certain 
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direction through technical artifacts, creating a ‘synthetic world perceived by 
the spectator’ (Eisenstein, 2002: 44-45).  
Technological innovation in cinema should not only be understood as 
an altruistic or artistic outcome to improve film technology; it is essentially a 
capitalist impulse that combines the generation of profit with the fulfilment 
of human needs. Sound, colour or digital imagery would not have succeeded 
had the audience not enjoyed them. The conclusion is double, both economic 
and social: new technology cannot succeed unless the economic system 
requires it and, on the other hand, new technology must fulfil a social need. 
In the particular case of cinema, this need can be identified with the creation 
of (un)realism (Buscombe, 1978: 5).  
In parallel, we find that the use of cameras and the reproduction of 
films have changed substantially in recent times. Digital cameras are 
affordable for a significant majority of society, offering good quality for 
making films and consequently ‘democratizing’ the concept of cinema. Today 
everybody can potentially make a film and show it on the Internet or through 
mobile phones. Cinema is not such a privileged art anymore; it is open to the 
public. Therefore, technology has contributed to opposing stages in the 
history of cinema: making the creation of cinema first an elitist and then an 
open, democratic medium.  
 Filmmakers such as Jordan Belson and Stan Brakhage suggest that 
technology in cinema works as an extension of human psychology and 
physiology. The images projected on the screen are, in some sense, an 
appendix of the inner human mind. In fact, the rhythm of a film is 24 frames 
per second in accordance with the cadence of the brain waves, imitating, in 
this way, human perception. A similar observation can be made about the 
editing process because it can be seen to emulate the structure of memories 
(Hendriks 2004: 3). After all, the mere act of watching a film means 
‘abandoning our body’ and accepting an experience without corporeal 
satisfaction of our senses. Cinema has the ability to ‘evade’ us from ourselves 
and consequently facilitates the feeling of confusion about the 
reality/unreality of our perception.    
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Films by themselves are curious artifacts that take advantage of the 
psychological characteristics of humans. Imagination connects the fiction and 
reality of the films, and all the technology used, artifacts and creative work 
of the crew just push in the same direction: to either make the film 
realistically fantastic or fantastically realistic. The most efficient techniques 
in cinema are those that are not easily noticeable by the spectator; those 
that, after watching a film, audiences need an explanation about to realize 
that what they have perceived was not real. Films like Jurassic Park 
(Spielberg, 1993) perfectly represent this repercussion because its innovative 
visual techniques, specifically the accuracy in the reproduction of dinosaurs, 
meant that when it was released the spectators felt a confusion about what 
they saw in the film. In this sense, the social habits, the education of our 
perception plays an important role in the acceptance of cinematic innovation 
in audiences. We learn to watch and understand films and their technology 
precisely by watching films. 
As mentioned previously, cinema, together with videogames, is 
currently fulfilling some of the functions that in the history of humankind 
have been met by storytelling: films provide a system of symbols, myths and 
feelings that unite groups of people who share the same experiences and 
anxieties about the future. Paradoxically, cinema, invented by humans, is in 
some ways reinventing humanity with its storytelling abilities. Cinema is in 
the epicentre of current technological development; visual technologies and 
the ‘technological ideology’ of today meet in cinema. Today we find a cinema 
with an ever increasing perfection, expressed in its ‘veracity’ and the 
pretension to be real, the immediate, the unsignified. Cinema is fascinated 
by itself as we are fascinated by its ability to create unrealities. Cinema 
becomes ‘more cinema than cinema as images become more real than the 
real’ (Baudrillard, 1987b: 33). 
Cinema is thus a key, fluid and influenceable element that connects art 
and technology. McLuhan observes that ‘the artist is the person who invents 
the means to bridge between biological inheritance and the environment 
created by technological innovation’ (McLuhan, 1992: 98). The artist, the 
filmmaker in this case, then, is not only someone who uses technology, but 
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one who can explain to society, to the audience, the effects and meaning of 
new technology upon traditional conceptions. In this respect, Cronenberg 
uses many of his films to express an anxiety about the current state of the 
human condition provoked by technology. His vision of technology is dual and 
contradictory: enthusiastic and pessimistic about the future of human society 
in relation to the development of technology. Thus, Cronenberg’s films 
Videodrome and eXistenZ develop the notion of technology as the main 
impulse in the transformation of the human body, mind and social relations. 
He believes that technology has become an extension (sometimes literally) of 
the human body and that it also has an extraordinary effect on human 
interaction. In Videodrome and eXistenZ television and videogames 
respectively create a constant fluctuation between objective and subjective 
reality in the main protagonist, blurring the boundaries between the psychic 
world and the physical one. These two films supersede the classical 
metaphysical dichotomy mind/body which is dissolved and deconstructed by 
the ‘trichotomy’ consistent in mind/body/machine.  
The characters of Videodrome and eXistenZ feel confused 
distinguishing between reality and hallucination, and, on a parallel level, the 
disorientation of the audience comes from the identification of the objective 
and subjective, diegetic, filmic representation. Cronenberg suggests the fear 
of technological media is based on the lack of understanding of their danger 
and potential. eXistenz, in this sense, evidences a potential future where the 
Virtual Reality distorts the possibility of discerning what is reality and what 
belongs to virtuality, to the game. The film suggests that if we go a step 
further in the evolution of such technology, this can render return to reality 
an impossibility. The formation of a variety of ‘layers’ of virtuality can 
produce the ‘disappearance’ of reality, which can be indistinguishable in the 
chaos of the stratos of (un)reality. So, if reality remains there but cannot be 
differentiated from the artificial version of it, we can finally feel indifferent 
defining the status of the real.  
The Matrix trilogy (1999-2004) is another filmic SF illustration of the 
impossibility of differentiating between reality and unreality, a fear that is 
directly linked to the evolution of technology and its effect in our society. 
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The Matrix is, in this sense, a perfect cinematic embodiment of our fears of 
modernity, the efficiency achieved by technology and science that turn 
against us when humans are reduced to energy sources for the machines. For 
Žižek, The Matrix is the ultimate American paranoia: to find out that the 
world in which we live is false. Paradoxically, in Žižek’s opinion, the function 
of this state of paranoia is to preserve our ideology, to keep everything under 
control. He views The Matrix, not as an original and revolutionary film, but as 
a late capitalist version of the concept that it tries to enact (Žižek, 1999: 3). 
The best way to understand a film such as The Matrix is to be conscious of 
the implication of its (hidden) consumerist message without blocking its value 
as a very useful medium to examine the effect of technology on the confusion 
between reality and unreality. Indeed, the control exercised by products such 
as The Matrix is denounced by the film itself, as The Matrix represents a 
programme created to maintain everything under its control. Neo, then, can 
be read as an apt metaphor of the situation of western societies: he lives an 
unreal life but is unaware of his real life, immersed in a pod in a destroyed 
environment. As with the many other humans beings located in pods, he is 
forced to believe a certain reality. The conclusion is that understanding of 
the technology we create and develop is absolutely necessary if we want to 
be aware, and in control, of our reality. 
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Chapter III 
Cinema and (un)reality  
 
Clearly influenced by the current visual technological development and 
simultaneously able to express the contemporary situation with regards to our 
social understanding of it in a most accessible and palatable way, cinema, a 
(sometimes distorted) reflection of the ideology, collective imagination, 
knowledge and vision of our potential future, provides a most unique point of 
reference with respect to the confusion between reality and unreality. It is an 
art form that also has the ability to produce adhesion and cohesion between 
the realistic and mythical contents, and, for Gerard Imbert, this can be 
explained by the special characteristics of cinema: it has the potential of 
transforming the abstract configurations and signs into easily identified and 
communicated elements; to condense symbols, concentrating abstract and 
undefined aspects and shape them into stories (Imbert, 2002: 92). It is 
through the natural selection of the eye in the perception of reality, and the 
artificial discrimination of the camera, that reality is filtered, created and 
transformed in cinema to produce cinematic (un)reality.  
Cinema is an art of our time but simultaneously it has inherited 
important cultural baggage since its invention. Unlike the other arts, cinema 
does not have a past of centuries to be used as a reference. Yet, this is by no 
means a negative characteristic as it has facilitated the medium in absorbing 
technological development without prejudices. It is impossible to find an art 
that has had, in its first century of life, such a rich and dizzying evolution as 
cinema. The ‘culmination of two centuries of industrial modernism and 
technological sophistication in visual representation’ (Darley, 2000: 38), 
cinema had its genesis in the fusion of the machine with culture, producing a 
massive cultural diffusion and thus breaking with the principle of art being 
destined only for the benefit of a privileged minority.  
André Bazin (1967: 21) explains how the genesis of cinema began with 
photography, and he distinguishes a chain of progressive steps towards 
attaining the ideal of faithful reproduction of reality through visual 
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technological media. For him, the technological development in visual arts 
has historically demonstrated the intention of: 
 
A recreation of the world in its own image, an image 
unburdened by the freedom of interpretation of the artist or 
the irreversibility of time (Bazin, 1967: 21).  
 
Indeed, the advent of photography caused a revolution in our system of 
representation of reality and provoked a dilemma in fine arts as its aesthetic 
monopoly of the image was questioned. It is through the use of technology 
that photography became paradoxically more pure and more artificial than its 
precedent arts and transformed the relationship of the object with its 
representation; more pure as it captured and reproduced the object with 
(theoretical) fidelity and objectivity, and more artificial as it introduces 
between the object and the artist the filter of the technological equipment. 
In this sense, Hugo Münsterberg understands that, in photography, and this 
was inherited by cinema, the mind develops memory and imaginative ideas 
that give sense to the image. Therefore, the image is absolutely dependent 
on two factors: the perception of the eye and the mind of the spectator 
(Münsterberg, 2004: 58).  
The primary difference between the transcendental moment of 
photography and the existential moment of cinema is that photography can 
only be contemplated while cinema can be lived. Cinema spectators can be 
absorbed by a film and ‘transported’ via the combination of the narration of 
the story and their personal experience, whilst photography requires a 
‘mystic experience’ in which the observation needs to find the right 
memories and experiences to be personalized. In this respect, Baudrillard 
(2004: 193-202) observes the higher illusionism of photography over the 
cinematographic image. Indeed, the illusion of cinema itself gradually 
disappeared with the introduction of sound, colour, special effects and all the 
developments that have arisen during the last century and that have brought 
the medium closer to the reproduction of (un)reality. The illusion of cinema 
nowadays is fundamentally based on the fascination of the spectators about 
the (un)realities that it is able to create, the spectacular (un)realities and 
simulations, and not so much on the solution of an enigma in which the 
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spectator has to locate the image in his reality using his own imagination. In 
this way, cinema today moves further from photography and closer to 
spectacle. Of course, with cinema the illusionary component is always 
necessarily present as audience and spectacle do not share the same space 
and time. Everything, from actors to settings and the dialogue heard are 
absent in the moment in which we watch a film: it is the ‘semi-real presence 
of the unreal itself’ (King, 2005: 61). In this context in which reality and 
unreality are ambiguously represented to the audience in the present/non-
present, cinema reproduces life, with all the conscious and unconscious 
components, and reciprocally life reproduces cinema.  
Today technological development makes it not only possible to create 
the illusion of reality but also, thanks to digitalization, as discussed in the 
previous chapter, technology facilitates the recreation of unrealities. Bazin 
points out that art can only exist when the illusion of reality produces the 
dilemma of simultaneously finding the image unacceptable and pleasurable. 
Today, with the introduction of the digital image in cinema, this statement 
has absolute validity. Thus, Bazin observes that cinema invents or narrates 
‘dreams’ that are technologically reproduced with the highest accuracy and 
fidelity accessible (cited in Wollen, 1972: 131-132). Nowadays, visual 
technological developments have transformed the spectator’s gaze, our 
perception of films. In this sense, the incipient introduction of interactivity in 
films is a useful example of the technological evolution of the reproduction of 
reality. Virtual Reality offers the possibility to change the way in which we 
watch films. No longer just a fragmentary part of reality that we have to 
‘sew’ to give it sense, using our nervous system to cover the gaps in our 
perception, the possibilities of interactive cinema and Virtual Reality 
transforms the viewing process and consequently simplifies the perception of 
the footage: our efforts to interpret the image decreases and we do not need 
to process as much the information we are receiving. Think less and perceive 
more, this seems to be the aim of Virtual Reality and the cinema of the 
future.  
The simulation of reality that we find in Virtual Reality, cinema and 
videogames generates the multiplication of referents, as indicated by 
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Baudrillard and mentioned earlier in this research, and this has the potential 
to produce confusion. The confusion implied in the reproduction of reality 
raises an important question: why do human beings have the need to 
reproduce reality? We can find a possible (dual) answer in the risk of being 
confused, together with the satisfaction of seeing the world mirrored; in 
expressing and identifying our problems, fears and hopes through its 
reproduction. In this sense, technological reproductions of reality through 
Virtual Reality, cinema and videogames are successfully accepted by society 
as a means of creating faithful, immersive and interactive (un)reality; as a 
means of becoming the ‘perfect reproduction’. Nowadays, these 
technological developments pose new questions that supplement the 
traditional inquiries. Thus technological reinvention of the real in the 
application of virtuality and simulation brings up the question of whether we 
need a reality anymore when a multiplicity of realities are being created 
artificially. It is fitting that we find a dual answer in The Matrix: on the one 
hand the natural human search for truth represented in Neo seems to 
demonstrate that simulation will never be enough in comparison with reality. 
However, the hedonism of Cypher, who prefers satisfaction over truth, raises 
new sub-questions to the original dilemma which can only be answered with 
each individual human condition. 
  
3.1. Ideology, (Collective) Imagination and Utopias 
 
For Lacan, the social experience through the use of languages 
irrevocably alienates us from our real beings; thus language is a deceit or a 
trap regarding reality. Our configuration of reality is critically determined by 
our social relationships and how we observe the world through the perception 
of other beings (Branston, 2000: 140). In this sense, cinema plays a very 
important role in the creation and manipulation of our vision of the world, in 
other words, in our ideology. Every single film has an influence on how 
someone perceives the self and the world around, and, for writers like Louis 
Althusser, this is what creates ideology: ‘Ideology is a representation of the 
imaginary relationship of individuals to their real conditions of existence’ 
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(Althusser, 1977: 152). It reflects the way in which individuals interpret and 
answer to the social ambit, contributing to the organization of our 
experience. Today, according to postmodern authors such as Žižek, the 
function of ideology is not only to offer an escape from our reality, but also 
to provide an evasion of our current traumas (Žižek, 1989: 45).  
Cinema clearly also works in this way: it transmits habits, norms of 
conduct, mentalities, ways of life, myths and therefore images that 
constitute ideology itself. At the same time, cinema collects the wishes, 
eagerness and imaginaries of the people from the point of view of the 
director, someone not isolated in society and who gives a personal vision of 
what he or she sees (Camarero 2002: 18). For this reason, the relationship 
between emissary and receptor, filmmaker and spectator, is doubled and 
constitutes a feedback process. Consequently, cinema is a perfect tool for 
analyzing the hidden, invisible and unconfessed parts of our societies. Indeed, 
throughout their careers, key filmmakers such as Godard, Woody Allen, David 
Lynch and Cronenberg have consciously exercised the possibilities of 
‘cinematographic (un)reality’, exploring the power of the gaze, the 
sensitivity of the camera, as an effective instrument for transmitting 
information. Assuming that nowadays knowledge and information are the 
main sources of power, precisely such control of the image, its symbolical 
‘property’ and intention, what is shown and what is suppressed, becomes an 
important element in the configuration of today’s society at large.  
Cinema may be the perfect testimony of current ideology, not only 
informing the historical moment but also spreading and socializing these ideas 
to the population whilst offering a (necessarily selective) world onto which 
we can project our desires and where our deficiencies are compensated. 
Therefore, films such as The Matrix, eXistenZ and Total Recall, in which we 
find the fear of being confused and/or controlled by the fast technological 
development that fascinates western societies, also entail a consumerist or 
capitalist ideological message that is not necessarily opposed to the intention 
of the film. Indeed, these films suggest how the impact of technology in 
society drastically influences the relationship of ideology and individuals; its 
relevance has tinged both elements, creating a technological ideology in a 
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technological population – or vice versa. In general, of course, we assume 
that the anxieties and fantasies of each spectator are different, although in 
specific times there exists a common concern, a shared fear that affects large 
social groups or even society as a whole. According to Žižek, the fictional 
films of today are the best means we have of looking at the world in which 
we live: looking at it directly, in a ‘real’ way would be inconceivable for us 
(Žižek, 1989: 45). Thus, the visual technological developments that we are 
experiencing today through films with their unique ability for fascination and 
spectacle may be the perfect way to transmit ideas.  
David Hume explains that when people see a certain part of the 
reality/world in the same way, the picture gets sharper. This is the place 
where stories arise and simultaneously explains why people are filling this 
area, on the edge of reality, with myths or fictions (Hume, 1978: 8-90). 
Nowadays, films are situated firmly in this region and, together with 
videogames and other technological visual media, are absorbing, reflecting 
and sharing the collective imagination of western societies. The collective 
imagination is an essential dimension in every culture; it contains the roots 
and imperatives of any civilization. We can find in the collective imagination 
the anthropological background, desires and adversities of society. It can be 
understood as a social adaptation to the environment, a necessity to subsist 
and develop culturally. In films such as The Matrix and eXistenZ the 
collective imagination is identified in the social fear of the future of society 
in times in which technology escapes our control and society is paradoxically 
controlled by technology. Collective imagination is the consequence of the 
projection of illusion but, once it is consolidated, it manifests new ways of 
reinterpreting reality.  
The collective imagination implies an alternative to the multiple 
dualities compounded by the rational and irrational, logical and illogical, 
between reality and dreams. Its restriction in a binary dimension is 
paradoxically broken with its fusion. Imagination is the key element that links 
both worlds: the dreaming and the real one. It allows us, collectively, to go 
beyond the boundaries of established reality, have wider limits and 
consequently unlock the coercion that reality imposes on humanity. In this 
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respect, Roger Bastide suggests that the bewitchment of reality through the 
imaginary is only possible in cultures, like western cultures, that have 
previously fragmented the natural osmosis that exists between reality and 
dreams, exiling the dreams to the territory of the imagination (Bastide, 1972: 
32-65). This is the confrontation of reality and unreality that this thesis 
proposes to join with the concept of (un)reality. In this way, The Matrix and 
eXistenZ suggest an implicit convergence of reality and technologically 
created unrealities and are useful visual examples in our understanding of the 
potential conception of (un)reality.  
Collective imaginations have as much relevance today as they ever had 
in the history of humanity. Films such as The Matrix contribute to create a 
deposit of legends, myths and characters that play a fundamental part in 
molding, understanding and questioning the significance of reality and 
unreality in our culture. However, authors like Ledrut (cited in Carretero 
Pasín 2005: 41) believe that in a society of consumerism as in today’s western 
world, the imaginary carries the risk of being ‘ideologically distorted’: the 
preconceived styles of life that emanate from media are taken as imaginary, 
and, through the desire to achieve these lifestyles, are transmitting a 
consumerist message. The majority of the illusions, the imaginary realms and 
utopias of today are being produced by institutions and economic agents with 
an economic, ideological and/or political interest in maintaining the status 
quo and preserving the same society that they are pretending to alter. In this 
way, the irony is that we are at risk of playing a ‘preconfigured game’ in 
which, by thinking that we can change the rules, we are indeed respecting 
the instructions of the game. This ‘falsified rebellion’ is the key to keeping 
our conscience satisfied and simultaneously not transforming the system. The 
fear of being simple actors following a script when we think we are 
‘improvizing’ is reflected in films such as The Game (Fincher, 1997), The 
Matrix and eXistenZ, films in which the loss of control and dominion over our 
acts and decisions creates an anxiety in the characters that is mirrored in the 
spectators who have an unconscious concern about suffering the same 
phenomenon. 
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The potential capacity of imagination to fragment the established 
reality and consequently to show possible realities or probabilities inside the 
real, is the point where we can find a close link with the notion of utopia. 
Utopias are ‘incomplete’ cultural expressions; they are possibilities of reality 
that amplify the potential social existence. For Karl Mannheim (1936: 169), 
utopias are searching to find a shelter in places and moments where there is 
a need to imagine something that does not (or we do not want to) exist in 
reality. Utopias have, in this sense, some analogies with the mirror,23 dreams 
and the SF genre: they are unreal, with an origin and connection with reality, 
and thus ‘represent the reduction of the original abyss between ideas and 
reality’ (Ricoeur, 1997: 295).  
One of the characteristics of utopias is that they show disagreements 
with society through the exposition of alternatives and the reactivation of 
unrealities. Utopia implies the idea of a journey to a (non-) place that is 
completely different; most of the time this is a journey with a return ticket 
to the origin: ‘utopias have become a place without a place, a moment out of 
time, the truth of the fiction’ (Marin, 1993: 8). In such a (non-) place the 
conflicts of reality have the potential to be faced, analyzed, understood and 
overcome. Today, the creation of utopias/dystopias in which the loss of 
control over technology and the creation of alternative/virtual worlds are 
constantly being reflected, are a clear sign that we are aware of the 
problems that our society (potentially) has. Utopia has become an effective 
social tool that penetrates inside reality and transforms it, renews it, 
                                               
23 Indeed, Michael Foucault sees in the mirror a perfect analogy of utopias: 
 
The mirror is, after all, a utopia, since it is a placeless place. In the mirror, I see 
myself there where I am not, in an unreal, virtual space that opens up behind the 
surface; I am over there, there where I am not, a sort of shadow that gives my own 
visibility to myself, that enables me to see myself there where I am absent: such is 
the utopia of the mirror. But it is also a heterotopia in so far as the mirror does 
exist in reality, where it exerts a sort of counteraction on the position that I occupy. 
From the standpoint of the mirror I discover my absence from the place where I 
am since I see myself over there. Starting from this gaze that is, as it were, directed 
toward me, from the ground of this virtual space that is on the other side of the 
glass, I come back toward myself; I begin again to direct my eyes toward myself 
and to reconstitute myself there where I am. The mirror functions as a heterotopia 
in this respect: it makes this place that I occupy at the moment when I look at 
myself in the glass at once absolutely real, connected with all the space that 
surrounds it, and absolutely unreal, since in order to be perceived it has to pass 
through this virtual point which is over there (Foucault, 1998: 2). 
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provoking instability in the established social system. In this sense, the 
creation of alternative realities is questioned in a series of dystopian films 
like The Matrix, Dark City and Total Recall that make patent our intention to 
avoid a future in which we are unable to distinguish if our life is real and we 
are being dominated. These dystopian SF films demonstrate that the ‘bright, 
clears prospects of science and technology have turned into a grim 
nightmare. Dystopias are, after all, failed utopias, a demonstration of the 
dangers of attempting to engineer any kind of perfect world’ (King, 2000: 
15). 
Cinema seems, therefore, a perfect medium to represent ideology, 
collective imaginations and utopias/dystopias; the existence of all these 
elements is not exclusive as they can coexist and converge in the same film 
without necessarily being in contradiction with one another. In this sense, 
The Matrix and eXistenZ are pertinent examples of films in which the 
ideology, collective imagination and the dystopia narrated relate to various 
aspects of the understanding of (un)reality but the different perspectives 
cohabit harmoniously. Films are responsible for the representation of real 
spaces, where we could have physically been, and simultaneously cinema 
expresses credible fictions which nobody can ever inhabit. Therefore it fulfils 
the ritual function of enunciation in images, the knowledge of our time, the 
ideas, fears and hopes that refer to the large collective myths or the small 
mythologies of everyday life. Cinema is achieving this in the most spectacular 
way: giving the maximum (in)visibility to the ideology, utopias and collective 
unconsciousness of our society.  
 
3.2. Semiology and Knowledge of (un)reality 
 
As the real world becomes more fantastic, so the fantastic 
world becomes more real (King, L: 2002: 137). 
 
The unreal may arise spontaneously in dreams and seems to 
fool us while we are dreaming. The unreal may also result 
from sensory or cognitive error, again spontaneously, and 
such as to lead to deception. In either case, the world co-
exists with something else thanks to the powers and frailties 
of the mind. There is another way in which the real world 
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comes to co-exist with something else. Human beings can 
represent the world in signs, language and images. 
Consequently, we live in a world of things and of 
representations of things (Irwin, 2002: 229).  
 
Visual media, and specifically cinema, are fundamental 
representations of (un)reality and also of its signs. With the visual 
technological development experienced in recent years, representations have 
achieved a reproduction of the image that breaks the traditional relationships 
between the sign and the referent. Therefore, the (un)reality that we 
perceive in films has developed to a point where we need to understand the 
relationships of our world with the image if we do not want to be confused 
with/in the reproductions. In short, semiology in cinema, the study of the 
filmic signs we create to represent (un)reality, is fundamental to comprehend 
the world in which we live today.  
Baudrillard (1993: 50-57) describes the evolution of western culture 
regarding the relationship of reality and its representations, their signs and 
images as occurring in three well differentiated stages. He denotes the first 
stage the counterfeit, a period that extends from the Renaissance to the 
Industrial Revolution and whose chief characteristic is that signs reflect a 
basic reality; the intention of art was to imitate life. The second stage, which 
he calls production, lasted throughout the Industrial Revolution and refers to 
mechanical reproduction. The third stage, the simulation, introduced 
previously in this thesis, occurs in the moment in which we live today, and is 
based on information, cybernetics and hyperreal. In this period the definition 
of the real becomes ‘not only what can be reproduced, but which is always 
already reproduced, the hyperreal’ (Baudrillard, 1983, 146).  
Semiology of cinema in Roland Barthes’ (1972: 5) terms reaches the 
point where it can be seen as a semioclastia: the deconstruction of the 
system of signs that surround us and the attribution of the latent cultural 
messages that they invoke. Cinema is therefore composed of cultural signs 
which are semiologically more complex than the word in its relation to the 
referent. The cinematic image is constituted by a ‘galaxy’ of signifiers not 
based in a fixed structure but in networks and therefore with infinite 
interpretations (Barthes, 1981: 108). This ensures that each film is different 
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for each spectator: a film constitutes a spectator’s ‘version’ of the director’s 
film; in it the semantic and social values held by the spectator are combined 
with the (un)reality and diegetic world of the film.  
As outlined previously, one of the ways to understand the qualities of 
the image nowadays is to observe the image, not as simple imitation of 
reality, but as a creation of reality. According to Barthes (1964: 1-11), the 
image is basically a reconstruction and it does not intend to achieve the 
representation of reality; it is not a reproduction, it is a simulacrum. In this 
sense, Barthes questions visual representations, examining the possibilities of 
the copy to produce true systems of signs and not merely the aggregation of 
symbols. Barthes is interested in analyzing how cinema operates as a 
language, and, to this end, differentiates three levels of the message, all of 
which are present in the image: 
 
1. The linguistic: articulated in denotation and connotation 
2. The iconic: constituted by a series of discontinuous signs 
3. Symbolic: the correspondence of signified and signifier which 
produces meaning and is strongly codified. This is the place where we can 
find the ideological sense of the message.  
 
In short, Linguistic, Iconic and Symbolic elements of cinema create the 
(un)reality of films. The specific nature of each one, and the interaction of 
all of them together, will create a more or less (un)real representation of 
reality, a representation that is simultaneously communicable. Christian Metz 
(1982) believes that cinema is indeed a language. It is a language because it 
has a text and a meaningful discourse; but it is language without a code, with 
the ability of communicating (un)reality without the constraints of 
typographic media. Metz reduces the importance of iconography in cinema to 
a marginal level, focusing on simple evidence such as ‘good cowboys wear 
white shirts and bad cowboys wear black shirts’. Metz follows the same line 
as Saussure, who perceives in the signs an arbitrary condition that makes 
them fundamental in communicating cinematic (un)reality. In fact, in the 
symbol there is always a code: it is not absolutely open and the relationship 
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between signified and signifier is unequivocal, and it is complicated to 
replace the association (Wollen, 1972: 78-81).  
Godard is one of the directors who most emphatically investigates the 
possibilities of the image and cinema as a medium of communication. Godard 
makes the most of a medium that is semiologically complex. He achieves a 
satisfactory mixture of the Linguistic, Iconic and Symbolic levels of cinema in 
his continuous research into the nature of the perception of the (un)reality of 
cinema. His films are the result of a style of filmmaking in which the 
conceptual meaning of the film coexists with the visual beauty of the image 
and the documentary ‘truth’ (Baecker, 1996: 567 and Wollen, 1972). Godard’s 
films can be defined as ‘metacinematic’. This is to say, he makes cinema 
speak about cinema, ‘manipulating’ cinematic language to undress and reveal 
his ideas about it. He frequently questions the very reality of cinema, as we 
can see in films such as À bout de Soufflé (1960), Le Petit soldat (1963) and 
Le Mépris (1963). In these films, Godard conceives a cinema where the only 
reality that it is possible to stage is a reality that is paradoxically immersed in 
fiction. In films such as Une femme est une femme (1961) Godard suggests 
that the consequence of breaking the traditional fictional artifices that 
configure the (un)reality of cinema is that the distance between the 
characters and the audience is reduced, initiating a dual phenomenon of 
proximity between the director/medium/content/material and the audience. 
When the characters evade the cinematic conventions, the audience feels 
disturbed, as the expectations about the narrative are anomalous. In fact, in 
films such as À bout de soufflé and Le Petit soldat we are encouraged to 
consider the act of having characters occasionally talking to the 
camera/audience, breaking the traditional laws of cinema.24 Reflecting the 
(un)reality of films in this manner, Godard emphasizes cinema’s conventions 
and, as a result, the distance between reality and fiction, the (in)visible filter 
that separates them, is now evident and therefore it is possible to ignore it.  
Following, then, the cineliteracy of directors of the nouvelle vague, a 
post-classical American director like David Lynch in films such as Blue Velvet 
                                               
24 We find a similar, highly self-reflexive technique in films such as Play it Again, Sam (Ross, 1972) and 
The Purple Rose of Cairo (Allen, 1985). 
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(1986), Lost Highway (1997) and Mulholland Drive (2001) has similarly 
confronted the question of how we read a film and how it is related to 
reality. So, just as Godard uses his films to question and revise the old forms 
and conventions of cinema, so, too, does Lynch, arguably updating Godard’s 
exposé of cinematic reality to revel in a truly postmodern reliance on 
pluralities and multiple meanings. Thus, Lynch introduces the spectator to 
these films with a shocking immediacy, and then the reality, the place where 
the spectator was before, is revealed as an artifice, thereby suggesting the 
unconscious and unstable characteristics of reality (Lash, 1990: 192). In 
Mulholland Drive we observe the story of an aspiring actress who meets an 
amnesiac woman who has suffered an accident. The film then adopts a 
surrealistic/oneiric narration that makes sense only if we interpret the 
images as part of a dream. The reinterpretation of the laws of cinema and 
the confusion of the spectator’s perception of the film is the ultimate aim of 
Lynch. As an investigative artist, Lynch, like Godard, is interested in the thin 
line that separates reality and unreality, film and audience, and his mode of 
research is the creation of his own films. In short, in films such as Lost 
Highway and Mulholland Drive, Lynch confuses the spectators to demonstrate 
the manipulability of the (un)reality of cinema. 
The image has a quite unique ability to communicate, then, with its 
semiological complexity, the representation of (un)reality. The (un)reality of 
the image is explained by its inevitable comparison with reality, in other 
words, the distance and relationship between the sign and the referent. In 
this sense, fiction breaks with the conventions of language and modifies the 
relationship of the sign and signifier. The creation of fictions in films is the 
perfect example of the relationship between reality and unreality: fictions 
are unreal in their composition but they have the ability to look real in our 
perception. Thus, developments in visual technologies enable the image to be 
both: a perfect reproduction of reality and/or a complete invention, an 
image with no referent in reality. In this sense, the events that followed the 
devastation which occurred on the 11th September 2001 in New York affected 
the way in which we perceive films, transforming our symbolic and 
epistemological system. This episode was beyond our imagination, beyond our 
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words and, in Lacanian terms, we can say that it was necessary to reconcile 
the real and the symbolic to understand its consequences (King, 2005: 18). 
The (un)reality of films was superseded by reality on 9/11 and therefore 
cinema required a different kind of perception to offer to the spectators as 
the boundaries of imagination became altered. Baudrillard anticipated this 
situation a few years before saying that: ‘There is an escalation of the true, 
of the lived experience. And there is a panic-stricken production of the real 
and the referential’ (1994a: 12-13). Indeed, Baudrillard (1987a: 104) points 
out that our society only knows itself and the world around through the 
reflections that come from the camera’s eye. Thus, this is an unreflexive-
Americanized knowledge: as the production credits of many of the texts 
discussed in this thesis attests, because a vast amount of films, television 
productions and videogames are generated in America, it follows that what 
we perceive is a somewhat (unavoidably) ‘American reality’. Moreover, this 
America of today is a place where things only need to ‘appear’ credible in 
order to ‘be’ credible; it is the ‘desert of the real’ of today and an ongoing 
example of the emptiness of representations (Baudrillard, 1988a).  
We are witnesses to the rise of a new regime of signification that 
reconfigures the culture from its foundations. In this sense, Martin Barbero 
(2002: 81) affirms that what the technological revolution introduced into our 
society is not only a considerable number of new machines, but, more 
importantly, a new way of relating to the symbolic process. In other words, 
the most relevant consequences of technology are not the apparatus, the new 
devices, but the new modes of use of language and perception. The real 
impact of new technological inventions is produced in intangible elements: 
in(side) our selves, in the way that we interact with our environment, with 
(un)reality. This is the consequence of the dominion of the audiovisual 
experience over typography and the belief in the image as a legitimate way 
of transmitting knowledge. As Peter Greenaway points out ‘we have achieved 
the end of the supremacy of the text and we are entering now in the time of 
the image’ (Constenla, 2008). Therefore, we need to learn how to perceive 
and understand the image and its (un)reality. 
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For Lacan (1980: 80, 292) the ‘thing’ itself is the glance, not the object 
that is perceived. In this sense, images that distort our perception of reality 
are ‘real’ in themselves; they cannot be taken marginally. Reality in Lacan’s 
work (1980: 56-77) will not be the referent that should be discovered and 
domesticated using the filter of fantasy, because reality is also the filter 
itself. In this respect, Gilles Deleuze believes that when things are replaced 
by their image, the image becomes automatically self-sufficient, self-
referential and independent of the subject, in other words: an absolute. In 
the image, the truth and the imaginary are, in some sense, indistinguishable 
(Trifonova, 2004: 145). We need to ‘reconstruct’ our perception to manage 
our understanding of the new technological image which has no trace in 
reality. Indeed, our perception will need to get closer to ‘the artificial’ 
because this will be the perfect way to perceive (un)reality. In other words, 
this is the replacement of the ‘original purity’ of perception with the 
artificial/technological understanding of it.  
Deleuze (2005: 163) designates the cinema of the last few decades a 
cinema in which the image by itself produces fascination as ‘pure expression’, 
a cinema of real falsification. His conception of cinema is similar to the idea 
of knowledge in Plato: the world is a film that was there before the 
perception of the human eye captured the images in celluloid, creating a 
‘camera consciousness’. Indeed, it is interesting to use the allegory of Plato’s 
cave to illustrate the knowledge of reality in cinema spectators when they 
give ‘reality to a world without substance’ (Konigsberg, 1996: 1), and, being 
immobile and passive in the dark, accept copies or simulacra for the original 
objects. Plato (1992: 514-517) illustrates the human situation with respect to 
knowledge of reality and what informs this by evoking the image of a cavern. 
Within the deepest part of the cavern he depicts prisoners who have been 
chained up since their childhood, and are able only to watch what is 
presented before their eyes: a wall onto which the shadows of various objects 
placed behind them, and therefore that they cannot see, are being 
projected. In a situation like this, when a prisoner is released they perceive 
the first shadows as more real than the direct objects they encounter. Only 
once the initial pain is transformed into a clear vision would they begin to 
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perceive the true things; and thus it is in this ‘outside luminous’ that the real 
knowledge of these things occurs. The prisoners would learn not to be 
deceived by appearances that, inside the cavern, they had taken as a true 
and unique reality. We can find a strong parallelism here with The Matrix 
trilogy in which the humans connected to The Matrix undergo the same 
phenomenon: their vision of the world is far from reality and clearly 
distorted. Just as in dreams, they live in an unreal world, but they ignore the 
fact that this is their condition. 
Indeed, cinema is, in a sense, comparable to the act of dreaming. 
Cinema and dreams are usually seen as diametrically opposed to reality when 
they should be observed as dialectically linked. Cinema shares some of the 
functions traditionally fulfilled exclusively by dreams as it helps our brain to 
improve its operation, identifying our worries, fears and hopes. For authors 
such as Jean-Louis Baudry the analogy between cinema and dreams is based 
in a ‘form of lost satisfaction’ (1986: 307); indeed in cinema we find 
something that ‘belongs to the sphere of the double, the phantasm, the 
mirror or the dream’ (Baudrillard, 1987b: 25). Thus, apart from the obvious 
physical affinity between both experiences (the darkness, the passivity, the 
images), the most relevant similarity lies in what cinema gives to us: a 
primary and unconscious identification with what we are seeing/dreaming. 
Baudry describes it as being: 
 
A relative narcissism, and even more to a mode of relating to 
reality which could be defined as enveloping and in which 
the separation between one's own body and the exterior 
world is not well defined (Baudry, 1986: 312). 
 
In this process of watching a film, the cinematographic image suffers a 
double and paradoxical effect: it becomes more real than the simple 
succession of images and it also becomes more ‘ours’. Cinema contains its 
own reality but this reality is appropriated by the spectator who, with his 
memories, experiences and personality, ‘reconstructs’ and gives a personal 
sense to the (un)reality of the film. The spectator, during a specific lapse in 
time, introduces the imaginary of the film into his life and the film becomes 
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like that of a ‘lent dream’. Such interwoven processes of absorption generate 
a (partial) disconnection from the reality of the individual.  
A common response to the power of a film’s images comes from their 
peculiar characteristics, where the large scale and highly detailed images 
engage the audience in an activity of intense but simultaneously relaxing 
sustained attention. In cinema, the spectator’s actions are normally reduced 
to merely watching and listening to the film. Under these conditions, the 
normal ‘judging’ function of the ego is suspended, to some degree, and our 
ability to be receptive to ideas, to the (un)reality of the film, increases in 
comparison to our everyday life. This can be interestingly compared to the 
activity of watching a film at home where, in spite of the development in 
technological audiovisual devices, the capacity of concentration decreases in 
inverse proportion to the increase of distractions. In this context, the 
(un)reality of the film encounters more barriers in linking with our 
imagination, permeating our psyche and being appropriated by the spectator. 
The lights, noises, interruptions and other interferences make the spectators 
less vulnerable to the film when watching in a domestic environment.  
Metz observes that one of the most remarkable qualities of cinema is 
that it effaces the absence of the real with a simulated or constructed 
reality, and, as a result, it fills the spectator’s lack, restoring him to an 
imaginary wholeness: 
 
The unique position of the cinema lies in this dual character 
of its signifier: unaccustomed perceptual wealth, but at the 
same time stamped with unreality to an unusual degree. It 
drums up all perception, but to switch it immediately over 
into its own absence, which is nonetheless the only signifier 
present (Metz, 1982: 45).  
 
In this sense, Lacan, who locates himself at the point of confluence between 
unconscious reality and conscious reality, refers to this phenomenon when 
reality and unreality comprise one entity using the term ‘suture’. Lacan 
(1979: 118) explains the identification of the audience with the film, relying 
on this ‘conjunction of the imaginary and the symbolic’ within the cinematic 
 - 87 -
discourse itself. In Lacan’s terms, cinema sutures the reality and the 
imaginary, and produces (un)conscious satisfaction in the audiences. 
The continuous play of contemporary cinema with presence and 
absence, with reality and unreality, produces a new harmonic co-existence 
within the ‘cinematic dream’. The perceptual equality of the image, as real 
and unreal objects have the same status on the screen, means that, in filmic 
terms, the imaginary can be just as credible as the real. Therefore the 
consequence is a disconcerted consciousness where the imaginary seems 
perceptual and the perceptual seems imaginary. In Sartre’s terms we can 
deduce that there is a displacement of the real by the unreal and it is this 
which produces pleasure in the audience (Orr, 1993: 85-90).  
To achieve this connection of the (un)reality of the film with the 
spectator, cinema has created a series of shared conventions, a kind of 
accepted (un)reality, to watch films in a certain way. The assumption is that 
the initial reality is being substituted for an illusion of reality, and 
consequently, it has become an established complex set of abstractions 
mixed up with elements of ‘authentic’ reality. A perfect illustration of the 
‘real’ status achieved by (un)real conventions of cinema is sound and colour. 
We certainly perceive the world with colour and sound and therefore an 
accurate representation of it should have these characteristics. But in spite of 
this, when it became technically feasible, colour and sound in audiovisual 
media did not faithfully reflect the reality perceived when we are not in front 
of the screen. The social habits, the education of perception, play a 
fundamental role in the acceptance of cinematic (un)real conventions and 
therefore are adapted according to the circumstances and technology 
available at the time. In this sense, one of the most relevant conventions we 
can find is the use of the black and white image. It seems to be completely 
artificial, but nevertheless human perception has managed to give it 
cinematic (un)reality. Language and certain sounds are other conventions 
that have ‘gained reality’ through the historical cinematic education; the 
language in a film may not necessarily correspond with the time and location 
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represented25 and we accept that some sounds are different to the ones we 
hear in real life. In particular spot effects demonstrate how cinematic 
conventions can become real for audiences. A useful example is the sound of 
gun fire: onscreen, gun fire has to whistle to seem real, a noise that does not 
correspond with the real sound of a bullet. 
Paradoxically, the violation of such conventions concerning the 
(un)reality of the film creates fascination and satisfaction in the audience. Á 
Bout de soufflé, Le Petit soldat, Le Mépris, Lost Highway and Mulholland 
Drive are all illustrative of the violation of classic cinematic conventions in 
order to investigate the (un)reality of cinema. Today what we find in films 
such as The Matrix, eXistenZ, Memento, Waking Life and Run Lola Run is the 
‘technological’ twisting, the transformation and innovation of such 
conventions to research the technology and the (un)reality in which we live. 
These films break with the conventions of cinema using ‘artificial’ zooms, 
movements and camera positions, slow motion, colours, sounds and narration 
of the plots, which leave the spectator in a position of uncertainty. 
Therefore, we should say that cinema is not real per se, but we ‘make it real’ 
in an (un)conscious social and audiovisual process that today reflects the 
transformation in the perception and understanding of (un)reality.  
The new cinematic conventions that films are creating through 
technology, among which the ‘bullet time’ is the most representative, 
demonstrates that the social and technological time in which we live is 
generating a new glance at the world; one in which reality and unreality is 
digitally (con)fused. Therefore, the introduction of new technologies implies 
that cinema is not simply a ‘realist mirror’. The new technologies applied to 
cinema favour the creation of new styles and simultaneously the 
complexities, fears and hopes of contemporary life provides new thematics 
for these films. Fused together, both elements generate the appearance of a 
new image as well as a new way of seeing cinema.  
 
                                               
25 In this respect Zack Snyder, the director of 300 (2007), justifies the abundant presence of British actors 
in the film, claiming that ‘it was a convention of those type of movies that people from the ancient world 
speak with an English accent. I know it is completely ridiculous, but I thought audiences would accept it’ 
(Millar, 2007: 25) . 
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3.3. Postmodernity  
 
One could isolate two impulses in tension at the turn of the 
century -the impulse to rectify the discontinuity of 
modernity, its traumatic disruption, through the provision of 
an illusion of continuity (to resist modernity), and the 
impulse to embody discontinuity as a fundamental human 
condition (to embrace modernity). The cinema, in effect, 
does both (Doane, 1993: 13-14). 
 
Postmodernity is explained by the disruption of the modern illusion in 
constant progress. Today we find that progress in cultural, social, political 
and economic areas is not as advanced as we might wish; yet technology 
hides this frustration with the ability to create unrealities never thought able 
to be produced before. George Balandier indicates that today we are living in 
a hyperrationalized and aseptic culture that is sentenced to segregation: on 
one side exists a collective imagination that reflects the socially frustrated 
dreams, and on the other side a ‘technoimaginarium’, where the power of 
the image and the magic of the complex machines that we have developed 
cover up the dissatisfaction hidden behind the brightness of the lights 
(Balandier, 1988: 242). The reproductions that we have created conceal our 
incapacity to build a world in which égalité, fraternité and liberté, the 
dream of the Enlightenment and the fundamentals of modernity, become 
true, not only in virtual, hyperreal, cyber-realities of 0s and 1s, but in the 
real world of atoms. Thus, the so-called culminating point of our society is 
revealed in films such as The Matrix, Blade Runner and Terminator, SF 
dystopias with a pessimistic image of the future: a loss in faith related to our 
progress in terms of science and rationality. The assumption of this social and 
cultural failure of modernity is metaphorically represented in The Matrix 
when Neo, after choosing the red pill and consequently choosing to know the 
truth, opens his eyes and is guided by Morpheus in a demonstration of the 
real status of the world: a destroyed society in a deserted environment.   
In economic and political terms, we can define our era as that of a 
multinational capitalism, a system that is highly dependent upon rapid 
technological advancements for its continuous expansion. As described 
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previously, today the key ‘global resource’ is information itself rather than 
oil, farm goods or other resources usually associated with capitalist market 
systems. Information today represents power and determines the 
population’s actions; consequently dominion over the world of bits is 
translated into control in the world of flesh. Blade Runner is perhaps the film 
that in the clearest way shows the dramatic view of a postmodern society 
(Lyon, 1994: 1-6). Blade Runner takes place in Los Angeles, a modern and 
multicultural city nowadays, but which in 2019 presents an aspect of absolute 
urban decadence. The sunny California that we know has obviously suffered a 
nuclear or chemical disaster. The city becomes an impersonal place without 
distinctive characteristics, where different styles and cultures are mixed up 
under the neon lights of commercial advertisements. It is in this context that 
the modern industrial organization shows new principles that are not based in 
capital or work as the main resource of power. Instead, they have been 
substituted for information, knowledge and communication. Therefore, we 
cannot see any political or social influence in the execution of power. 
Economy manipulates society and both are directly dependent on the 
technological and information industry. Blade Runner portrays a consumerist 
society in which everything is a show and the most important thing is 
appearance. Blade Runner depicts a situation in which all boundaries have 
imploded within cultures, biology, technology and between reality and 
unreality. Consequently, this is a world in which simulations have displaced 
reality (Kellner, 1995: 305). 
At the point of confluence of reality and (un)reality, of machine and 
human, we find Cyberpunk. Cyberpunk is defined as a postmodernist 
tendency and ‘the cultural expression of late capitalism’ (Jameson, 1996: 9). 
It is a vision of the future under the prism of a pessimistic imposition of 
technology and its consequences: its impact on the conduct of the people and 
the living space which turns from an empirical reality to a virtual one, the 
Cyberspace, the ‘no-space’ (Jameson, 1991: 38 and 321). Cyberpunk should 
be understood as a kind of socio-economic theory that embraces technology 
and offers up an alternative to the bright, utopian dream of modernity: a 
dystopian future. Cyberpunk is reflected in the increasing number of dark 
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premonitions about the fast technological changes that not only affect 
society, but also the human body. The Matrix, Videodrome, eXistenZ, Strange 
Days (Bigelow, 1995) and The Terminator are perfect examples of both: a 
pessimistic vision of the future and the increasing link of technology with the 
human body, the end of the duality of flesh and machine. In this respect, we 
find the work of Donna Haraway as an alternative to the pessimistic 
conditions described by Cyberpunk. For Haraway the cyborg is a ‘hybrid of 
machine and organism, a creature of social reality as well as a creature of 
fiction’ that designates forced adaptations of life to global capitalism and 
produces future hybrid solutions to technological societies (Haraway, 1991: 
199).   
Indeed, (con)fusion and contradiction are probably the best way to 
define the nature of the postmodern cinema wherein there is a constant 
blurring of boundaries; where reality and unreality share the same 
representations; and where technology and human, cultures, temporal 
periods, spaces and languages are (con)fused. In other words, postmodern 
cinema symbolically (re)constructs and (re)presents reality in ways that 
‘simultaneously and contradictorily abolish and establish the real and its 
representations’ (Jameson, 1991: IX-XIII). Postmodern cinema should be 
understood as the ‘historical’ and social result of the confusion between 
reality and unreality, a cultural intention to join the technological 
development with our old social and philosophical knowledge that has not 
been significantly transformed since the Enlightenment. Postmodern cinema 
reflects the times in which we are living, times of digitalization in which copy 
and modification acquire new magnitudes and consequently affect the 
relationship of signifier and referent. Postmodern cinema is, in this sense, the 
‘crisis caused by modernism and modern culture confronting the failure of its 
own strategy of visualizing’ (Mirzoeff, 1998: 4). Lash (1990: 11-12) indicates 
that the basic difference that we can find between modernism and 
postmodernism in cinema is that whilst modernism is interested in the 
problematic character of representation, postmodernism makes reality 
problematic and consequently referents and signifiers assume a new and 
different relationship: 
 - 92 -
Modernism had clearly differentiated and autonomized the 
roles of signifier, signified, and referent. Post-modernization 
on the contrary problematizes these distinctions, and 
especially the status and relationship of signifier and 
referent, or put another way, representation and reality 
(Lash, 1990: 12).  
   
According to postmodernism, behind surface and simulation there is nothing; 
there is emptiness in the representation. Postmodern cinema is based around 
simulation, (un)reality, substitutes and virtuality. This is a paradigm that 
contrasts it with modernity and its obsessive search to discover hidden 
referents under (un)reality. Indeed, in postmodernity the images and signs, 
the representation of the objects have achieved a similar standard to the 
referents, the objects that contribute to the configuration of our lives 
(Baudrillard, 1974: 32-33). In Jameson’s words: 
 
If there is any realism left there it is a ‘realism’ which is 
meant to derive from the shock of slowly becoming aware of 
a new and original situation in which we are condemned to 
seek History by way of our Pop images and simulacra of that 
history, which itself remains forever out or reach (Jameson, 
1991: 71). 
 
 The image that we can see in Jameson’s vision of postmodernism is 
similar to Lacan’s endless chain of signifiers, which culminates with no 
reference in the world of experience and produces emptiness, despite the 
fulfillment of images. The conclusion is that technology has, in our current 
time, an effectiveness never experienced before to (re)create (un)reality 
from representations. In this sense, films like The Matrix trilogy, Dark City, 
Total Recall and eXistenZ appeal to the perfect simulation of reality; the 
ultimate virtual technology that provokes inestimable consequences in our 
lives when we do not know if we are living in the representations. Apart from 
a common concern across their plots, some of these films coincide in having 
an astonishing level of performance in which the visual spectacle works 
together with the story, mutually reinforcing each other in their coexistence 
and generating a cinema with a figural connotation. In these films the 
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spectacle is (un)reality, its potential transformation and our fears related to 
this phenomenon. 
The continuous play with the (un)reality of the images and the 
consequent belief/disbelief in the spectator denotes a cinema in which ‘being 
tricked’ is its final aim. Signification does not run very deep and ‘being fooled 
is enormous fun, and although we are not sure precisely how it was done, we 
are amazed at the cleverness of it all’ (Darley, 2000: 55). As discussed in the 
previous chapter, today the irony of the computer generated image and 
visual-technological special effects is that even being conscious that we are 
being deceived we can still submit to the illusory effect generated by them. 
New technologies will provide us with the tools necessary, not only to 
reproduce the reality that we know but to communicate new forms of reality 
or new realities. In this sense, special effects are a way to ‘represent a mode 
of visual display that privileges aesthetic novelty over realism’ (Pierson, 
2002: 156).  
We are thus living in a society where our perceptions are divided and 
confused between reality and the representations of reality. The latter 
gradually constitute a larger proportion of our perceptions and consequently 
the vision that we have configured of the world is closer to the simulacrum 
than to what it actually represents. In particular, SF films such as The Matrix, 
eXistenZ and Total Recall are very useful cultural tools to analyze the 
creation of alternative/simulacral (un)realities, their cultural and social 
significance, and how individuals react to such technological confusion. 
 
3.4.  Science Fiction 
 
Because real life, true life, will never be enough to 
overwhelm human desires. And because without the vital 
dissatisfaction that the lies of fiction appease, we would 
never have real progress. The fantasy we have is a demonic 
gift. It continuously opens an abyss between what we are 
and what we want to be, between what we have and what 
we wish. But imagination has conceived an astute and subtle 
palliative for that inevitable divorce between our reality and 
our excessive appetite: the fiction. Thanks to it we are more 
and we are others being the same persons. (Vargas Llosa 
1990: 19). 
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We engage ourselves in the fictional space the film creates for 
us. The more we ‘lose ourselves' in the fiction, the further we 
choose to enter this altered reality in a way psychologically 
similar to the way Neo entered his new reality, Douglas Hall 
and Jane Fuller enter simulated worlds in The Thirteenth 
Floor, or the way Allegra Geller and Ted Pikul enter the 
simulated game world of eXistenZ (Irwin, 2002: 179).  
 
In creative terms, fiction is defined in opposition to reality, 
designating all those productions with a content that does not directly 
correspond to the empirical reality of the world. SF is a composed and 
opposed concept, because science refers to the set of knowledge subject to 
experimentation, arrangement and verification but fiction, on the other 
hand, evokes invention, the ‘no-existence state’. SF, from this point of view, 
constitutes a step forward in the idea of transgressing reality, transforming it 
into something credible. And to make this possible the unconditional and 
(un)conscious collaboration of the spectator is essential.   
SF has used its diversity and flexibility to absorb ideas from other 
domains and genres to keep the genre alive for more than a century (King, 
2000: 3). Films like The Matrix are SF productions that contain elements of 
other genres such as the martial arts film, the western and the thriller.  SF 
cinema manages to amalgamate the subjective point of view of the artist who 
creates the story with the objectivity of science and, as a result, it creates a 
scientific perception of the future observed from the subjective position of 
the director. SF shows, in this way, the possible changes that will occur in a 
hypothetical future from a credible point of view, telling us (sometimes 
pessimistically) how things will be if we follow a certain direction and 
thereby highlighting our present fears and anxieties. However, SF cinema 
does not only display the contradictions of the system; it also makes clear 
that the world in which we live is not the only possible one, but simply a set 
of social and human relationships that is one amongst many possibilities. 
 Like myths, the main tool used by SF to reflect the problems of our 
society is to project them into a different world or a distant future where we 
can see, reflected with more objectivity, these problems of our society far 
from the location and time where we live. Today these problems are mainly 
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related to the fears of losing control over our life provoked by the 
development of technology, and this often leads to the creation of virtual 
worlds in which the perception of reality and unreality is confused. SF films 
such as Total Recall, eXistenZ, The Lawnmower Man, The Matrix, Abre los 
Ojos, Dark City and The Thirteenth Floor are perfect illustrations of these 
fears and the pessimistic predictions of our society. 
Science has always endeavoured, with theories and with the use of 
technology, to explain and question the nature of reality and the way we 
perceive it. Scientists such as Hugh Everett III discovered in 1956 that reality 
may not be the product of universal laws of perception as we can only 
experience ‘one world’ consciously, and so named his theory the ‘Many 
Worlds Theory’.26 The Many Worlds Theory is useful to apply to the 
experience of SF protagonists such as Neo, César, Quaid and Allegra Geller, 
and simultaneously the experience of the spectators of these films. According 
to this theory, there is a coexistence of different worlds, different realities. 
Technological virtual worlds are only an alternative and, concurrently, visual 
technologies in cinema, the diegetic worlds that we perceive on the screen, 
are just a different level of (un)reality. Both of them cannot be defined as 
opposed to reality but at a step removed from the natural world.  
With their arguments and questions, films of the SF genre denote the 
social and ideological changes in the concept of reality and, in this sense, we 
can observe a problematization of reality, the coincidence of various levels of 
reality in some of the SF films released in the last two decades. In this way, 
in The Matrix we see a computer generated life, the battery life of the pods 
and the life in the ‘desert of the real’. Total Recall juxtaposes the ideal 
reproduction of the character’s life with the reality of his existence, and this 
is interwoven in a way that the fact of who he is is completely indiscernible 
for him. And in eXistenZ we can perceive diverse and simultaneous virtual 
levels (when the protagonists play virtual games inside games) together with 
the reality of the computer users. In eXistenZ, the perception of the 
boundaries between virtuality and reality shift and alter in such a way that 
                                               
26 See Giobran (1999). 
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the distinction between the game and the diegetic world(s) of the film 
becomes blurred. All these SF films demonstrate that western society is 
aware of the reproduction/creation of technological (un)realities and the 
dangers that they imply. The only possible way to avoid the fear and feel 
confident about our creations is to understand their potential, the dangers of 
our technology and how to deal with the virtual worlds that we are 
producing. 
SF is historically and intrinsically linked to technology, and, in this 
respect, we can trace two fundamental stages in the relationship between SF 
and technology, periods in which the technology used in the films also 
reflects the historical social moment and the transformation of the genre 
from low budget films to the spectacular budgets of today. So, we find a 
period in the 1950s when technology was acquiring a new role: the Cold War 
and the fear of the outsider inspired many films in which Earth or our society 
is attacked by societies/aliens with more advanced technology. Indeed, films 
such as It Came from Outer Space (Arnold, 1953), Invasion of the Body 
Snatchers (Siegel, 1956), Forbidden Planet (Wilcox, 1956) and It, The Terror 
From Beyond Space (Cahn, 1958) illustrate this fear of the unknown in 
western societies. Today, with a consumer electronic/virtual/digital society, 
and where technology has achieved a different stage and become part of our 
life and simultaneously an unknown, the social fear is different; the threat is 
not outside but it is ‘in’ us, in our society. This is a fear based on losing 
control over our technological creations, of being dominated by the 
technology we have produced and not being able to understand the virtual 
environments that we have produced. Films such as The Matrix, eXistenZ, 
The Lawnmower Man, Total Recall and Abre los Ojos are perfect examples of 
both the technological fears and the SF of today. In this sense Vivian 
Sobchack suggests that ‘we have lost a concrete perception of reality and 
those changes in technology have led to the radical alternative of our 
culture’s temporal and spatial consciousness’ (Sobchack, 1997: 255). Thus, SF 
films have the ability to analyze social changes and the way that individuals 
perceive reality; this makes SF a most crucial tool for analyzing the 
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technological confusion between reality and unreality that we are 
experiencing today. 
In this sense, and according to Isaac Asimov (1984: 2), the concept of 
SF emerged and was directly linked to the social change caused by scientific 
and technological development. The interest of SF would be to criticize, 
extend, review and revolutionize all the scientific models with a core 
purpose: to provoke a new vision, a more suitable and appropriate perception 
of the world. For Asimov, SF uses arguments as a tool to introduce scientific 
concepts to the receptor, raising new theories and discovering what could 
happen if they were ever applied in reality. New technologies, specifically 
visual, digital and virtual technologies, are the innovations that SF of the last 
decades is projecting in the future. And this has devastating consequences for 
individuals and the society as we can observe in The Matrix, Total Recall, 
eXistenZ and The Lawnmower Man. 
Paradoxically, SF has always used ideas and concepts from science but 
has also inspired scientists to research and believe in certain possibilities 
concerning the evolution of technology in a double feedback process. The 
Internet is a good illustration of a fiction which ‘inspired’ or preceded a real 
invention. As mentioned in the previous chapter, some years before the 
general public had news about the World Wide Web, William Gibson proposed 
in his novel Neuromancer the concept of a network that facilitates 
connections and communication among humans, what we understand today as 
the Internet. SF is therefore the result of speculations that have the potential 
to become real, thanks to the impulse of the imagination. In this sense, the 
SF films from the end of the 1980s, such as 12 Monkeys, Strange Days, The 
Matrix, The Lawnmower Man, eXistenZ and Total Recall, are based on 
variations of the technology that we currently have and the fears that they 
invoke. 
SF productions make a double and paradoxical use of technology: they 
apply to the film the most developed technology to denounce the ‘perverted’ 
side and obscure perspective of technology. Bukatman (1999: 265) identifies 
the ‘sublime’, the ‘dark side’ of this technological evolution in SF productions 
in which there is a connection between the technological spectacle, as in The 
 - 98 -
Matrix and Total Recall, and our anxieties about the appearance of new 
technologies. Bukatman points out that the paradox of:  
 
the presence of the sublime in the deeply American genre of 
science fiction implies that our fantasies of superiority 
emerge from our ambivalence regarding technological 
power. The might of technology, supposedly our own 
creation, is mastered through a powerful display that 
acknowledges anxiety but recontains it within the field of 
spectatorial power (Bukatman, 1999: 265).  
 
Therefore, the spectacle displayed by SF films hides a terrifying truth under 
the spectacular surface: the technology that we have created has moved 
beyond our ability to control and understand it. To denounce this, SF requires 
the submission of the spectator to its internal logic. The capacity of cinema 
to immerse ourselves in the film is analyzed by Sarah E. Worth (Worth, 2002: 
180-181) who names her theory ‘the paradox of fiction’, and which can be 
explained via three central points:  
 
1. We only respond emotively to things that we believe to be real, 
2. We do not believe fiction is real, and 
3. We respond emotionally to fiction 
 
In spite of the contradiction that it represents, the paradox is possible thanks 
to both: the ability of SF film narratives to immerse the spectators and the 
visual credibility of the ‘technological tricks’ of the films. The consequence is 
that the spectator is able to believe in the (un)reality of SF. The narrative 
structure of SF films also helps to produce submission to the film on the part 
of the spectator. The spectator identifies with the reality that is described in 
the beginning of the film, but one or more elements will break the normality 
and confuse it with fiction. In this way, The Matrix, eXistenZ and Abre los 
Ojos use ‘science’, technology that is not completely unfamiliar to us, to 
immerse us in the film, then the ‘fiction’ arrives once we ‘believe’ and are 
completely submerged in the film. In The Matrix, the double life of Neo, who 
is both a computer programmer and hacker, is twisted when he is immersed 
in a virtual world. And, in Abre los Ojos, the dream life of César turns into a 
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nightmare when he has an accident: his inability to accept his consequently 
disfigured appearance drives him to commit suicide and, with the help of 
technology, he leaves his body frozen while his brain is fed with a virtual pre-
selected future. These are the facts that will not need a rational explanation, 
although they are not necessarily illogical. Thus, maintaining a link with an 
unusual perception of the familiar, SF manages to make credible the 
incredible, justify what our reason points to as a hypothesis or present a 
world that only responds to speculation.  
In parallel with the narrative structure and tricks of the SF genre, its 
visual technology, the image, is also perfectly adapted to the believe/doubt 
structure. On one hand, it reproduces a credible (sometimes future) real life, 
the ‘believing element’, and on the other hand it astonishes the spectator 
with optical tricks and spectacular images, the ‘doubt element’. Indeed, in SF 
it is not possible to speak about content eluding the form and vice versa, 
because each element contributes to and depends on the other; in fact 
‘spectacle and speculation sum up the two dimensions of the genre’ (King, 
2000: 7). SF explores a fundamental objective: to satisfy the spectator about 
the creation of credible (un)real worlds. The genre is developed between the 
spheres of the real and the imaginary (Gatto, 2000), and therefore requires a 
special relationship between both dimensions. Indeed, we are thus reminded, 
once again, that SF cinema perfectly illustrates the (con)fusion of reality and 
unreality. Reality is revealed in films such as The Matrix, Total Recall and 
Lawnmower Man ‘through’ fiction. SF represents ‘the sublime’ and the 
‘suture’ of the real and imaginary, and, in the process, provides satisfaction 
together with the simulation of undesired and probably terrible experiences. 
This is actually a recurrent idea in Dick’s stories. The ideas of this 
famous SF writer have been adapted into several films that have been 
released in the last three decades such as Blade Runner, Total Recall, 
Minority Report (Spielberg, 2002) and A Scanner Darkly. His main ideas can 
be summarized in the existence of a simulation or perceptual trick, a fictional 
reality that may be under someone else’s control. The idea of false 
consciousness, an intentional deception, is combined with the belief that to 
be in control of reality and its representations is the only way to re-conquer 
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our existence. According to Richard Wright, such films found their inspiration 
in ‘a media critique which sees the new information societies as having 
created and imposed on their populations a form of organization structured 
by mediated forms of experience’ (Wright, 2000: 1).  
SF makes clear the unconscious, hidden and imperceptible elements of 
our society and also makes credible and acceptable ‘the supernatural’ and a 
variety of strange elements, finding its justification in the progress of 
science. The verisimilitude that arises from the association with the 
attitudes, methods and terminology of science is one of the aspects that 
distinguishes SF from fantasy films. In other words, SF implies the transition 
from magic to science while the magical characteristics of fantasy clash with 
the scientific approach of SF. According to Robert A. Heinlein, this is 
precisely the definition of SF:  
 
realistic speculation of future events, a speculation based on 
a suitable event of the past or present world and that is 
constituted through the understanding of the nature or the 
signified of the scientific method (Heinlein, 1964: 22). 
  
Thus the principal difference of fantasy films and SF films is that fantasy is 
simply elaborated with elements of reality but has no connection with 
reality. Fantasy does not intend to project our society into the future with its 
present problems, but is presented as an escape or an alternative to our 
current issues. Fantasy cinema is defined by James Donald as: 
 
Films which show worlds, whether ours or not, that depart 
from the rules of everyday reality, often using cinema’s 
spectacular capacity for illusion and trickery to conjure up 
before our eyes weird creatures and strange happenings in 
impossible narratives (Donald, 1989: 10). 
 
 In this way, the huge economic success of fantasy sagas such as Lord of the 
Rings (Jackson, 2001-2003), Star Wars (Star Wars Episode IV: A New Hope 
(Lucas, 1977); Star Wars Episode V: The Empire Strikes Back (Kershner, 
1980); Star Wars Episode VI: The Return of the Jedi (Marquand, 1983); Star 
Wars Episode I: Phantom Menace (Lucas, 1999); Star Wars Episode II: Attack 
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of the Clones (Lucas, 2002) and Star Wars Episode III: Revenge of the Sith 
(Lucas, 2005)) and The Chronicles of Narnia (Adamson and Apted, 2005-2008) 
suggests that spectators also find satisfaction in the absence of reality. This 
is not in contradiction with our fears of technology and the perception of 
(un)reality but should be understood as an alternative to them. In fact, the 
disavowal of reality produces in the spectator the avoidance of present 
threats. In this way, due to its connection with the unconscious, fantasy is 
especially open to psychoanalytic studies, suggesting a confrontation 
between the laws of society and the unconscious resistance of the mind. 
The extraordinary events that we perceive in fantasy are admitted as 
genuine in the fiction, although the spectator does not believe in these facts 
in his real life. The strategy of fantasy is to immerse the spectator in a 
delimited-unlimited reality-unreality. This is a place we will inhabit for a 
certain, though usually prolonged,27 amount of time before coming back to 
the real world, not believing that the fantasy continues there. In other words, 
in fantasy, we are always aware of what constitutes the real world, our lives 
and what does not; reality and unreality are clearly bordered. This is in 
distinct contrast with SF in which the ideas of the film tend to continue in our 
minds after we finish watching, simply because it has a stronger link with our 
reality. This is the ‘exit strategy’ that for Darren Tofts (2003: 4) frames 
fantasy in opposition to SF. Ironically it also reflects the experiences of the 
characters in some SF films of the last decade: Neo in The Matrix, Quaid in 
Total Recall and Allegra Geller in eXistenZ. These characters try to find an 
exit and they ‘escape’ (or believe they do) from virtuality to return to the 
real world, something that is illustrative of both the escapist idea of SF and 
of the moment we are living, in which new virtual technologies fascinate us 
but simultaneously threaten to take us to labyrinthine places from where we 
cannot return.  
SF does not offer audiences an escape, but, like a distorted mirror, 
many SF productions of the last two decades showcase the problems that 
                                               
27 Indeed, many fantasy films are known for their long run-times. At a run-time of 201 minutes (251 
minutes for the special extended edition), a film such as Jackson’s The Lord of The Rings: The Return of 
The King (2003), the third in the trilogy, is indicative of the protracted immersion offered up by the 
fantasy genre.   
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society faces today as well as those that are waiting to come. It achieves this 
using the same elements that it is denouncing: confusion and technology. Its 
analytical and anticipative qualities make SF an essential tool and medium 
with which to understand the confusion of reality and unreality provoked by 
technology and that lies at the heart of this thesis. 
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Chapter IV  
 
Practical Project - Luna 28 
 
Luna is an independent film that investigates the confusion between 
reality and unreality. The film works synergistically with the text, creating a 
body of work that conducts research in the same direction, pursuing the same 
target but from different perspectives. It was apposite to use images and 
words, practice and theory, the subjective experience of the diegetic 
character concerning the confusion of reality and unreality and what is 
generally held to be the ‘objective’ concepts of academic formality in a 
complementary and mutually beneficial endeavour. The theory is thus 
‘translated’ into facts to see if the academic discourses - social, philosophical 
and cinematographic theories - can be applied to everyday life, or, in other 
words, to examine if the scholarly vision of our society is accurate, or, if it 
reflects a non representable dimension of our culture. Central to the film, 
however, is precisely the confusion of reality and unreality and the use and 
influence of technology in this confusion, a phenomenon oscillating at the 
crux of the various discourses presented in the thesis.  
This film is not a SF production; nevertheless the structure of the film 
maintains some common elements with the SF productions examined in this 
research including The Matrix, Total Recall and eXistenZ. Thus, Victor’s 
(Vicente Diaz Gandasegui) perfectly normal life is altered by an incident that 
produces confusion about the (un)reality in which he is living. Victor, like 
Neo, Quaid and Allegra Geller has to deal with the new circumstances of his 
life and the confusion of not being able to differentiate between what is real 
and what is unreal. With each of these characters it is technology that plays a 
fundamental part in provoking such confusion, being the origin and the 
medium to be (un)consciously confused. Luna is a story that ‘belongs’ to our 
society and at the same time shows the inner concerns of our society, 
specifically our incapacity to deal with the attributes intrinsic to new 
technology. The experiences narrated in Luna are not intended to be 
applicable to every single individual but to capture a more general social and 
                                               
28  The original script is included in the appendix. 
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sociological concern in western societies: today technology provides new 
sources to immerse and confuse reality and unreality through Cyberspace, 
digital worlds and videogames, and our misunderstanding of it can potentially 
affect us.  
It was intended that an uncomplicated film be made; a film that 
presented the audience with the (un)reality of daily life. It was the objective 
that the originality of Luna had to reside largely in the narrative decisions 
and not in the digital manipulation of the image. That said, such audiovisual 
manipulation is certainly present in Luna when the female protagonist, Luna 
(Małgorzata Wądek), faints in the toilet, and, correspondingly, the alteration 
of colour and the change of speed illustrate the potential of digital 
techniques and their capacity to (re)create (un)reality. Offering a subjective 
viewpoint, these scenes emphasize and transfer the feeling of confusion from 
the eyes of the character to the audience. Thus, and although budget 
limitations and equipment availability were factors in not pursuing a special 
effects heavy SF film, production circumstances have nevertheless inspired 
the use of creative resources in the expression of the story.  
Indeed, a variety of cinematographic techniques are employed to 
transform the spectator from a voyeur to an active participant; mirroring, in 
this way, the special effects of big budget productions such as The Matrix, 
Total Recall, Abre los Ojos and eXistenZ that are able to communicate a 
much more heightened sense of interaction and confusion. The use of the 
hand-held camera is significant in this process, as are the postproduction 
effects that replicate the immersion in virtual environments that is 
experimented by Victor. Here, the camera moves from a bush to the diegetic 
television screen and then stays immobile, absorbed by the flashing light, 
brusque movements and captivating sounds of the game. It then moves again 
to Victor eyes, in which we can see not only his intense immersion in the 
videogame, but, in a double reflexivity, we observe the camera, being a 
witness to everything. Therefore, Victor’s eye is the point of confluence of 
three dimensions: the diegetic world of the film, the virtual world of the 
game and our (un)reality, that is ‘denounced’ by the camera.  
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Dialogue is also a key tool in disconcerting and implicating the 
spectator in the film. Victor speaks to the camera, breaking the fourth wall 
between him and the spectator, connecting reality and fiction in a pertinent 
monologue in which he wants to explain his feelings and thoughts about the 
(un)reality he is living to those who are observing him. His words are the 
words of a diegetic character to his extra-diegetic audience, assuming 
therefore the existence of the camera as an observer and recognized filter; in 
Lacanian terms, identifying the existence of the camera its influence can 
resultantly be ignored. Indeed, the cinematic reality and the fiction of the 
film find each other in two images where the camera and the tripod are 
slightly visible: the reflection on the tap and in Victor’s pupils.  Nevertheless, 
and in spite of the importance of the sequence in which Victor speaks directly 
to the camera, it is feasible that Luna also works as a silent film: muting the 
volume, the film conserves its meaning and the story is not significantly 
affected. The movements of camera, the corporeal and facial expressions of 
the characters and the images speak for themselves. In this way the dialogue 
and soundtrack are simply additions, serving to enrich the meaning of the 
film. 
Symbolism has a remarkable relevance in Luna. The mirror as a 
reflection and reproduction of images is employed to show Victor in two 
specific moments, before and after the incident that changes his life, 
displaying two ‘different’ people. The mirror and constant reflections in 
different objects, function, in this way, as a simplistic, but nonetheless 
illustrative and useful metaphor of the reproduction of the image in digital 
media, the copy or the simulacrum. The mirror is also an important prop and 
feature of the mise-en-scéne in that it permits visual access to the story and 
characters in the scene in which Victor speaks from his room to Ania 
(Katarzyna Różańska), who is sitting in a different room. Here the simple 
positioning of the camera and a mirror allows the spectator to simultaneously 
perceive both actors and the existing distance between them. And there are 
other moments of symbolism which evoke the potential unreality of the 
events: thus, the creak of the door or an alarm clock that advances by three 
minutes, hints that we can be observers of a dreaming state.  
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Luna was filmed using three non professional actors and, in this 
respect, it was necessary that the character of Victor was interpreted by the 
researcher, me. Like Leonard Shelby (Guy Pearce) in Memento and Tyler 
Durden (Brad Pitt) in Fight Club (1999, Fincher), Victor is (un)consciously 
confused about the reality he is living. Yet, for Victor, it is not his mental 
health but technology which works to reinforce his desires. And so to be the 
person who is writing about the confusion and to simultaneously be confused 
in the diegetic world of the film is a very captivating paradox, and a perfect 
way to ‘close the circle’. Paradox and confusion thus impregnate both the 
thesis and the film. Luna is a film in which an unreality occurs inside a dream 
where the protagonist becomes immersed in virtuality. Four different levels 
or layers of reality – the (un)reality from which the film is filmed, the 
diegetic world of the film, dreams and the virtual world of the games – all 
meet in a short portion of time, reflecting in this way the plot of some of the 
most significant films examined in this research. That said, Luna exercises the 
capacity of cinema for suggestion and the absence of a definitive conclusion 
that produces a second paradox: the audience can feel confused about a film 
that is all about confusion, something that we can also observe in films such 
as The Matrix, eXistenZ, Total Recall and Abre los Ojos.  
Victor’s confusion is provoked by the disruption of his perfectly 
ordinary and satisfactory life with the introduction of a shock that changes 
everything. In this case, the incident that affects Luna opens a gap between 
Victor and his reality. Victor explains in a monologue how he is consciously 
adopting a position of total denial, submerging himself in a world of illusion 
where he is happier than facing the ‘ignorant bliss’ described by Cypher in 
The Matrix. Victor makes use of technology in his aspiration of abandoning 
reality after Luna’s incident: becoming immersed in videogames (instead of 
actual games, like football), Victor obtains satisfaction, living the experience 
of being someone else or simply not being himself in this world. In the virtual 
environment, Victor lives and enjoys life and this is reflected by the vividness 
in his use of the interface that contrasts with the passivity and boredom of 
the rest of his life. The reality that he has to walk is a transition, a 
‘punishment’, which he has to travel every day. Technology and the digital 
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world open a new door for escape to Victor through non-personal 
communications, e-mails and instant conversations. He confuses reality 
because, nowadays, when it is often the case that characters on screen are 
all we have to meet, communicate, identify and become intimate with, only 
the faith and confidence in receiving the true 0s and 1s makes possible such 
relations. Victor (un)consciously avoids questioning the information received 
from the screen and in consequence he becomes confused; for better or 
worse trusting in his own hopes and desires, in his own constructed 
(un)reality. 
Luna reveals that if we want to believe, we can believe, and if we 
prefer to admit an unreality we will find the necessary resources in 
technology to make (un)real our mental representations. As Sherry Turkle 
suggests illustratively, if ironically: ‘On the Internet nobody knows you are a 
dog’ (1997: 263). The film culminates by raising the question of a dream 
state, something that is directly linked to the moment in which Victor wakes 
up and then contemplates his face at the mirror in the bathroom, moments 
before Luna faints. He looks at himself trying to find out if he is awake, and, 
trying to certify his feeling, he touches his face and rubs his eyes, but nothing 
seems to offer definitive proof to differentiate his dreams from reality. The 
film creates a duality in that moment, urging the audience to question 
whether the following scenes can be interpreted as reality or part of his 
dreams. 
Luna is a project that translates the abstract notions investigated by 
this thesis into a practical and familiar context. Placing these concepts within 
such a framework they arguably become ‘alive’: they can be interpreted and 
analyzed in order to question the hypothesis that the confusion of reality and 
unreality is a phenomenon that has recently acquired new and peculiar 
characteristics. In this respect, the film responds affirmatively, 
demonstrating, by way of an ‘ordinary’ and tangible experience, the causes, 
morphology and consequences of such confusion.  
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Conclusions 
 
The history of western thought has always been linked with the 
confusion between reality and unreality. The nature and morphology of such 
disorientation is diverse; and a sign of its importance and complexity is that 
figures as diverse as Plato, Descartes, Hume, Baudrillard, Geoff King, Žižek, 
Allen, Godard, Cronenberg and Lynch have each dedicated part of, or their 
entire, production to the contemplation and analysis of this phenomenon. 
Today, the peculiarity of the confusion between reality and unreality is 
wholly and inevitably linked with the rapid development of technology. The 
configuration of our future will depend upon our ability to understand the 
present and our capacity to react to and defend ourselves from potential 
threats. If we do not want to make true the worst forecasts about our future, 
we need to anticipate the consequences, identify and find solutions for them. 
Our future depends on us, on our decisions, today. The notion of 
‘potentiality’ is indeed recurrent in this research because the technological, 
social and historical processes that it describes are incomplete and their 
consequences are certainly predicted but remain uncertain. 
In western societies we are currently living in a constantly changing 
environment in which technology has affected the majority of the contexts of 
our personal and professional lives. We live in houses surrounded by 
technological devices; our work is often influenced by technology; we use 
transport that is managed by technology; and, most crucially for this project, 
our leisure time is very often employed in finding satisfaction through 
technology. Therefore, the different levels of ignorance that we manifest 
about how and why these technologies operate means that, nowadays, we do 
not know ourselves and, more importantly, we exhibit a tangible paralysis 
when it comes to actually analyzing, understanding and knowing the future 
perspectives of our society. Our perception of the world is also being 
radically transformed. Many of our daily perceptions and communications are 
compositions of 0s and 1s, hence our interpretation of reality is 
technologically mediated and altered: we are observers of a world of 
representations. The reality that we perceive today does not only consist of 
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atoms, but also of bits, a binary source that facilitates the alteration, 
combination, elimination and construction of new (un)realities of an abstract 
nature. To be deceived is not a particularly atypical feeling in western 
societies: our reality has been extended to the ‘unlimited’ hyperspace, and 
although this change implies certain problems and potential dangers we can 
be positive and not necessarily afraid of the creation of new dimensions.  
The appearance of digital imagery (and sound, of course, though this is 
not a concern of this thesis) has unequivocally affected the medium of 
cinema, facilitating the manipulation of the image, and even the possibility 
of creating an image with no source in reality. Today, the simulation of 
reality in films has acquired new levels of credibility: we have achieved a 
technological status in which it is possible not only to represent with 
unparalleled accuracy reality, but also to ‘create’ it. These days, special 
effects are chiefly at the service of recreating reality; and these artificial 
simulacrums of reality produce, simultaneously, a fascination and confusion 
in spectators. The audience have to decide what they believe and what they 
do not. The answer to the question ‘is that thing I am watching real?’ is not 
only ‘on the screens’, but also lies within each spectator.  
More than ever before, the future evolution of cinema is dependant on 
the development of technology. New technological and digital imagery is 
continually being discovered and investigated, and the concept of interactive 
and personalized films, in which every spectator will have their individual 
film ‘built’ as to his requirements, is no longer science fiction. Therefore, if 
we wish to explore the future of cinema we should look to the videogames 
industries and the possibility of accessing virtual/alternative worlds where 
responsibilities are reduced to a minimum, boredom is eliminated and 
satisfaction maximized. In other words, cinema will provide the highest 
experience of ‘personalized otherness’ during a time of leisure which defines 
our society. Indeed, our entertainment frequently consists of being someone 
else or being ourselves in different contexts and conditions. This is a clear 
sign that we are discontented with what we have around us. 
In a parallel phenomenon, digital technologies have opened up the co-
production of cinema to the audience. The accessibility of the medium, 
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where the necessary devices are affordable, and production and 
postproduction processes are accomplishable for a large portion of the 
population and not just professionals, has the potential to provoke, in the 
short term, the ‘democratization’ of cinema. In fact, the quality of the image 
is not necessarily impoverished by a low budget film, but the technological 
creation of (un)reality may well be. Thus, although the economic and 
ideological influence of the film industry is still crucial in our understanding 
of the world through films, today we are in a position to affirm that cinema is 
not such a medium of privilege; it is (almost) accessible to anyone who wishes 
to transmit ideas.  
Mass media, like cinema, has been deeply influenced by the 
development of technology, and, simultaneously, have contributed to the 
confusion between reality and unreality. The appearance of digital media and 
new ways of communication such as the Internet has provoked new means of 
reaching audiences and the possibility of efficiently manipulating the message 
with ‘credibility’. This is metaphorically illustrated in The Matrix which 
achieves, in Morpheus’ words, a ‘world that is pulled over your eyes to blind 
you from the truth’. The truth of being, allegorically speaking, a ‘slave’ in 
total control is realized. Mass media does not only take advantage of the 
technological evolution but also of its social repercussions and our ‘naïve’ 
understanding of such phenomena. Furthermore, it is essential to preserve a 
certain grade of diversity of thought. Our society has always evolved thanks 
to the confrontation of different perspectives, but the recent tendency to 
‘unify’ society through technological media which are able to reach the 
majority of the population can imply a cultural failure. We should respect and 
maintain alternative attitudes and behaviours if we want to avoid the 
possibility of becoming simple cogs in a machine in which our function will be 
to do and consume what ‘we are being told’. 
The future of our society depends on how we deal with technological 
progress and the new forms of (un)reality. If we are able to have control over 
the evolution and development of technology and have dominion over virtual 
spaces we will succeed in the most important ‘battle’. This is indeed the 
battle that humanity loses in films such as The Matrix and The Terminator 
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and that consequently threatens human existence. We should be prepared to 
face the moment in which technology will have consciousness and will try to 
gain independence and subsequently domination. Hence, we must be 
constantly aware that technology is destined to fulfill our necessities, 
facilitate our lives and provide satisfaction for humanity. Indeed, we need to 
remain ‘independent’ from technology and from those who produce and 
communicate information, and not be totally influenced by it.  
Today, information, access to it and the means to disseminate it, is the 
key to economic and political power. Mass media does not only transmit 
information; it produces knowledge and creates habits that are translated 
into what, how, when, where and why we consume. Individuals in 
contemporary societies are the last link in the consumerist chain. It is 
possible to argue that we are not defenseless, that the plurality of 
information that brought new means of communications provides a freedom 
of choice that did not exist before. Yet, while retaining a certain degree of 
truth, this argument also implies the potential danger of being adrift in the 
‘sea of signs’ that is produced, the Hyperreality that Baudrillard speaks of.  
Hence, under the double threat of being manipulated and/or lost by 
the multiplicity of information, we need to use filters, mechanisms in the 
perception and understanding of the information that facilitates the 
discrimination of what we believe. In other words, these tools of cognition 
aim to protect ourselves from being manipulated and confused and the 
solution is the discrimination of the different layers of (un)reality to ensure 
we are not totally lost. The constant and Cartesian doubt can be a useful and 
definitive tool, but the idea of not believing in anything can also produce a 
schizophrenia which will prevent us from developing our lives. Thus, the path 
we should follow, if we do not want to be lost within the confusion of reality 
and unreality, requires a constant and fluid questioning tinged with 
skepticism in which the examination will not eliminate or block the value and 
nature of our perceptions. It is important to be conscious of the confusion of 
reality and unreality and the concepts that are formed and deformed in the 
process. Nevertheless, understanding the disorientation of reality and 
unreality does not imply a rejection of everything that is not real. On the 
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contrary it can be applied to take advantage of the situation and construct a 
satisfactory environment where we can fulfill our needs, still being aware 
that we are ‘partially residing’ in a virtual context. We live in a kind of 
multiple reality where reality and unreality can potentially coexist and 
coincide in time and space. The idea of ‘this is or this is not real’ should be 
replaced by ‘this has a certain grade of reality’. The alternative to this, 
either the passive acceptance or the complete denial of the information we 
receive, is equivalent to the formation of a multiplicity of personalities that 
will depend on the source (and reality) of the information and the resultant 
confusion.  
In this way, the ‘prolongation’ of reality through virtuality will not 
necessarily impoverish or remove reality, but can potentially enrich reality. 
We have to comprehend that reality is constantly changing, and the future 
conceptions of reality will inevitably be different as they will likely 
incorporate what we understand today as unreal or virtual dimensions. 
Indeed, the virtual spaces created by technology ensure that economic, 
social, ethnic and gender factors do not have the same influence in the 
interrelations that occur in these territories where equality and freedom of 
expression acquire new meaning. We simply need to learn how to use the 
capacities that virtuality offers, and prevent, through knowledge and 
understanding, the potential dangers that they imply. Once we are aware of 
what technology ‘means’ and how it can influence our lives, we will be 
prepared to discover, inhabit and return from these domains.  
We have to adapt our social and cultural knowledge to the evolution of 
technology if we do not want to be immersed in social and psychological 
dysfunctions and be ignorant about of our creations. Consequently, we should 
break the social duality of reality and unreality and reconcile both concepts. 
The static and rigorous description of these notions does not only imply 
difficulties but simultaneously suggests a strategic error. Reality and 
unreality are fluid, changing and dynamic concepts and their status requires a 
redefinition and the creation of new concepts. In this sense, (un)reality could 
be a solution to denominate all the ambiguous spaces created between both 
spheres. (Un)reality means the fusion, and simultaneously the assumption, of 
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a contradiction; (un)reality is the perfect way to define the creation of 
spaces, elements and identities that share characteristics of both. Indeed, 
the use of brackets in this thesis is fundamental to express terms that are 
synthesized, reconciling the opposition of the previous concepts. Thus, the 
ambiguity of language is being used to express the openness of the concepts 
treated in this research. In this sense, mass media, the Internet, virtual 
games and cinema will not simply be considered as ‘not real’, but as 
elements that contain a different grade of (un)reality and that, further, have 
the capacity to be subsequently segmented within the (un)realities of a 
particular web site, Virtual Reality environment, videogame or film. 
The primary use of cinema in this research is not arbitrary. The role of 
cinema in this investigation is indeed essential to examine the ‘intangible’ 
aspects of the confusion of reality and unreality, everything that the abstract 
abilities of the image can explain without ‘confessing it’, such as the hopes 
and fears held by society. In fact, cinema captures and reproduces our 
society, culture, ideology, fears and hopes and simultaneously it produces 
knowledge with the transmission of certain ideas. The relationship between 
cinema and technology is double and paradoxical: cinema necessarily employs 
technology and at the same time it denounces, with its plots, our current 
situation in relation to technology. Thus, the subjectivity of cinema, its 
active implication in the topic researched here, renders it particularly 
relevant for the investigation as it offers a diegetic perspective of this 
problematic. In this way, films such as The Matrix, eXistenZ, Total Recall, 
Abre los Ojos, The Lawnmower Man and Dark City are most useful examples 
as they are witnesses, symptoms, causes and consequences of the confusion 
of reality and unreality produced by technology.  
The Matrix, a film whose recurrence throughout this thesis denotes its 
usefulness in these discussions, is a most pertinent illustration of the human 
reaction to the simulation of the world, where the reproduction of the world 
has the potential to be more satisfactory than the real world. The character 
of Cypher, then, is the best illustration of this. However, what we see in The 
Matrix is that the majority of the characters ‘choose to know’, following, in 
this way, the Platonic allegory of the cave that indicates that happiness and 
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freedom come from the knowledge of reality; in this sense when the 
characters are able to discern the dimension that they inhabit. Perhaps the 
duality blue/red pill, knowledge of reality or illusion, will not be the election 
of the future of our society, but conversely something more intermediate and 
with a temporal effect: the idea of being immersed in virtuality, taking it as 
real, but knowing that there are ‘doors’ opened to return to our reality. The 
fears start when we cannot open these doors, when we lose the 
determination to decide when to open the doors, or when we are not sure 
when we have left virtuality. 
We have to understand the confusion of reality and unreality in social 
and psychological terms. This confusion is in our society: it has social 
repercussions, but it also manifests different intensities for each individual in 
different contexts and times. The disorientation in our perception of reality 
varies depending not only on personal, contextual, perceptual, educational 
and identity factors, but also in respect to how we perceive and understand 
contact with virtuality. Thus, the range of our communion with virtuality can 
vary from an occasional visit to the (un)real world to an ‘inhabitation’ of this 
space which can affect us to a lesser or greater degree. However, 
independently of how our relationship with virtuality operates, it is important 
to be aware of the existence of a virtual dimension and the confusion that it 
provokes. 
In conclusion, the destiny of our society depends upon a (re)definition 
of reality and unreality, and also upon a social and cultural understanding of 
the new spaces created by technology and the social consequences that they 
produce. This research seeks to provide a guide to understand the relation of 
reality and unreality, the new conceptualization derived from the 
transformation of this relation and how our perception of the world is being 
modified at a time when technology is influencing every aspect of western 
society. Therefore, it is essential to comprehend the effects of technology to 
be able to understand ourselves, individually and as a society. Hence, using 
the ability of cinema to examine our society from a subjective and abstract 
perspective, Luna ‘generalizes’ a particular disorientation of reality and 
unreality in which technology plays a crucial role. Luna, like films such as The 
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Matrix, Total Recall and eXistenZ help us to be aware of the dangers and 
potential confusions that can affect our minds. These films will certainly help 
us to interpret the world and our (un)reality; however, knowing the risks does 
not make us immune to the threats. 
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Opening credits. 
 
SCENE 1. INT. NIGHT. VICTOR´S ROOM. 
 
Victor and Luna lie in bed. Victor is in his thirties and 
Luna in her late twenties. We can see them from the foot 
of the bed. The room is in half-light. The desk lamp 
beside the bed is on and illuminates their faces. They 
speak very low, almost whispering. 
 
VICTOR: 
 
Entonces ¿compramos mañana los 
billetes para Barcelona? 
 
LUNA: 
 
Creo que si, podríamos comprarlos. 
Esperar más es tontería, más 
baratos no van a ser en el futuro. 
 
VICTOR: 
 
Cojonudo. Empezaré a descontar los 
días. Mañana avisare a Juanjo ¿Nos 
quedaremos en su casa? 
 
Luna opens her eyes in an expression of surprise and 
disagreement. 
 
LUNA: 
 
¡Estarás de coña! Mi madre me 
mataría si no nos quedamos con 
ellos. Además, a Juanjo le podrás 
ver todos los días. 
   
VICTOR: 
 
Tiene su sentido, pero acojona. 
 
LUNA: 
 
¿El qué te acojona ahora, mis 
padres? 
 
VICTOR: 
 
No, vivir con ellos. 
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LUNA: 
 
No digas tonterías cariño, son 
sólo cuatro días. 
 
VICTOR: 
  
Joder ¿solo cuatro días? Le acabas 
de quitar parte del encanto… ¿nos 
dará tiempo a ir a la playa? 
 
LUNA: 
 
Podrás ir todos los días, si es lo 
que quieres. 
 
VICTOR: 
 
Uhuuuum… ya estoy saboreando la 
jarra de cerveza del chiringuito… 
 
LUNA: 
 
Que tonto eres, aun queda un 
mundo. 
 
VICTOR: 
 
O dos… 
 
LUNA: 
 
Pues venga, tu a tu mundo y yo al 
mío. Apaga la luz y a dormir, que 
aquí algunos tenemos que trabajar 
mañana. 
 
Victor turns to the left and switches off the light. It 
is dark now and we can just make out shadows and 
contours. 
 
VICTOR: 
 
¿Luna? 
 
LUNA: 
 
¿Uhm? 
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VICTOR: 
 
Que duermas bien. 
 
LUNA: 
 
Buenas noches cariño 
 
We can hear a good night kiss. 
 
 
 FADE OUT  
 TO BLACK:  
 
SCENE 2. INT. NIGHT. VICTOR´S ROOM 
 
In the darkness of the room we see the LED red light of 
the alarm clock. The time is 5.05. With very dim light we 
can just make out the outline of Victor and Luna who are 
sleeping. After a couple of seconds Victor sits up and 
kisses Luna on her cheek, then he whispers. 
 
VICTOR: 
 
Voy al baño. 
 
LUNA: 
 
Espera, voy contigo. 
 
They both get up from different sides of the bed. Victor 
walks first and opens the door. It creaks with a loud 
noise. 
 
LUNA: 
 
Esta puerta me va a matar. 
 
They walk down the corridor and both look to the right 
hand side where there is a door wide open. The interior is 
dark, someone is sleeping inside. When they reach the 
bathroom, Victor opens the door and pulls the cord to 
switch on the light. 
 
LUNA: 
 
Yo primera. 
 
Luna sits on the toilet with her elbows propped between 
her legs, her head holding her hands. Her eyes are wide 
shut. Victor is standing, drinking from a glass of water. 
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Then he straightens up and he looks to the mirror, 
touching his face with his fingers for a few seconds, as if 
checking if he is totally awake. When Luna finishes she 
looks at Victor with scared eyes. 
 
         LUNA: 
   
No me encuentro bien. 
 
She attempts to stand up, but she faints. Victor tries to 
hold her but she falls to the left side and Victor just 
manages to put his arms around her before she reaches the 
floor. 
 
VICTOR: 
 
Luna ¿Que te pasa? 
 
Luna is on the floor and Victor is kneeling when she 
starts to have convulsions. She is very pale and she opens 
her eyes but she is definitely unconscious. Her pupils are 
very dilated. 
 
   VICTOR: 
 
¡oye, despierta! 
¡Luna!  
¡Luna! 
¡Luna! 
¡Abre los ojos! 
 
Victor touches her face, trying to wake her up. After 15 
seconds she comes back to consciousness. She looks 
confused. 
 
LUNA: 
 
¿Qué ha pasado? 
 
VICTOR: 
 
Te has desmayado ¿te encuentras 
bien? 
 
LUNA: 
 
No demasiado. Me encuentro rara. 
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VICTOR: 
 
Luna ¿has tenido alguna vez 
ataques epilépticos? 
 
LUNA: 
 
No digas tonterías cariño, te lo 
habría dicho ¿no crees? 
 
VICTOR: 
 
Si, supongo que si. Pero… 
 
LUNA: 
 
Ya vuelve otra vez… 
 
Luna has another episode of convulsions. She is in the 
same position and again her eyes are open and she has very 
pale skin. 
 
VICTOR: 
 
¡Luna! 
¡Luna!  
¡Luna! 
Venga, abre los ojos. Vamos 
cariño, que ya ha pasado todo. 
 
A few seconds after Luna’s eyes look different. She has 
recovered consciousness. She is again looking confused. 
  
LUNA: 
 
No entiendo nada ¿pero que me esta 
pasando? 
 
VICTOR: 
 
No tengo ni idea ¿Qué es lo que 
sientes? 
 
LUNA: 
 
Es como una cosa fria y oscura que 
se acerca hacia mi. La siento 
aproximarse, pero después todo se 
queda en blanco. 
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VICTOR: 
 
No te preocupes, ya ha pasado 
todo. 
 
LUNA: 
 
Victor, tengo miedo. 
 
VICTOR: 
 
Lo se, yo también. 
 
LUNA: 
  
Ya esta aquí…  
 
   
For the third time Luna suffers an episode of convulsions, 
with exactly the same effect as the last two. 
 
VICTOR: 
 
¡Luna! 
¡Luna! 
¡Luna! 
 
Somebody knocks the door and before Victor can say 
anything it is open. Ania is standing there. She is 
Polish, around twenty-five years old. She is in her 
pyjamas with a shocked expression on her face.  
 
ANIA: 
 
What is going on? 
 
FADE OUT: 
 
 
 
SCENE 3. EXT. SUN LIGHT. A BENCH IN THE PARK 
 
Victor is sitting on a bench in Roath Park. He is looking 
nowhere. After few seconds he starts to speak to the 
camera. 
 
VICTOR: 
 
No es que no pueda creerlo, 
simplemente se trata de que no 
quiero creerlo. Quizá podría hacer 
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un esfuerzo, pero dudo seriamente 
de que merezca la pena 
 
He looks to one side and he thinks for a few seconds. 
 
VICTOR: 
 
Siempre he estado interesado en 
conocer cuales son los beneficios 
de la realidad o los 
inconvenientes que implica la 
ficción, pero nadie ha sabido 
explicármelo de forma convincente. 
 
Victor looks again to one side, contemplating something or 
someone that we cannot see. 
 
   VICTOR: 
 
Supongo que algún día estaré 
preparado para mirar a la cara a 
la realidad, pero mientras tanto 
me siento más seguro y más cómodo 
en mi mundo. El de la negación 
total, el de la fantasía 
artificial. 
 
Victor looks to the ground. He takes some time before he 
continues. 
 
VICTOR: 
 
Nadie ha dicho que esto sea fácil. 
Siempre hay puertas y ventanas, 
finas fronteras que se abren a 
todo aquello que no quiero ver. Sé 
donde esta la realidad, pero ahora 
mismo no estoy interesado en 
visitarla. Solamente tengo que ser 
suficientemente listo para 
declinar esas invitaciones. 
 
Victor smiles sadly and pauses. His eyes look somewhere 
else for a few seconds before he returns to the camera. It 
is as if someone has asked him a question but we cannot 
hear anything. 
 
VICTOR: 
 
¿Si soy consciente de todo esto? 
He conseguido ser inconsciente de 
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mi propia consciencia. Al fin y al 
cabo, no es tan difícil hacer 
oídos sordos a la razón. Cuando mi 
mente aporta alguna argumentación 
que no me interesa yo lo niego o 
simplemente no la escucho. Es un 
proceso complicado y que conlleva 
cierto entrenamiento, pero he 
conseguido convertirme en un gran 
escéptico de mi mismo… 
 
Victor smiles. He laughs at himself and the words he has 
just pronounced. The camera moves and we see what Victor 
was observing before: a deserted park, where no one is 
playing or doing anything of any note. 
 
DISOLVE TO: 
 
 
SCENE 4. INT. DIM AND ARTIFICAL LIGTH. LIGHT OUTSIDE. 
LIVING-ROOM OF THE HOUSE. 
 
Victor is playing play-station sitting in the floor of the 
living room. He is not far from the television. Victor is 
absolutely immersed in the game he is playing. We can see 
him moving according to the movements of the game. He is 
living the virtual experience and is detached from the 
real world. Ania opens the door to his back and walks 
around him in the direction of the kitchen. She looks at 
him, observing what he is doing. 
 
ANIA: 
 
Hi Victor. What are you playing? 
 
Victor does not seem to realize that Ania is in the same 
room. He is absorbed in the game. Ania stands there for a 
few seconds waiting for an answer that is never given. 
Then she continues on her way to the kitchen and closes 
the door, but after a couple of seconds she opens the 
door, and sticks her head around it.  
 
ANIA: 
 
Tea or coffee? 
 
 
Ania waits patiently for a few seconds. She does not 
receive any answer. She reflects understanding in her face 
and then she closes the door. We just see Victor’s face 
and hear the sounds of the videogame coming from the TV. 
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Victor’s face demonstrates his distraction in the virtual 
world of the game. 
 
FADE OUT TO 
WHITE: 
 
 
FADE IN FROM WHITE: 
 
 
SCENE 5. EXT. DAY. TEWKSBURY STREET. 
 
Soundtrack music is all we hear. There is a view of the 
street, a long street and in the distance we can see 
Victor walking slowly. As he approaches the camera we can 
see that he has been playing football. He is still wearing 
the football kit, the boots are hanging around his neck 
and his shin pads are in one of his hands. His legs are 
covered in mud, as if he has been playing an energetic 
match. But as he approaches and it become possible to 
distinguish his face, we see that he looks sad and 
distracted in his thoughts. He constantly looks to the 
ground.   
CUT TO: 
 
 
SCENE 6. INT. HALLWAY OF VICTOR´S HOUSE.  
 
From upstairs we can see Victor opening the door and 
slowly making his way upstairs. He looks tired. He turns 
left into the bathroom and cleans the mud of his face with 
both hands. While he is washing, he lifts his head up to 
look in the mirror. The water is running constantly. He 
contemplates his reflection in the mirror for a few 
seconds. It is the same mirror he was examining himself in 
a few nights before. He smiles very sadly and he turns off 
the water. He then walks the corridor to his room. Ania’s 
door is open and she is sitting inside, in front of the 
computer. End of soundtrack with a fade out. 
 
VICTOR: 
 
Hi 
 
Ania speaks from her room. We cannot see her. We can just 
see Victor who collapses onto his bed, apparently devoid 
of any energy. 
 
ANIA: 
 
How was the match? 
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Victor throws his boots to the floor with no interest. 
 
VICTOR: 
 
Good. 
 
Victor takes off one of his socks. 
 
ANIA: 
 
Did you win? 
 
VICTOR: 
 
Yeah 
 
Victor takes off the second sock. 
 
ANIA: 
 
Did you score any goals? 
 
VICTOR: 
 
Yes, a lucky one… 
 
Victor smiles. He then stands up and steps towards the 
door. He is about to close the door, but as he goes to 
shut it he realizes that the door is not making any noise. 
He closes and opens the door a couple of times and after a 
few seconds he makes a face of surprise and he leaves it 
open. 
 
Victor turns and walks across his room in the direction of 
his computer which is on the desk, on the other side of 
the room. He turns his computer on and he looks out the 
window. The moon is there, a pale moon, because the sky is 
not completely dark. He notices a picture of Luna that is 
in the windowsill. It is a black and white picture and 
Victor remains absorbed in the image until his computer 
makes a noise indicating that it is ready to be used. 
 
Victor sits in front of the computer and he checks his 
mails. His face changes drastically. We can see the screen 
that shows a recent mail from Luna. His hand is trembling 
but he manages to do a double click. The mail simply says: 
‘Hello, how are you? I am doing ok, but I miss you a lot. 
Kisses, Luna’. We can see his face. Victor is absolutely 
amazed. He is frozen, with his right hand on the mouse and 
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the left one on the desk. His eyes are lost inside the 
screen and he repeatedly reads the mail. 
 
A beep coming from the computer reactivates him. He then 
realizes that it is Luna who is speaking to him using 
messenger. She starts an unremarkable conversation: ‘How 
are you?’ ‘What are you doing?’ ‘Where have you been?’ 
Victor reads all these questions before he can move his 
hand to the keyboard and ask her: ‘How is that possible?’ 
‘How can you be online?’ ‘Where are you?’ ‘Where are you?’ 
‘Where are you?’ But she is not responding to any of these 
questions. Victor waits impatiently for a few seconds but 
when it is obvious that she is not typing anything else 
Victor jumps from his chair and makes his way out of the 
room, starting to speak before he reaches Ania´s room.  
 
VICTOR: 
 
Ania! Ania! You won’t believe what 
is happening! 
 
Ania does not reply. But Victor enters her room very 
excitedly and he continues talking. 
 
VICTOR: 
 
Luna… Luna is there! Well, she is 
not there but she is, was, 
speaking to me in messenger. 
 
Ania looks to Victor with a half smile and a compassionate 
face, but she does not say a word. 
 
VICTOR: 
 
This time… This time it is true. 
It is not happening in my mind. 
She e-mailed me and she was just 
speaking to me in messenger. I 
told you! I told you! I… 
 
Victor looks to the screen of her computer. We can see it 
as well. 
 
VICTOR: 
 
…am an idiot. 
  
On the screen we can see a window of messenger open and 
flashing. It is a conversation with Victor. Victor’s face 
looks sad and disappointed. 
 - 142 -
 
VICTOR: 
 
Wh… why? I mean… Why? 
 
 
ANIA: 
 
I am sorry, Victor. I didn’t want to 
disappoint you or play with you. It is 
just… 
 
Ania thinks for a moment. 
 
ANIA: 
 
You were so far from this world that I 
thought I could help you in yours. I 
thought that at least you would be 
happy. Real or not, I had the 
impression that anything will be 
better than the sadness I can see 
everyday. But I was obviously wrong… 
 
VICTOR: 
 
But… 
 
Victor looks as if he is going to complain, but 
he stops and moves his head, nodding. 
 
VICTOR: 
 
Just tell me. How did you manage to be 
her? 
 
Ania smiles and then speaks with tenderness. 
 
ANIA: 
 
How can you forget that? You gave me 
Luna’s computer a few days ago. So 
when I turned on the computer her mail 
and her profile were there, in front 
of me. 
 
Victor listens to her moving his face. 
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ANIA: 
 
When I spoke to you in English I 
thought you were going to realize that 
I was not Luna, but you simply didn’t 
want to see it. You didn’t question 
anything. You were eager to believe 
and be involved in this fiction. 
 
VICTOR. 
 
I see… 
 
Victor turns and starts to walk. 
 
ANIA: 
 
Victor. 
 
VICTOR: 
 
Yes. 
 
ANIA: 
 
I am sorry. 
 
VICTOR: 
 
No… No… Thanks… 
 
Victor slowly leaves Ania’s room and enters his room. He 
stops in the middle of the room for a moment, confused, 
not knowing what to do. Then he approaches his computer, 
sits at the desk, stretches his fingers and starts to 
write in the window of Luna’s instant conversation. We can 
see his face behind the computer. He happily smiles. 
 
 FADE OUT: 
 
 
FADE IN: 
 
SCENE 7. INT. NIGHT. VICTOR´S ROOM. 
 
We see the same alarm clock of the beginning of the film. 
The time is 5.09. Very slow fade out, like the eyes of 
someone falling sleep. 
 
Credits. 
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